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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THE DEMOCRACY OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
The intention of campaign finance regulations was to reduce the influence of 
special interest groups while increasing citizen contributions.  Critics have suggested an 
unintentional consequence of this policy of increasing bias in campaign contributions in 
favor of incumbents.  These claims of intentional and unintentional consequences, 
however, have rarely been tested.  My dissertation examines the intentional and 
unintentional consequences of campaign finance regulations in the American states.   
This study adopts a theoretical framework emphasizing the different effects of 
regulations on two distinctive types of contributors.  A particularistic contributor, whose 
motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits.  A 
universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her favorite candidates, is not 
likely to respond to regulations.  Furthermore,   the disparity of contributions is not 
expected to be affected by contribution limits. Two specific hypotheses reflecting the 
theoretical consideration are tested:  1) Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number 
and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity between the 
numbers as well as the amounts of contributions, and   2) Contribution limits do not 
affect the number, the amount, or the disparities of universalistic contributions. 
Individual contribution records on gubernatorial elections are collected from 1990 
to 2000 in 42 states.  After aggregating individual contribution records by state and 
candidate, two analyses are conducted at the state and candidate level.  
The results indicate that campaign finance regulations work without the 
unintentional consequence of providing a financial advantage to incumbents at both the 
state and candidate levels.  Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, 
reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions, and increase the number 
of universalistic contributors.  In addition, further analyses show a dynamic effect of 
contribution limits on corporations, labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideology 
PACs. Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of corporate 
contributions, but only reduce the amount of labor union contributions.  On the other 
hand, strict contribution limits encourage individual contributions, but discourage party 
and ideological PAC contributions.  The intentional consequence of campaign finance 
regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of increasing bias in favor of 
incumbents.  These findings suggest that current regulations that limit campaign 
contributions should remain in place. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
American democracy refers to rule by the people, exercised indirectly by 
representatives elected by the people in the United States of America.  Democracy resides 
in popular sovereignty, political equality and political liberty (Greenberg and Page 2002).  
Popular sovereignty means the source of power resides in the people; in the American 
case it presupposes the participation of citizens.  Political equality means everyone is 
treated as equal when voting.  Finally, political liberty depends upon a guarantee of 
freedom of speech, as in the First Amendment. 
In an attempt to enhance and protect these principles in the electoral arena, 
government reform efforts have often been directed at the campaign finance system 
(Corrado 1997b).  For example, to achieve political equality and/or prevent unequal 
influence, in 1907 the Tillman Act was enacted to prevent banks from influencing federal 
candidates by barring campaign contributions by banks.  The Federal Corrupt Practices 
Act was passed in 1925 to require the disclosure of contributions; it also imposed 
spending limits for congressional candidates.  The Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendment (FECA) of 1974 (Public Law 93-443) put an unprecedented ceiling on 
campaign contributions.   
To enhance popular sovereignty, diverse measures were undertaken  to encourage 
citizens’ participation (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Malbin and Gais 1998).  For 
example, the FECA of 1974 imposed contribution limits aimed at promoting political 
participation and to assure the substantial equality of influence in elections and policy 
outcomes.  Finally, freedom of speech was a basic issue in the Supreme Court’s decision 
of Buckley v. Valeo (1976), when it overruled the campaign spending limits of FECA.  In 
sum, the history of campaign finance is a history of attempts to protect the principles of 
democracy.  Campaign finance regulations have been instituted to try to prevent unequal 
influence in elections, facilitate voters’ participation, and encourage potential candidates 
to challenge incumbents.   
The intrinsic question is: do they really work?  Do contribution limits discourage 
special interest groups from contributing?  Do they make more citizens participate in 
elections through political contributions?  And, do they increase the disparity of 
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contributions and thus scare off potential challengers?  These questions still remain 
arguments to be tested, as explicitly articulated in the decision of Buckley v. Valeo.1   
Since the reforms in the 1970s, students of campaign finance have predominantly 
focused their research on campaign spending (Abramowitz 1991; Ansolabehere and 
Gerber 1994; Glantz, Abramowitz and Burkart 1976; Goidel, Gross and Shields 1999; 
Goidel and Gross 1994; Green and Krasno 1988 and 1990; Jacobson 1978 and 1990; 
Kenny and McBurnett 1992; Levitt 1994; Shin et al. 2002).  Less research has focused on 
public financing (Goidel, Gross and Shields 1999; Goidel and Gross 1996; Gross, Goidel 
and Shields 2002; Malbin and Gais 1998; Welch 1974) and campaign contributions 
(Aranson and Hinich 1979; Gross, Goidel and Shields 2002; Hinich 1977; Hogan 2000; 
Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1974).  In particular, the effects of limits 
on campaign contributions have received little attention, even though important 
principles of democracy are at stake (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Gross, Goidel and 
Shields 2002; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001).2   
It is time to examine the arguments underlying campaign contribution regulations.  
Do campaign contribution limits significantly affect the number of contributors and the 
amount of contributions?  If so, do they affect those who try to influence policy related to 
their interests?  Or, do they affect those who attempt to influence the electoral outcome in 
general?  Do regulations increase the disparity between the numbers as well as the 
amounts contributed to an incumbent and a challenger?  If so, which disparity is affected 
by regulations?   
In order to answer these questions, two types of contributions, particularistic and 
universalistic contributions, along with total contributions need to be analyzed.  These 
two types of contributions are alleged to have different characteristics.  Particularistic 
contributors refer to those who supply campaign funds in exchange for anticipated favors.  
Universalistic contributors refer to those who supply campaign funds for a universalistic 
                                                 
1  . See Goidel, Gross, and Shields (1999) for a discussion of the difference between policy output 
(campaign finance regulations) and policy outcome (campaign finance practice). 
2 . Note that most of PAC contribution studies focus on the relationship between the actual contributions 
and the candidate attributes (Sorauf 1992) such as assignment, committee seniority and expertise 
(Romer and Snyder 1994), majority status (Cox and Magar 1999), and the characteristics of PAC 
contributions (Moscardelli, Haspel and Wike 1998).  For further reference, see chapter 2.   
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purpose, mostly helping their favorite candidates. 3   Therefore, I adopt a theoretical 
framework that emphasizes the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of 
contributors.  I examine the effects of contribution limits on the two types of contributors 
in a series of gubernatorial elections.  Gubernatorial elections are a better place to collect 
contribution data than state legislative elections and may not encounter the problem of 
inference of micro findings to macro analysis or vice versa (Achen and Shively 1995; 
Morton and Cameron 1992).4  Furthermore, a gubernatorial study helps increase the 
understanding of the governorship, which is understudied (Beyle 1999; Gross 1989).    
 
1. The Intentions of Campaign Finance Regulations 
Before the questions stated above are examined, it is useful to depict briefly the 
more recent history and purposes of campaign finance regulations.  The most 
comprehensive reform of the campaign finance system was adopted in the 1970s after the 
Watergate scandal.  The FECA created the Federal Election Commission to administer 
and enforce campaign finance regulations, enacted unprecedented limits on contributions 
and expenditures for national elections, and introduced public financing in presidential 
elections.  The Supreme Court, however, overruled spending limits while upholding 
contribution limits and voluntary public financing (Buckley v. Valeo).5  The Supreme 
Court ruled against expenditure limits because they violate freedom of speech.  The 
contribution limits, however, were upheld due to “no indication” of a violation of free 
speech.  
Given the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution 
restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented 
candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective 
advocacy. There is no indication, however, that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act 
would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political associations. 
The overall effect of the Act’s contribution ceilings is merely to require candidates and political 
committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would 
                                                 
3 . For more detail, see chapter 3.  
4 . Cross-level inference has been a hot potato since the 1950s (see King 1998).  One of examples for cross-
level inference is that the relationship between the foreign-born and literacy rate is different 
between at individual level and state level.  See Achen and Shiverly (1995) for a summary of 
cross-level inference problem and Voss (2000, chapter 6) for a summary of solutions.   
5 . See Corrado (1997a) for a document.   
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otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct 
political expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially [italic 
added]. ... Appellees argue that the Act’s restrictions on large campaign contributions are 
justified by three governmental interests. According to the parties and amici, the primary interest 
served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large 
financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office. Two 
“ancillary” interests underlying the Act are also allegedly furthered by the $1,000 limits on 
contributions. First, the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the 
election process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome 
of elections. Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some extent act as a brake on the 
skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political system more 
widely to candidates without access to sources of large amounts of money.  (Buckley v. Valeo 
424 U.S. 1 (1976) from Corrado 1997a, pp. 68 - 70).    
FECA and the Supreme Court decision cited above can be seen as attempts to reduce the 
impact of particularistic contributors on elections and solicit a greater number of 
universalistic contributors.  Although FECA and the Supreme Court were not in complete 
agreement (e.g., the FECA enacted contribution limits and spending limits but the 
Buckley v. Valeo overruled the latter and upheld the former), the decisions have a 
consistent idea - cultivating democracy, which has been the intent throughout the history 
of campaign finance regulations. 
Since campaign finance regulations at the national level have not been 
significantly changed from the 1970s, it is hard to analyze whether the intent of campaign 
finance regulations worked in practice.  However, the states, often referred to as 
“laboratories of democracy” in most American government textbooks, are a good place to 
test the regulations (Gross, Goidel and Shields 2002; Hogan 2000; Stratmann and 
Aparicio-Castillo 2001).  Differences existing across states in regulations guarantee 
sufficient variation for analyzing the effects of contribution limits on the frequency of 
contributors, the amount of contributions, and their disparities.6 
The institution to be studied is the governor.  Analyses are undertaken on two 
levels: state and candidate levels.  The state level analysis examines the relationship 
between contribution limits and the total of the contributions to all candidates as well as 
                                                 
6 . Campaign finance reforms in the American states are also rare events over time (Eom 2000).   
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the major party candidates in gubernatorial elections.  The candidate level analysis 
evaluates the relationship between contribution limits and contributions to the individual 
major party candidates.  The candidate level analysis should not only reinforce findings at 
the state level, but also enrich interpretation and provide more efficient estimates.  The 
dependent variables are the number, the amount and the disparities between incumbents 
and challengers in particularistic contributions, universalistic contributions, and total 
contributions 
 
2. The Approach  
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the likely effects and consequences 
of regulations that were intended to improve democracy.   Furthermore, the dissertation 
focuses on the impact of contribution limitations on the disparity between the numbers as 
well as the amounts contributed to incumbents and challengers.  In Chapter Two, I 
outline the existing studies on political contributions and limitations on contributions.  
Most of the studies indicate that two distinctive types of contributors exist based on their 
motivations.  A particularistic contributor seeks to influence policy and thus contributes 
to a candidate with a higher probability of winning an election.  On the other hand, a 
universalistic contributor seeks to help his or her favorite candidate and thus is more 
likely to contribute to a candidate when a candidate needs money the most.   
In Chapter Three, I build a model to explain the behaviors of particularistic and 
universalistic contributors under the constraints of contribution regulations.  The model 
predicts that, under restrictive contribution limits, a particularistic contributor is less 
likely to donate.  In addition, contributions are expected to be of smaller amounts with 
the disparity in the number and amount of contributions between an incumbent and a 
challenger increasing.  On the other hand, a universalistic contributor is less likely to be 
affected by contribution limits.  Restrictive contribution limits do not bring a meaningful 
change in the number or amount of universalistic contributors.  Nor does it lead to a 
meaningful change in incumbent – challenger disparities.  The relationship between 
limits and total contributions is theoretically unclear because the relationship is the sum 
of two distinctive relationships; particularistic contributions are likely to be affected by 
limits, whereas universalistic contributions are not likely to be affected by limits.  Since 
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the relative weight of particularistic and universalistic contributions is unknown, I 
confine my examination to an empirical mapping.   
Chapter Four deals with the measurement of political contributions and 
contribution limits and suggests appropriate statistical models.  Although campaign 
contribution data are well known for inconsistent reporting schemes across states, the 
data from the National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) provides the 
characteristics of contributions across states in a consistent manner: individual, party, 
ideology/single issue, labor union, or corporation. 7   Based on previous literature, 
particularistic contributors are identified as corporations and labor unions while 
universalistic contributors are identified as individuals, parties, and ideology Political 
Action Committees (PACs).  Limitations on contributions are generated by those who are 
regulated.  The limitation on particularistic contributions is measured as a composite 
variable of limitations on corporations, labor unions and PACs.  The limitation on 
universalistic contributions is measured as a composite variable of limitations on 
individuals and parties.  The limitation on total contribution is the sum of limitations on 
particularistic and universalistic contributions. 
To test hypotheses developed in Chapter Three, statistical modes are introduced at 
the state and candidate levels and instrumental variable methods are utilized to estimate 
the models.  A statistically driven instrumental variable method using the two stage least 
squares method is employed for the state level analysis and a theoretically driven 
instrumental variable method is employed for the candidate level analysis.   
Chapter Five describes general trends in campaign contributions.  A number of 
findings are evident.  First, incumbent candidates raise larger numbers and amounts of 
contributions than challengers.  However, the fund raising of incumbents does not differ 
from that of challengers in close races which is measured by the vote share difference 
between the two major party candidates being less than or equal to 10%.  Second, 
challengers receive larger numbers and amounts of contributions in close races than in 
lopsided elections, whereas incumbents’ fund raising is not different between close and 
                                                 
7 . I thank the National Institute on Money in State Politics (http://www.followthemoney.org/) for allowing 
me to use their data.  I also thank the political science department at the University of Kentucky 
for a research grant to purchase the seed data from NIMSP, and the Horowitz Foundation for 
Social Policy and the University of Kentucky for helping me pursue data collection.  
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lopsided elections.  The election type – incumbent-running election and open seat 
elections – is not a factor in affecting the number and amount of contributions.  Finally, 
universalistic contributions are the major source of contributions in both incumbent-
running and open seat elections as well as for both of incumbents and challengers.   
 In Chapter Six, I analyze the effects of contribution limits on total, particularistic 
and universalistic contributions.  The analyses at the state and candidate level are 
undertaken on the number of contributors, the amount of contributions, and their 
disparities.   Empirical findings suggest that campaign finance regulations work, as 
suggested by their supporters, without the unintentional negative consequence of 
increasing disparities.  Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, 
reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the number of 
universalistic contributors.  The intentional consequence of campaign finance regulations 
is not accompanied by the feared unintentional consequence: increasing the bias for 
incumbents.  Limitations do not increase bias in contributions (numbers, amounts and 
average amount per contribution) for incumbents in total or in universalistic contributions.  
Rather, limitation decreases the bias for incumbents in particularistic contributions.   
In Chapter Seven, a series of analyses are undertaken examining corporations, 
labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideological PACs.  Further analyses illustrate a 
dynamic relationship between contribution limits and the sub-categories of particularistic 
contributions and the sub-categories of universalistic contributions.  Within particularistic 
contributions, corporate contributions are inclined to decrease in the number and amount 
of contributions to all and the major party candidates when restrictive contribution limits 
are enacted.  Labor union contributions tend to decrease in the amount, but not the 
number, of contributions to the major party candidates when regulations are tightened.  
Disparities in both the numbers and amounts contributed to incumbents and challengers 
are not related to contribution limits for either type of contributions.   
Within universalistic contributions, individual contributions are encouraged by 
restrictive contribution limits; states with tight limits tend to have a larger number and 
larger amount of contributions compared to states with loose limits.  However, this 
tendency is only statistically supported in the case of contributions to all candidates but 
not for the major party candidates.  The rest of universalistic contributions - party and 
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ideological PAC contributions - are related to contribution limits but in an opposite 
direction.  That is, the amount, but not number, of party and ideological PAC 
contributions tends to decrease for all and the major party candidates when tight 
contribution limits are enacted.  Neither disparities in number nor amount of 
contributions are related to contribution limits.   
In Chapter Eight, I summarize the findings and suggest the policy implications of 
this study.  In general, the findings in Chapters Six and Seven suggest that campaign 
finance regulations should continue the current pattern, because they are effective and do 
not have the major unintentional consequence of favoring incumbents over challengers. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The intention of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment (FECA) of 1974 
was to reduce the influence of special interest groups and to encourage citizen 
contributions.  Critics are often concerned with enforcement of the law; whenever 
regulations are enacted, contributors often find loopholes and try to acquire what they 
want (see Goidel, Gross and Shields 1999 for a journalistic view).  Furthermore, many 
students of campaign finance are concerned with a potential unintentional consequence of 
FECA: contribution limitations may exaggerate contribution bias that ultimately favors 
incumbents in elections (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Hinich 1977; Welch 1974 and 1980).   
Similar concerns are found in analyses of state campaign finance regulations.  
Gross, Shields and Goidel (2002) show that restrictive contribution limits result in more 
spending by incumbents and increased disparity in expenditures favoring incumbents in 
gubernatorial elections.  Malbin and Gais (1998) similarly argue that contributors are 
easily adapting their contribution strategy to the new regulations.  Further, they argue that 
those who already have large resources are more easily adaptable. Subsequently, 
regulations will have an unequal effect with the result being that groups that do not have 
many resources will be further disadvantaged.   
Why do contributors make donations? Existing literature shows two distinctive 
motivations for contributions: influencing policy and helping favorite candidates 
(Aranson and Hinich 1979; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; 
Hinich 1977; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990 and 
1993; Welch 1974 and 1980).  Those who try to influence policy related to their interests 
behave differently, under the same regulations, from those who attempt to help favorite 
candidates in a systematic manner (Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990 and 1993).   
Those who have influencing policy as their prime motivation are called 
“particularistic contributors” whose assumption is “certainty of returning favor” (Morton 
and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990 and 1993; Welch 1974 and 1980).   Particularistic 
contributors supply campaign funds in an effort to influence narrowly defined policy that 
provides a benefit for their business, assuming that the probability of winning an election 
is fixed.  Aranson and Hinich’s (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Hinich 1977) works on 
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particularistic contributions are the basis of further theoretical modeling:  agents in the 
game have a monotonically increasing but marginally diminishing function on a 
contribution (i.e., ∂f(mi) / ∂mi > 0 and ∂2f(mi) / ∂mi2 < 0), where f is a function and m is 
contribution.  In addition, in order to be sure of returning a favor, a particularistic 
contributor makes a decision on contributions primarily based on the winning probability.  
Since most incumbents have a higher winning probability, a particularistic contributor is 
more likely to allocate a big portion of his or her contributions to an incumbent at the 
expense of a challenger. 
A particularistic contributor has been further classified as either buying insurance 
or swaying legislation.  Aranson and Hinich (1979) and Hinich (1977) argue that donors 
make contributions because they want to “buy insurance.”   Hinich (1977) points out that 
since candidates, after winning, have a quasi-monopoly power over big contributors, “a 
winning candidate can punish an industry or a group.  The contributions may be viewed 
as an insurance investment which reduces the probability of enactment of a government 
policy which is extremely costly to the contributor” (p. 48).1   
The other motivation of particularistic contributions is “swaying legislation” 
(Austen-Smith 1995; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox 
and Magar 1999; Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000; Jones 1981; Morton and Cameron 
1992; Snyder 1990 and 1993; Stratmann 1998; Welch 1974 and 1980). 2    Contributors 
donate only on a quid pro quo basis and are interested only in private benefits to 
themselves. Snyder (1990 and 1993) finds that the total amount of particularistic 
contributions is equal to a candidate’s probability of winning in the House and Senate.  
That is, a donor decides to donate money when it is a sure-bet for a profitable return on 
his or her investment.   
Regardless of these sub-motivational assumptions (buying insurance or swaying 
legislation), the sure-bet assumption leads to the same conclusion regarding the effect of 
contribution limits: contributors generally make donations to those who have a higher 
winning probability - mostly incumbents - in order to be sure of returning favors 
regardless of whether favors are buying insurance or swaying legislation.  Thus, if the 
                                                 
1 . But see Morton and Cameron (1992) for a different view of monopoly power.   
2 . To simplify the argument, the assumption of influencing policy covers the access assumption.   
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amount of possible contributions is shrunk, due to contribution limits, contributors are 
more likely to allot the contracted amount to incumbents rather than challengers.  This 
argument leads to the proposition that strict contribution limits are more likely to 
augment bias in favor of incumbents.   
Testing an investment model, Box-Steffensmeier and Dow (1992 and see Dow 
1994) find evidence to support this argument; limitations lead to an increase in the 
number of total contributors, which usually goes to incumbents, and thus restrictions 
benefit incumbents and major parties.  However, the story they suggest is different: “if an 
interest group is prohibited from providing additional resources to candidates whom it 
would otherwise support, it will, in general, substitute part of the intended contribution 
from the most preferred recipients to others and reduce the size of the total budget 
allocated. ... However, given the extraordinary resources of major contributors, their 
optimal allocation across candidates in a regulated setting will likely result in a larger 
number of candidates receiving contributions than would otherwise be the case” (Box-
Steffensmeier and Dow 1992, p.613).   
Similar arguments and concerns are found in analyses of state campaign finance 
regulations.  In gubernatorial elections, Gross, Shields and Goidel (2002) point out that 
restrictive contribution limits result in more spending by incumbents, especially by 
Democratic Party candidates, but no difference in total spending or expenditures by 
challengers and Republican Party candidates.  A disparity in spending, operationalized as 
the absolute differences in partisan spending, increases where restrictive contribution 
limits are enacted.   
Malbin and Gais (1998) also argue that contribution limits do not accomplish their 
intentional purposes to reduce the influence of special interest groups.  Rather, limits 
generate an unequal effect; those who already have resources are easier to be amenable, 
while those who have small resources experience a hard time finding out how to adapt to 
a new system.  Furthermore, Malbin and Gais (1998) suggest that imposing any limit 
hinders challengers: “in all states, winning challengers spent substantially more than ones 
who received 40 to 45 of the vote.  However, they did not have to spend as much as 
incumbents to win [italic original].”  Because of the importance of campaign spending, 
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imposing regulations on challengers makes it more difficult to raise and spend funds 
needed to win elections.  
Testing McDevitt’s (1978) theory in the unregulated setting of 1984 and 1986 
California Assembly elections, Box-Steffensmeier and Dow (1992) suggest the 
unintended consequence of regulations: since contributors donate money to candidates as 
“investments,” imposing restrictions on contributions allocate resources from the most 
preferred candidate to the next preferred candidate, i.e., one incumbent in a state to the 
other incumbent in the other state.  Because of this ordering preference, restrictive 
contribution limits increase the number of contributors.  This theory and the findings 
supported by Box-Steffensmeier and Dow (1992) suggest that campaign finance 
regulations may benefit incumbents at the expense of challengers.   
In sum, existing research suggests that restrictions on campaign contributions 
collectively favor incumbents.  Hence, tight contribution limits are more likely to 
reinforce existing biases in contributions favoring incumbents without producing 
intentional consequence of reducing the influence of particularistic contributors. 
Studies of campaign finance, however, demonstrate the positive consequence of 
campaign finance regulations as were intended by FECA.  Hogan (2000) argues that 
contributions limits as well as public financing decrease incumbents’ spending level and, 
in turn, decrease the disparity in expenditures between incumbents and challengers.  
Based on an analysis of state legislatures after 1994, he finds that tight contribution limits 
are not related to challengers’ spending but reduce incumbents’ spending.  Furthermore, 
imposing restrictive contribution limits lessens the disparity of contributions to 
incumbents and challengers.  Taking into account the loopholes in the campaign finance 
systems, the influence of contribution limits is substantial while leveling the playing field 
of campaign spending.    
Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2001) also observe a positive effect for 
contribution limits.  Based on Lott’s theory (1987), restricting contributions implies that 
incumbents raise fewer funds, which, lead to less spending and less name recognition.  In 
the long run, incumbents’ relative advantage declines with restrictive limits.  In state 
house single member districts, Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2001) find that tight 
contribution limits diminish incumbents’ war chests and facilitate electoral competition, 
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and the effect becomes stronger in the next round. The effect, however, does not affect 
the outcome of the election (but see Gross, Goidel and Shields 2002).     
Compared to those of particularistic contributors, the theoretical foundations of 
universalistic contributors are not well established (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder 
2002).  Those who support candidates with desirable viewpoints are called “universalistic 
contributors.”  Universalistic contributors donate funds to affect the probability of 
winning elections given the fixed policy position of a candidate (Ansolabehere, 
Figueiredo and Snyder 2002; Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Morton and Cameron 
1992; Mutz 1995; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1984; Snyder 1990 and 1993; Welch 
1974 and 1980).   
As Snyder et al. observed (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder 2002; Snyder 
1990 and 1993), one of the common themes for universalistic contributors is that their 
contributions are “consumption”; “political giving must be a form of consumption not 
unlike giving to charities, such as the United Way or public radio” (Ansolabehere, 
Figueiredo and Snyder 2002, p.10).3  Therefore, a universalistic contributor “consumes” 
his or her money for their favorites.  In addition, Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell (2000) and 
Mutz (1995) point out that consuming is maximized in close races.  Mutz (1995, p.1019) 
finds that since universalistic contributions suffer from the “free rider problem,” 
universalistic contributors support their favorite candidates when candidates are 
threatened or losing ground.   Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell (2000) find that, when public 
opinion polls reported the 1989 New York mayoral primary election tightened, both 
candidates but especially the trailing candidates, received more contributions.   
Shields and Goidel (2000) find that income is a consistent variable to affect a 
contribution decision.  Based on American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1952 
to 1994, economic class bias is clear over the years.  Those in the high income levels 
typically contribute more than those in the lower levels.  This tendency is stable over time 
and little fluctuation is found in contributions in the lower classes.  Comparing eras 
before and after the campaign finance reforms in the early 1970s, they find little 
empirical evidence to suggest that campaign regulations increase political contributions.   
                                                 
3 . Also see Morton and Cameron (1992) for  a summary of universalistic contributors. 
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The major difference between a particularistic and a universalistic contributor is 
what the contributor expects in return for contributions.  A particularistic contributor 
expects narrowly defined favors such as a policy outcome.  He or she contributes to a 
candidate on a quid pro quo basis and the return is in private benefits to themselves 
(Snyder 1990).  Therefore, the share of particularistic contributions is equal to the 
probability of winning an election in the U.S. House and Senate elections (Snyder 1990 
and 1993).  As Morton and Cameron (1992) observed, however, since to donate 
universalistically is of insignificant value to an individual because of the nature of 
donation, viz., “public goods”, the utility of donating is not much different from non-
donating.   
The second difference comes from the assumptions on the probability of winning 
an election that particularistic and universalistic contributors make.  Particularistic 
contributors donate to candidates to affect favors while the probability of winning an 
election is fixed, whereas universalistic contributors donate to candidates to affect the 
probability with favors fixed.  “Affecting the probability” does not mean altering the 
candidate’s fortune per se, but helping contributors’ favorite candidates.  Fuchs, Adler 
and Mitchell (2000) find that “As his or her [candidate’s] probability of victory decreases, 
individuals with progressively smaller utilities for the candidate over his or her opponent 
become more likely to contribute ” (p.484).  That is, universalistic contributors are more 
likely to contribute when their favorite candidates are losing grounds and thus need 
money the most.   
On the other hand, particularistic contributors do not attempt to change electoral 
outcomes (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder 2002; Welch 1974 and 1980).  They 
donate money to candidates to receive favors in return.  In fact, the proportion of 
particularistic contributions is too small to change a candidate’s fortune even on the 
whole.  Welch (1980, p.102) reports that in 1974 no economic interest contributor gave 
more than two percent of the total amount spent in the U. S. House races.  This pattern 
holds for three other elections (1972, 1974, and 1976).  Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and 
Snyder (2002) also find that Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions, which are 
particularistic contributions, are a small part of total contributions in presidential and 
gubernatorial elections compared to that of individual contributions, which are 
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universalistic contributions.  At the margin, therefore, a particularistic contribution does 
not aim to alter a candidate’s electoral fate.   
In Chapter Three, based on Aranson and Hinich’s (Aranson and Hinich 1979; 
Hinich 1977) works, I construct a model to explain the behavior of particularistic 
contributor and extend this model to a universalistic contributor.  The models begin with 
a perfect market for campaign contributions – a simplified world.  I then develop models 
imposed on by one structural constraint – contribution limits.  I observe the effect of 
limitation on the behaviors of a particularistic and a universalistic contributor.  These 
models are tested using gubernatorial elections in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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Chapter 3: A Model of Campaign Contribution 
 
The agents of campaign finance contributions are a candidate, a candidate’s 
opponent and contributors.  Contributors can be further classified into particularistic and 
universalistic contributors based on their motivations (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Box-
Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Hinich 1977; Morton and 
Cameron 1992; Mutz 1995; Snyder 1990 and 1993; Welch 1974 and 1980).1  Whether 
and how much a donor wants to contribute depends on the solicitation of a candidate and 
a candidate’s opponent as well as on the expected contribution utility of a donor.  The 
behaviors of agents, however, are not free; their behaviors are constrained by structural 
components and one of them is campaign contribution limits.  This story can be 
represented in a graphical way as shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1. A Model of Campaign Contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 .  Some contributors can be defined as a social contributor, as in Bibby (1998, p.117) and Mutz (1995).  A 
social contributor donates to candidates just to participate in a fund-raising party or avoid social 
pressure.  In this study, I do not distinguish between a social and a universalistic contributor.  If 
the motivation of a social contributor is self-satisfaction from donating to his or her favorite 
candidates, it is not much differentiated from the motivation of a universalistic contributor.  
A contribution decision by 
a particularistic contributor and a universalistic contributor 
A candidate’s solicitation strategy An opponent’s solicitation strategy 
Contribution limits 
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In modeling a particularistic and a universalistic contributor, I construct a model 
assuming a perfect market in which no constraint exists.  I relax this assumption in the 
next step and observe the effect of contribution limits on their behaviors.   
 
1. Perfect Market of Campaign Contributions  
A model for a particularistic contributor is first constructed assuming a perfect 
market.  I extend this model to explain the behavior of a universalistic contributor. 
 
1.1. A Particularistic Contributor 
A particularistic contributor refers to one who supplies campaign funds in 
exchange for narrowly defined favors after winning an election, while the winning 
probability is assumed to be fixed.  It is similar to an economic interest or quid pro quo 
contributor (Welch 1974 and 1980), an investment contributor (Snyder 1990 and 1993), a 
service-induced contributor (Morton and Cameron 1992) or a hesitancy-based contributor 
(Mutz 1995).  As Snyder (1990 and 1993) observes, particularistic contributors include 
corporations, labor unions, and Political Action Committees (PACs).  
Aranson and Hinich’s seminal works (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Hinich 1977) 
provide a base for a particularistic contributor.  A particularistic contributor has a 
monotonically increasing utility function on the contribution (m) in return for the 
anticipated favors such as policy benefit: ∂f(m)/∂m > 0 where f is a quadratic function of 
contributions representing anticipated favors, and m is denoted as the amount of 
contributions.2   Second, the function has a diminishing marginal return on a contribution 
to a candidate, ∂2f(m)/ ∂m2 < 0.  This relationship reflects the non-linear relationship of 
contributions and favors; contributions driven from anticipated favors increase 
dramatically at the lower level, yet the expected returning favors get smaller in proportion 
                                                 
2 .  Assuming a quadratic utility function for a contributor is conventional in the rational choice approach 
(Aranson and Hinich 1979).  The quadratic function can be written as follows:  f(m) = m – αm2, 
where 0 < α < ½  and m > 0.  Aranson and Hinich (1979) assumes that f(m) = m – 0.5m2.  Since 
we do not know the parameter for the second order of m, I do not specify the parameter as a fixed 
number.  The restriction of α is 0 < α < ½.  In order to prevent negative expected utility, the α 
should be less than ½. And, because contribution (m) should be more than zero, α is more than 
zero.  The intercept is dropped in the function suggesting non-contribution does not bring any 
return.  The maximization point is m =
α2
1 .  
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to the amount of contribution.  Beyond a certain point (∂f(m)/∂m = 0), therefore, it is 
irrational for a donor to contribute to candidates, because donations would not bring 
additional benefit.   
PC = f(m) 1) 
where PC is a particularistic contribution with ∂f(m)/∂m > 0 and ∂2f(m)/ ∂m2 < 0. 
Some guidelines on particularistic contributions are drawn from them.  A 
particularistic contributor does not contribute more than the utility maximum point 
(∂f(m)/ ∂m = 0), and thus it becomes the upper limit of contribution decision (mU).  In 
addition, since he or she attempts to change the stand of a candidate in return for 
contributions, a particularistic contributor will not contribute if a contribution is so small 
that it does not affect the policy position of a candidate.  Therefore, the lower limit of 
contribution decision is mL.  Though the thresholds are uncertain, the likely maximum 
and minimum of a particularistic contribution decision can be set.   
Assumption 1. The decision point of a particularistic contribution (mD) is 
between the lower limit and upper limit: mL ≤ mD ≤ mU.   
Winning probability and incumbent advantage are two factors that differentiate 
the utility functions of a contributor to an incumbent and a challenger.  The winning 
probability is one of the consistent factors to affect the calculus of a contribution decision 
(Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Hendrie, Salant and 
Makinson 2000; Snyder 1990; Welch 1974 and 1980).  Since winning an election is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition to take delivery of favors, a contributor’s 
utility banks on its probability.  If a candidate is more likely to win an election, the 
anticipated favors are more likely to be realized and a contributor is more likely to donate 
to the candidate. 
In addition to a winning probability, the other factor that differentiates the utility 
functions is the incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Aranson and 
Hinich 1979; Baron 1989; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Morton and Cameron 
1992; Welch 1989; Welch 1974).  Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000, pp.70-77) summarize 
what the incumbency advantage in campaign finance is: human capital, social capital and 
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political capital.3  Incumbents learn through elections how to raise and spend money 
(human capital).  They have political connections and enjoy celebrity status (social 
capital).  Finally, incumbents have more power and resources so that they are more likely 
to realize the promises they make to contributors (political capital).  Comparing total 
receipts between candidates themselves who were challengers or open seat candidates in 
previous elections but incumbents in the following elections, Ansolabehere and Snyder 
(2000) find that “ascending to office adds $191,000 to a new incumbent's campaign chest.   
This is fully 70 percent of the total advantage enjoyed by incumbents in these races” 
(p.78).4 
PC = P[f(m), I] = Φ (m, P, I)  2) 
where P is the probability of winning an election and I is incumbency advantage. 
Combining two differentiating factors, Figure 3.2 shows how particularistic 
contributions vary with winning probability and incumbency advantage.  Since two 
factors (P and I) work against challengers, the curve PC1 for an incumbent gets less steep 
(Aranson and Hinich 1979; Hinich 1977), and it becomes the curve PC2 for challengers.  
In other words, PC1 has a steeper curve than PC2 has, 1  
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∂ .  Hence, 
given the amount of a contribution (mD), a particularistic contributor can receive a larger 
benefit by donating to an incumbent compared to a challenger; the expected utility of a 
contribution to an incumbent is higher than to a challenger, Φ (mD) > Φ (m2D).   
Assumption 2. A particularistic contribution is more likely to be made to an 
incumbent than to a challenger. 
                                                 
3 . The other components of incumbency advantage in the House, they suggest, are “positions of power” 
such as committee assignment, majority party status, ideologically median legislators, and 
seniority.  Since the object studied is governor, positions of power are not considered. 
4 . They control the demand of contributions by selecting the marginal elections in which the vote share of a 
winner  is 55 percent or less. 
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Figure 3.2. Expected Utility of Particularistic Contributor  
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Φ (m) is the expected utility of contribution (m).   
mL is the lower limit and mD is the decision point of a contribution. 
mU is the upper limit for candidates.   
PC1 is the expected utility function of particularistic contributions for an incumbent 
PC2 is the expected utility function of particularistic contributions for a challenger.  
 
When is disparity in contributions the largest and smallest?  Given the budget of 
contributions, who benefits the most?  Suppose a contributor has the mD amount of 
contribution budget.  Given the amount, represented as in Figure 3.3, the marginal 
benefits for incumbents and challengers are 
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PC |.  Since DmD is bigger than DmD+1, the disparity in 
contributions gets smaller when the budget of contributions gets larger.  Put differently, 
the difference is the largest at the lower limit and decreases when the givable amount of 
PC2  
PC1 
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contributions increases. Finally, the difference is the smallest when the budget of 
contribution is unlimited and a particularistic contributor maximizes his or her expected 
utility, 
m
PC
∂
∂ 1 = 
m
PC
∂
∂ 2 =0. 5  This leads to the following assumption.   
Assumption 3. The disparity of contributions to an incumbent and a challenger 
gets smaller in proportion to the givable amount of a contribution. 
 
Figure 3.3.  Marginal Benefit of Particularistic Contribution 
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mL is the lower limit and mD is the decision point. 
mU is the upper limit for  an incumbent and m2U is the upper limit for a challenger. 
 
Two cautions should be noted.  First, a candidate’s favors are endogenously 
related to contributions.  Considering that gubernatorial elections in the American states 
mostly involve two candidates of the Republican and Democratic parties, the strategy of a 
candidate’s opponent (f2) should be taken into account.  If a challenger attempts to 
                                                 
5 .  The absolute term is used in order to facilitate the interpretation.  Disparity, therefore, means the 
magnitude of slopes.  One may draw an inference from Figure 3.2.  Since a curve of PC1 is steeper 
than that of PC2, the first derivative of PC1 (i.e., a tangent line on curve) is larger than that of PC2.  
∂PC1/∂m 
∂PC2/∂(m) 
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propose more favors, an incumbent is more willing to promise favors to keep or entice 
more contributions, and so on (Baron 1989; Snyder 1990).6   
Second, the probability of a candidate winning an election is not endogenously 
related to contributions.  Particularistic contributors do not have the intention to change 
electoral outcomes; they donate money to candidates to receive favors in return (Welch 
1974 and 1980).  In addition, the portion of particularistic contributions is so small that it 
may not affect electoral outcomes in practice (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder 
2002; Welch 1974 and 1980).  Welch (1980, p.102) reports that in 1974 no economic 
interest contributor gave more than two percent of the total amount spent in U. S. House 
races and only three contributed more than one percent.  This pattern holds for three other 
elections (1972, 1974, and 1976).  Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder (2002) also find 
that PAC contributions were a small part of total contributions in presidential and 
gubernatorial elections in the 2000 elections. 
These assumptions, with cautions, allow us to specify the behavior of 
particularistic contributors as follows.  First, a particularistic contributor does not donate 
under the lower limit (mL), because a contribution does not make any difference to a 
candidate’s policy position below that level.  Second, above the lower limit, a 
particularistic contributor is likely to donate more money to an incumbent rather than to a 
challenger, because the marginal benefit of a contribution is higher to an incumbent than 
to a challenger.  The difference between marginal benefits of contributions, however, 
decreases as the contribution approaches to the maximization point (mU) and, in turn, the 
disparity of contributions to an incumbent and a challenger becomes negligible.  Recall 
that a perfect market is assumed; a particularistic contributor is not constrained, for 
example, by contribution limits and/or budgets, and thus a donor can maximize his or her 
contribution up to mU.   
To this point, my discussion follows the logic of Aranson and Hinich (1979).  But, 
it is important to mention that this reflects a mode of particularistic contributors.  
Aranson and Hinich’s work (1979) does not specify the behavior of universalistic 
                                                 
6 . The same kind of simultaneity prevails over campaign spending literature; not only does an incumbent’s 
spending increase his or her vote share, but also, given the expected loss of the vote share for an 
incumbent because of spending by a challenger, an incumbent spends more money than otherwise  
(Goidel and Gross 1994; Green and Krasno 1990; Gross and Goidel 2003; Jacobson 1990). 
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contributors whose motivation is helping their favorite candidates.  In the next section I 
extend the model to explain the behavior of universalistic contributors.   
 
1.2. A Universalistic Contributor 
A universalistic contributor refers to one who supplies campaign funds to help 
candidates with desirable policy positions.  He or she donates money to try to affect the 
winning probability, assuming the candidate’s policy position is fixed (Fuchs, Adler and 
Mitchell 2000; Morton and Cameron 1992; Mueller and Stratmann 1994; Mutz 1995; 
Snyder 1990 and 1993; Welch 1989; Welch 1974).  It is a similar concept to an 
ideological contributor (Welch 1974 and 1980), a consumer contributor (Snyder 1990 and 
1993), a position-induced contributor (Morton and Cameron 1992) or a loyalty-based 
contributor (Mutz 1995).  Universalistic contributors include individual contributors, 
parties, and ideological Political Action Committees (PACs) (Snyder 1990 and 1993). 
The major difference between a particularistic and a universalistic contributor is 
what a contributor expects in return for contributions (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; 
Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990 and 1993).  A particularistic contributor expects 
narrowly defined favors such as policy outcomes, whereas a universalistic contributor 
looks forward to altering electoral outcomes.  As Morton and Cameron (1992) observes, 
to donate universalistically is of insignificant value to an individual because of the nature 
of the donation (i.e., “public goods”); the utility of donating is not much different from 
non-donating.  Snyder (1990 and 1993), therefore, conceptualizes a universalistic 
contribution as “consuming” compared to a particularistic contribution as “investment.”   
This notion indicates that the utility function of a universalistic contributor is less 
sensitive to contributions compared to that of a particularistic contributor.  In other words, 
given a unit change of a contribution, the difference between the expected utilities is 
insignificant and a universalistic contribution is less likely to be affected by whether a 
candidate responds to a donation or not.  In the first place, a universalistic contributor 
perceives that his or her contribution does not attract a candidate’s attention; he or she 
wishes to “help” a favorite candidate (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Mutz 1995).7  
Hence, an expected utility for universalistic contributions is smoother than that for 
                                                 
7 . But see Cooper (2001, f.3, pp.5-6). 
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particularistic contributors; 
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.  This leads to the expected utility 
function for a universalistic contributor as follows:  
UC = P(m)[f, I] = Φ (f, P(m), I) where 
m
mUC
∂
∂ )(  < 
m
mPC
∂
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Figure 3.4. Expected Utility of Universalistic Contributor 
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mL is the lower limit and mD is the decision point of contribution.  
mU is the upper limit for candidates.  
UC1 is the expected utility function of universalistic contributions for an incumbent 
UC2 is the expected utility function of universalistic contributions for a challenger.   
 
The gentle curves of the expected utility for universalistic contributions are 
different from that seen for particularistic contributions.  Suppose a contributor makes a 
donation (mD) to an incumbent and to a challenger.  The difference between the expected 
utilities of contributions to an incumbent and a challenger is much smaller in a 
universalistic contribution than in a particularistic contribution, represented as thick lines 
in Figures 3.2 and 3.4.   
                                                 
8 . The reason of dropping m in favor function f and adding m in probability of winning an election will be 
explained in the end of this section.   
UC2 (m)  
UC1 (m) 
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Because of the smaller difference between the expected utilities to an incumbent 
and a challenger, the loss of being a challenger is less in universalistic contributions than 
in particularistic contributions.  Therefore, the difference in contributions between an 
incumbent and a challenger gets smaller if the contribution is universalistic.  This leads to 
the following assumption:  
Assumption 4. The difference in universalistic contributions between incumbents 
and challengers remains, yet the difference in universalistic contributions is smaller than 
that in particularistic contributions.   
The marginal benefit shows where the disparity is maximized and minimized.  
The pattern is similar to a particularistic contributor; yet the difference is much smaller 
for a universalistic contributor.  The weaker slopes for an incumbent and a challenger 
(∂UC1/∂m and ∂UC2/∂m)), compared to those for particularistic contributions (∂PC1/∂m 
and ∂PC2/∂m), reduce the disparity of universalistic contributions.  Figure 3.5 shows 
differences, represented as a short dashed line, with particularistic contributions as in 
Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.5.  Marginal Benefit of Universalistic Contribution 
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mU is the upper limit to an incumbent and m2U is the upper limit to a challenger. 
 
The difference decreases when the amount of contributions increases.  When a 
contribution is maximized, the difference becomes negligible.  However, the reduction of 
differences is not apparent compared to that of particularistic contributions.  Because of 
the gentle slopes of universalistic contributions, the difference of contributions is not 
evident in the range of contributions donated to an incumbent and a challenger.   
Assumption 5. The difference between universalistic contributions to an 
incumbent and a challenger gets smaller in proportion to the givable amount of 
contributions, but the reduction of differences is less apparent than the differences of 
particularistic contributions. 
Compared to particularistic contributions, two cautions should be noted.  First, a 
candidate’s favors are not an endogeneous but exogenous condition for universalistic 
contributors.  In a particularistic contributor, favor variables are endogenous because a 
particularistic contributor gives funds to a candidate anticipating the return of favors. The 
expected loss of contributions because of a candidate’s opponent makes a candidate sell 
more favors than otherwise.  In a universalistic contributor, however, a favor variable is 
not endogenous but exogenous because a donor is not attracted by the favors of a 
candidate’s opponent because a donor has a fixed position.  Second, the probability of a 
candidate’s winning an election is endogenously related to contributions.  Universalistic 
contributors have not only resources but also the intention to help a candidate win an 
election.  If their favorite candidates are seen to be viable, donors are more likely to 
contribute, which in turn helps a candidate increase the probability of winning an election.   
All in all, these assumptions allow us to specify the behavior of universalistic 
contributors compared to particularistic contributors.  Universalistic contributors are 
likely to contribute to incumbents over challengers, yet the difference in contributions 
between incumbents and challengers is not as apparent compared to that of particularistic 
contributions.  In addition, the difference in contributions between incumbents and 
challengers gets smaller in proportion to the givable amount of contributions, but the 
reduction in the differences is less apparent than that in the differences of particularistic 
contributions.   
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2. Imperfect Market of Campaign Contributions 
In reality, the market of campaign finance contributions is far from a perfect 
world.  Campaign contributions are structured by the donor’s budget and the limitation on 
contributions (structural constraints).  Candidates and contributors play a game without 
perfect information, and contributors provide funds for expecting returns in the future 
(uncertainty).  The market becomes a quasi-monopoly by a winning candidate, because 
the winning candidate determines the volume of favors and contributors cannot substitute 
him or her until the next election (quasi-monopoly market; but see Morton and Cameron 
1992).  In this study, I focus on the effect of one of the structural constraints on 
contribution behavior: contribution limits.    
 
2.1. A Particularistic Contributor 
The behavior of a particularistic contributor is affected by contribution limits.  For 
example, if contribution limits are set below a certain amount (mL-1), particularistic 
contributors will not donate.  Since a donor does not expect his or her contribution to 
bring the anticipated favors back, it is irrational for him or her to contribute.  Therefore, 
particularistic contributions decrease if the limitation is set below the lower limit.  On the 
contrary, if the limitation is set above the maximum point of contribution (mU), the 
limitation does not affect the behavior of a particularistic contributor, because he or she 
does not contribute beyond the maximum point.   
What happens between the lower and upper limits (mL and mU)?  Suppose a donor 
decides to contribute if the expected contribution utility is more than or equal to the 
expected utility of a decision point Φ(mD), that is, PC* = PC if Φ (m) ≥ Φ (mD) where 
PC* is the latent variable and PC is the realized variable.  Further suppose contribution 
limits in some states tighten regulations to mD-1 (see Figure 3.2).  This movement 
discourages donors from contributing, because contributions do not bring the expected 
returns.  If limits are set at mD+1, they do not affect the number of particularistic 
contributors but do affect the amount of particularistic contributions.  Since the expected 
utility at mD+1 is beyond the decision point, particularistic contributors donate to 
candidates, but they could not maximize the contributions than would be otherwise.  
Finally, if limits are set beyond a maximization point (mU) or simply no limit is set, the 
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behavior of particularistic contributors is not affected. In sum, campaign finance 
regulations reduce the influence of particularistic contributions, especially the amount of 
the contribution.   
Proposition 1. The stricter the contribution limits, the smaller the particularistic 
contributions.   
What happens to disparity between incumbents and challengers?  Figure 3.3 
shows that the disparity of particularistic contributors to an incumbent and a challenger 
gets larger with restrictive contribution limits.  Contribution limits shrink the amount a 
donor can contribute and particularistic contributors should choose a strategy regarding 
how contributions are allotted to candidates.  Because the marginal benefit in donating to 
incumbents is higher than in donating to challengers, with a smaller pie due to the 
regulations, incumbents are favored over challengers.  As limits decline or become less 
restrictive, the disparity gets slighter because of a smaller difference of marginal benefit.  
Finally, if contribution limits are at the maximized point (mU), the disparity becomes 
negligible.   
Proposition 2. The stricter the contribution limits, the larger the disparity in 
particularistic contributions.   
In sum, tight regulations reduce the influence of particularistic contributions 
because particularistic contributions are less likely to bring anticipated returns.  On the 
other hand, disparity in contributions between incumbents and challengers gets larger 
under tight regulations, because donating to incumbents brings greater marginal benefits 
than donating to challengers.   
 
2.2. Universalistic Contributors 
A universalistic contributor, who has a motivation of helping his or her favorite 
candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations; nor is the disparity of contributions 
affected by limits.  Since the expected utility of universalistically donating is a small and 
widely disposed utility, the utility of donating is not much different from non-donating.   
One of the characteristics of universalistic contributions is that the expected utility 
function for universalistic contributors is smoother than that for particularistic 
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contributors, 
m
mPC
m
mUC
∂
∂
<
∂
∂ )()( .  This feature separates universalistic contributors 
from particularistic contributors.   
The effect of limitations on universalistic contributions, however, is less evident 
than that on particularistic contributions.  Because of 
m
mPC
m
mUC
∂
∂
<
∂
∂ )()( , the reduced 
area in universalistic contributions resulting from regulations is smaller compared to that 
in particularistic contributions. Furthermore, considering that donating universalistically 
is much different from “not-donating,” Φ (mD) - Φ (mD-1) is extremely small and the 
consequence of campaign regulations on universalistic contributions is hard to be realized.   
Proposition 3. Contribution limits do not bring a substantial change in 
universalistic contributors.   
Additionally, there may not be a substantial difference between the disparity of 
universalistic contributions to an incumbent and a challenger after different contribution 
limits are set.  The slopes of marginal benefits for incumbents and challengers change 
gradually and thus the difference of marginal benefits imposed by limits (e.g., from mD to 
mD-1) is less likely to be substantial compared to that in particularistic contributions (see 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.5).9  Since the difference of marginal benefits is small, the effect 
of contribution limits on disparity is less evident for universalistic donations.  
Proposition 4. Limitations are not likely to alter the disparity of universalistic 
contributions between an incumbent and a challenger. 
Based on Aranson and Hinich (1979)’s model, I constructed a model to explain 
the behavior of particularistic and universalistic contributors.  A Particularistic – 
Universalistic Contribution Model (PUCM) incorporates the elements of the differential 
expected utilities between incumbents and challengers: incumbency advantage as well as 
a winning probability.  Since incumbents are more experienced, have larger political 
connections, enjoy celebrity status, and have more power and resources than challengers, 
besides a higher winning probability, the expected utility for incumbents is higher than 
                                                 
9 . It does not mean that the difference between contributions to an incumbent and a challenger disappears.  
Still, an incumbent candidate enjoys larger contributions because of incumbency advantage and 
higher winning probability.  However, the disparity of universalistic contributions is not large 
compared to that of particularistic contributions. 
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that for challengers, which in turn leads contributors to donate to incumbents rather than 
to challengers.   
PUCM articulates the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of 
contributors.  Particularistic contributors are very elastic to contribution limits, while 
universalistic contributors are inelastic to contribution limits.  Therefore, contribution 
limits make a substantial difference to particularistic contributors, but do not make a 
difference to universalistic contributors.10 
Finally, PUCM extends its interpretation to the number of contributors and the 
amount of contributions as well as the disparity in contributions.  Since contribution 
limits reduce the anticipated returns, they discourage donations from contributors in 
general, but especially from particularistic contributors. In turn, the number and amount 
of contributions are likely to decrease in the presence of restrictive contribution limits, 
although limits increase the disparity that favors incumbents over challengers. 
One caution should be paid attention to, however, when drawing theoretical 
implications from a particularistic and universalistic model.  The model does not work if 
campaign finance reforms are implemented below the lower limit or above the upper 
limit.  Suppose some states regulated limits on mL which is the lower limit.  Further 
suppose that the states move to prohibit contributions.  Since contributors do not donate 
at either of the limits, there is no differential effect of the limitation.  Conversely, if 
campaign regulations move from mU to no limit, there is no difference experienced, 
because contributors do not contribute more than the maximization point (mU).  Therefore, 
one may argue that neither of the limits has a significant relationship with contributions, 
even though the relationship exists between lower and upper limits.  The model for 
particularistic and universalistic contributors contains this theoretical limitation.   
Whether this theoretical limitation exists in reality or remains only in a theoretical 
world, however, is an empirical question.  What is the range of contribution limits?  Is the 
range of contribution limits too extreme or is it extensive enough to generate the plausible 
effect of limits?  For empirical testing, the ideal range of contribution limits is from no 
                                                 
10  . Note that it might be argued that since challengers get a greater return for every dollar spent 
universalistic contributors are more likely to give to challengers (see Goidel and Gross 1994; 
Green and Krasno 1990; Gross and Goidel 2003; Jacobson 1990).  However, universalistic 
contributors do not believe their contributions change the electoral outcome; they simply want to 
help their favorite candidates. 
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limit to prohibition and is evenly distributed.  This range captures the lower and upper 
limits and can test the relationship between limits and contributions.  Since this 
theoretical limitation expects no relationship between limits and contributions, a 
significant relationship will provide evidence against this problem.   
 
3. Testable Hypotheses 
A model of campaign contributions can be tested using empirical data.  I 
explained the behavior of a particularistic and a universalistic contributor under a perfect 
market.  Imposing contribution limits on a perfect market, I develop several propositions.  
First, restrictive contribution limits reduce particularistic contributions but increase the 
disparity of particularistic contributions.  Second, restrictive contribution limits are 
neither likely to be related to universalistic contributions nor the disparity of 
universalistic contributions.  These propositions can be represented as the following 
hypotheses.   
 
- A particularistic contributor 
Hypothesis 1.1. The presence of restrictive contribution limits will reduce the number of 
particularistic contributions. 
Hypothesis 1.2. The presence of restrictive contribution limits will reduce the amount of 
particularistic contributions. 
Hypothesis 1.3. Restrictive contribution limits will increase the disparity in the number 
of particularistic contributions between incumbents and challengers.   
Hypothesis 1.4. Restrictive contribution limits will increase the disparity in the amount 
of particularistic contributions between incumbents and challengers.   
 
- A universalistic contributor 
Hypothesis 2.1. The presence of contribution limits is not likely to affect the number of 
universalistic contributions.  
Hypothesis 2.2. The presence of contribution limits is not likely to affect the amount of 
universalistic contributions. 
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Hypothesis 2.3. Contribution limits are not likely to influence the disparity in the number 
of universalistic contributions between incumbents and challengers. 
Hypothesis 2.4. Contribution limits are not likely to influence the disparity in the amount 
of universalistic contributions between incumbents and challengers.   
The relationship of limits to total contributions is theoretically uncertain because 
the relationship is the sum of two distinctive relationships; particularistic contributions 
are likely to be affected by limits, whereas universalistic contributions are not likely to be 
affected by limits.  It depends upon which type of contributions is dominant.  If 
particularistic contributions prevail over universalistic contributions, total contributions 
are likely to follow the relationship between particularistic contributions and contribution 
limits, even though the relationship will be less evident.  If both types of contributions are 
equally distributed, the relationship of total contributions to limits is theoretically 
untraceable, because uncertainty is too dense.   Since the relative weight of particularistic 
and universalistic contributions is unknown, I confine the relationship to the empirical 
part.  In the following chapter, I explain the characteristics of political contributions data 
as well as the independent variables, and construct a statistical model controlling for the 
confounding factors.   
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Chapter 4: Data and Method 
 
In Chapter Three, I adopted a theoretical framework emphasizing the different 
effects of regulations on two distinctive types of contributors: particularistic contributors 
whose motivation is influencing policy, and universalistic contributors whose motivation 
is helping their favorite candidates.  Specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical 
considerations were posed.  Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount 
of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity in the number and amount of 
particularistic contributions donated to an incumbent and a challenger.  On the other hand, 
contribution limits do not affect the number, the amount and their disparities of 
universalistic contributions. 
In this section, I will describe data and methods to test the hypotheses.  In the first 
section, the dependent and independent variables are operationalized.  The dependent 
variables are the number of contributors, the amount of contributions and the disparity in 
the number as well as in the amount of contributions.  The major independent variable is 
campaign contribution limits.  Political control variables are interparty competition, 
partisan strength, and government status.  Demographic control variables are the level of 
wealth and the level of education.   
In the second section, statistical models are constructed to test the hypotheses.  
Instrumental variable methods are used to correct biased, inefficient and inconsistent 
estimates resulting from simultaneity.  Several methodological concerns on campaign 
contribution data are considered: a truncation issue, variance of residuals, and unknown 
proportion of contributions.   
 
1. Data 
Collecting campaign contribution data at the state level can be problematic 
because most states use not only their own coding schemes to organize information, but 
they also do not necessarily articulate the type of contributions in terms of the context of 
particular regulatory categories.  In some cases, one may be able to verify the type of a 
contribution by using the contributor’s name or contributor’s employer (see Hendrie, 
Salant and Makinson 2000).  However, matching each individual record with the list of 
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Political Action Committees (PACs) or corporations in each state is extremely expensive 
and time consuming. 
The National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) has helped solve these 
problems.1  The Institute provides the characteristics of contributions across states in a 
consistent manner.  The data are sorted into individual, party, ideology/single issue, labor 
union, or corporation.2  The Institute also reports the election year and the amount of 
contributions along with the data.3, 4  
The institution to be studied is “the governor.”  The empirical analyses examine 
58 gubernatorial election cycles from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states.5  Campaign contribution 
data are specified as individually recorded contributions to gubernatorial candidates in 
the American states. 6   The dependent variables are campaign contributions (i.e., the 
number of contributors, the amount of contributions, and the disparities of contributions).  
The key independent variable is campaign contribution limits.  Several control variables 
are also included in a full model (see Appendix A for the measurement and source of 
variables).     
 
1.1. Dependent Variables 
                                                 
1 . I thank the National Institute on Money in State Politics (http://www.followthemoney.org/, visited on 
January - March, 2002) for allowing me to use their data.  I also thank and the political science 
department at the University of Kentucky for a research grant to purchase the seed data from 
NIMSP, and the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy and the University of Kentucky for 
helping me pursue data collection.  
2 . Corporation refers to general business, agriculture, energy, finance, health, electronics, construction, 
lawyers, and transportation (see Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000, chapters 7 and 10).  The rest 
of the categories are candidate contribution, small contribution, other, non-contribution and 
unknown.  These types of contributions are excluded from analysis.  Note that small contribution 
is the aggregate sum of contributions below the required amount of disclosure (a personal email 
with a staff from NIMSP, March 4th, 2002).  Small contributions, however, are too unreliable to 
include in analysis, because they are not collected in a consistent manner.   
3 . Just 71 percent (41 out of 58 election cycles) report day and month as well as year of contributions.  
4 . Data provided by NIMSP, however, encounters the other problems embedded in campaign finance 
practices (see Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000; Malbin and Gais 1998).  Multiple donations by 
the de facto same contributor and bundled contributions are hard to separate.  Data are entangled 
with outside money, although data purchasable from NIMSP do have information on city, state 
and zip code of contributors. 
5 . The states to be studied are Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, West Virginia and 
Wyoming. 
6 . Individually recorded contribution data are disaggregate contribution records for each candidate.  
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Theory in Chapter Three specifies the two types of contributors (particularistic, 
universalistic contributors).  In addition, two levels of analysis are examined to improve 
statistical interpretation: state and candidate levels.  The state level analyses examine the 
relationships between contributions to all or the major party candidates in a state and 
contribution limits.  That is, the state level analysis involves analyzing data where each 
case is a given set of gubernatorial candidates in a given state in a given election cycle.  
The candidate level analyses evaluate the relationships between contributions to each 
major party candidate and contribution limits.  That is, in the candidate analyses, each 
case is a given candidate in a given state in a given election cycle.  The candidate level 
analyses should not only reinforce the findings from the state level analyses, but also 
enrich interpretation of contribution limits (i.e., who benefits or suffers from limits).  At 
the state level analysis, the number (and the amount) of contributions refers to the sum of 
the numbers (and the amounts) contributed to all and the major party candidates in a state 
and an election.  On the other hand, at the candidate level analysis, the number (and 
amount) of contributions refers to the sum of the numbers (and the amounts) of 
contributions donated to each major party candidate in a state and an election cycle.   
Particularistic contributors are labor unions and corporations, while universalistic 
contributors are individuals, parties, and ideological PACs (see Chapter Three).  
Individually recorded contributions are aggregated by the definition of the two types of 
contributors and, in turn, into total contributions.  The procedure of aggregation is as 
follows.  First, the basic type of contributions is identified such as corporation, labor 
union, individual, party and ideological PAC contributions. Second, particularistic and 
universalistic contributions are coded using the basic type of contributions.  Corporate 
and labor union contributions are coded as particularistic contributions, while individual, 
party, and ideological PAC contributions are coded as universalistic contributions.  Third, 
the number and amount of universalistic and particularistic contributions are aggregated 
for each candidate in each state and election cycle, if the amount is above the disclosure 
amount of itemization.7 , 8   Then, the total number and amount of contributions are 
aggregated by each state and election cycle.9  
                                                 
7 . State campaign finance regulations require candidates, campaign committees and the like to report 
and/or itemize contributions (Feigenbaum and Palmer 1990-2000).  Some states require them to 
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Finally, disparity is the ratio between contributions donated to incumbents and 
challengers.  Disparity of the number is the number of contributors to an incumbent 
divided by the number of contributors to a challenger.  Disparity of the amount is the 
total amount of contributions to an incumbent divided by that of a challenger.10  The 
numbers and the amounts used are the sum of contributions contributed to an incumbent 
and a challenger from major parties in a state and an election cycle.   
 
1.2. Independent Variables 
1.2.1. Contribution Limits 
Contribution limits are defined in Campaign Finance Law (Feigenbaum and 
Palmer 1990-2000).  Different levels of restrictions are set on corporations, labor unions, 
PACs, individuals, political parties and the like (see Malbin and Gais 1998 for the trend 
of campaign finance regulations, especially Chapter One).  In 1998, 44% of states 
prevented corporations from donating and 30% of states prevented labor unions from 
contributing.  If corporate contributions are prohibited, so are contributions by labor 
unions in more than half of the states (68.18%).  Seventy three percent of states put some 
restrictions on PAC contributions.  On the other hand, no state prohibits individual 
contributions and 28% of the states even allow individuals to contribute as much as they 
want.  Political party contributions are not prevented in any state, and 52% of the states 
                                                                                                                                                 
report regardless of the amount of donation and to itemize if the donation is above the disclosure 
amount.  However, other states do not require them to report the amount of contributions if the 
donation is less than the disclosure amount.  However, the donation must be reported and itemized 
if it is above the threshold.  To ensure consistency, I use contributions above the disclosure 
amount of itemization.  
8 . If these numbers and amounts are used for the unit of analysis, it is the candidate level analysis.  If these 
numbers and amounts are aggregated by a state and an election cycle and are used for the unit of 
analysis, it is the state level analysis.   
9. There is no indication of whether a contribution is by a corporation itself or a corporate PAC, or by a 
labor union itself or a labor union PAC.  According to Sorauf (1992), however, if a state prevents 
a corporation from donating, a corporation forms its affiliated PAC and donates funds to 
candidates through the PAC.  Therefore, the ambiguity of a corporation or a labor union and their 
related PAC contributions will not mislead the analysis if these contributions are coded by a 
corporation or a labor union.   
10 . If a challenger does not receive contribution, this case is excluded in calculating disparity measures, 
because including zero as denominator generates infinite number.  However, if neither of the 
candidates receives any contribution, it is coded as one indicating no disparity between them.  It is 
why sample sizes are different between the number of disparity at the state level and the number 
of incumbents at the candidate level.   
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do not put any restriction on party contributions (see Appendix I for a detailed description 
of campaign finance regulations).   
Three new limitation variables are created in order to pursue research questions in 
this study: limitations on particularistic and universalistic contributions as well as on total 
contributions.  A particularistic contribution limit is coded 0 if no limitation is on PAC 
contributions regardless of corporate and labor union contribution limits.  This is done 
because corporations and labor unions can circumvent their limitations through their 
affiliated PACs (Sorauf 1992).11  It is coded 1 if some limits are placed on corporations, 
labor unions and PACs and 2 if corporations or labor unions are prohibited from 
contributing with some limits on PACs.  A universalistic contribution limit is coded using 
a similar logic: it is coded 0 if individual and party contributions are not constrained, 1 if 
some limits are on either of them, and 2 if some limits are on both of them.   
Finally, total limitation is generated by the sum of particularistic and 
universalistic contribution limits.  The range of limitation is from 0 (no limit) to 4 (tight 
limits).12  This is a cumulative scale representing 0 as no restriction on particularistic and 
universalistic contributions while 4 as severe restrictions on such contributions.  Gross, 
Shields and Goidel (2002) use a similar logic to construct limitation on all contributions.  
They code each type of contribution limits as 1 if some limitation is imposed, and 0 
otherwise, and then make a composite variable summing across all the categories of 
contribution limits.13   
                                                 
11 .  It is the general case that if PACs are prohibited from contributing, corporations and labor unions are 
also prevented.  The only exception is Missouri from 1996 to 1999.  It puts no limit on 
corporations and labor unions, but some limits on PACs.  I assign this case as 0, because 
corporations and labor unions themselves can contribute as much as they want.   
12 . For chapter 7, I generate “corporate contribution limits” utilizing limits on corporations and PACs.  I 
code corporate contribution limits as 0 if PAC contributions are not limited, 1 if some limitations 
are imposed on corporations and PACs, and 2 if corporate contributions are prohibited and some 
limitation is on PACs.  “Labor union contribution limits” are coded as 0 if there is no restriction 
on PAC contributions, 1 if some limitations are imposed on labor unions and PACs, and 2 if labor 
union contributions are prohibited and some limitation is on PACs.  Without notice, corporate 
contribution limits refer to the limitation on corporate contributions and labor union contribution 
limits refer to the limitation on labor union contributions.  Limitations on individuals, political 
parties, and ideology PACs are used as they are. 
13 . The other coding scheme, as Hogan (2000) did, is to generate a dummy variable representing whether 
some limitation is imposed on or not.  Or, another scheme is to utilize particularistic and 
universalistic contribution limits when examining all contributions.  The advantage of utilizing 
these schemes is to circumvent an unnecessary assumption of the sum of ordinal values, while the 
disadvantage is to suppress the variation in total contribution limits.   
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1.2.2. Political Control Variables 
Control variables are specified as political control variables and demographic 
control variables.  Political control variables are candidate status, interparty competition, 
government status, partisan strength, and open seat elections. Demographic control 
variables are wealth of states and education level.   
It is well known that contributions are biased in favor of incumbents 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Bailey 2002; Malbin and Gais 1998; Sorauf 1992).  
Incumbents have experience in fund raising, have political connections and enjoy 
celebrity status, and even have power and resources to realize their promises 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000).  Challengers are in a weak position, because they need 
to fight against incumbents.  On the other hand, open seat candidates do not suffer from 
the mighty opponent.  Therefore, incumbents raise the largest contributions, followed by 
open seat candidates and, then, challengers.  Candidate status is composed of three 
dichotomous variables.  Being Challenger (BC) is coded 1 if a candidate is a challenger 
in incumbent-running elections and 0 otherwise.  Being Incumbent (BI) is coded 1 if a 
candidate is an incumbent and 0 otherwise.  Being open seat candidate (BO) is coded 1 if 
a candidate runs in open seat elections and 0 otherwise.  BO is used as a base category.  
Candidate status is just inserted at the candidate level analysis, because the candidate 
                                                                                                                                                 
When examining limitations on particularistic, universalistic and all contributions, they all show a 
cumulative property.  First, limitation on particularistic contributions shows a cumulative property.  
In the 1998 elections, if corporate contributions are prohibited, so are contributions by labor 
unions in more than half of the states (68.18%).  Seventy three percent of states put some 
restrictions on PAC contributions.  If corporate contributions are limited, so are labor union 
contributions in 86% of the states and PAC contributions in 82% of the states.  Finally, if 
corporate contributions are not limited, none of the states put any restriction on labor union 
contributions and 83% of the states do not put any restriction on PAC contributions.  Limitation on 
universalistic contributions also shows a cumulative property.  If individual contributions are 
limited, so are contributions by parties in 46% of the states.  If individual contributions are not 
limited, eighty six percent of the states do not put any restriction on party contributions.  Finally, 
limitation on all contributions also shows a cumulative scale.  If severe limitation on particularistic 
contributions is imposed, 35% of the states put modest limitation and 65% of the states put severe 
limitation on universalistic contributions.  None of the states put “no limitation” on universalistic 
contributions.  If the least limitation on particularistic contribution is imposed, 89% of the states 
are not limited and 11% of the states put modest limitation on universalistic contributions.  None 
of the states put severe limitation on universalistic contributions.  See Appendix I for a detailed 
description.   
In addition, whether one utilizes a dummy variable for total contribution limits or particularistic and 
universalistic contribution limits for total contribution limits does not make a difference to the 
importance of the limitation on all contributions.  The results are available from the author.   
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level analysis is undertaken for each candidate, while the state level analysis deals with 
the sum of all candidates.   
As campaign finance scholars suggest (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; 
Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980), the closer the election gets, the 
more likely a contributor, especially a universalistic contributor, donates to a favorite 
candidate because he or she perceives contributions as a more effective means in an 
election characterized as a horse-race.  Interparty competition at the state and candidate 
levels is measured as the difference in electoral returns (i.e., an absolute difference in the 
percentage of vote shares between the major party candidates).14   
Government status, measured as whether a government is unified or divided, puts 
a contributor in a difficult situation.  A unified government has substantial powers to 
facilitate its collective electoral reputation (Cox and Magar 1999; Fiorina 1995).  
Suppose, however, that an incumbent gubernatorial candidate, Paul Patton (D), had a 
high probability of winning an election against Peppy Martin (R) in the 1999 Kentucky 
election, but the majority in the Senate is likely to be Republican.  If a donor contributes 
to influence policy outcomes, to which candidate does he or she contribute, the 
Democratic or Republic gubernatorial candidate?  Government status at the state level is 
coded 1 if either of the parties controls all branches of government and 0 otherwise.  
Government status at the candidate level is coded 1 if a candidate’s party controls every 
                                                 
14 . The foundation of interparty competition is Dawson and Robinson’s work (1963) on legislatures.  
Ranney (1976) extends Dawson and Robinson’s concept (1963) to four concepts: the average 
percentage of the popular vote won by Democratic gubernatorial candidates, the average 
percentage of the seats in the state senate held by Democrats, the average percentage of the seats 
in the state house held by Democrats, and the percentage of all terms for governor, senate and 
house in which the Democrats had control.  As Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993, p.955) point out, 
however, the concept and indicator of Dawson and Robinson and Ranney have several problems; 
theses indexes represent the party strength in the government, not the interparty competition and 
gives more weight to some state offices such as state legislature than to others such as governor 
(also see Bibby and Holbrook 1999, pp.95-96).  Therefore, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) 
suggest the new index of interparty competition; since legislators may perceive the threat from 
close party competition, they use the election results, not the seats in the assembly, at the district 
level.  The range of this index is from 0 (one-party dominance) to 1 (perfect competition).  Simply, 
Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) suggest that the measurement of interparty competition should be 
based on election returns at the district level (i.e., state).  Following this suggestion, interparty 
competition for gubernatorial elections is measured as the absolute difference in the vote shares 
between the major party candidates; |% of Democratic candidate’s vote share - % of Republican 
candidate’s vote share|.  Electoral returns are collected from Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 
(2000). 
 39
branch of governments, 0 if either of the parties does not control every branch of 
governments and -1 if his or her opponent’s party controls every branch of government.15   
The partisan strength in a district (in this case, a state) influences the volume of 
contributions (Snyder 1993).  If a state is in favor of, say, the Democratic Party, a 
Democratic candidate is likely to raise more funds.  The measure of partisan strength at 
the state level is an absolute difference between the vote shares of Democratic and 
Republican presidential candidates in the closest election in a state, viz., |the vote share of 
Democratic candidate – the vote share of Republican candidate|.  Partisan strength at the 
candidate level is the percentage of a candidate’s party’s vote share in the latest 
presidential election in a state (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 2000).   
To capture party difference, an additional variable is inserted only at the candidate 
level analysis: party affiliation.  Conlon (1987) finds that a candidate’s party is one of the 
elements to influence political contributions.  Based on national level data (the House and 
the Senate from 1976 to 1984), he demonstrates that Republicans raise larger funds from 
particularistic contributions than Democrats, while Democrats raise larger funds from 
universalistic contributions than Republicans.  Party affiliation is coded 0 if candidate is 
Republican and 1 if candidate is Democratic (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 2000).   
Open seat elections bring a larger volume of contributions if contributors are risk-
seekers.  In general, electoral expectation in an open seat election is uncertain to 
candidates and contributors compared to that in an incumbent-running election.  
Candidates are likely to sell more favors in order to raise larger funds (Snyder 1990).  
Contributors are likely to gain more net benefit of a contribution when candidates need 
money most, if contributors are risk-seeking.16  Open seat election is coded 1 if an 
election is open seat and 0 otherwise (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 2000).    
 
1.2.3. Demographic Control Variables17 
                                                 
15  . Data for government status is collected from U.S. Census Bureau (1990-2001) and Scammon, 
McGillivray and Cook (2000). 
16 .  An alternative hypothesis is risk-neutral or risk-averse. 
17 . The number of eligible voters, which is used for the denominator of the dependent variables, captures 
much of the variances of demographic variables such as population.  Therefore, I consider 
demographic variables which are often mentioned in previous literatures.   
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Demographic control variables are the level of wealth and the level of education 
in a state, which are often used to measure the pool of contributors.  These two factors 
differentiate universalistic contributors from particularistic contributors (Snyder 1993).  
Shields and Goidel (2000) find that “income” is a consistent variable that affects a 
contribution decision.  Based on American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1952 
to 1994, they find that those in the highest income level typically contribute more than 
those in the lower level.  Snyder (1993) also finds that, since universalistic contributors 
have “consumption” motivation, the pool of potential universalistic contributors increases 
along with state income and education level, but the pool of particularistic contributions 
who have “investing” motivation is not related to state income and education level.  The 
wealth of states is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state 
(U.S. Census-Bureau 1990-2001). The level of education is measured as the percentage 
of college graduates or higher in a state (U.S. Census-Bureau 1990-2001).  
 
2. Statistical Models and Methodological Concerns 
The model just discussed can be written as a regression equation in which the 
independent variables are contribution limits, political control variables and demographic 
control variables.  Since we are interested in examining the state and candidate level 
analyses, the models are specified for the state level equation and for the candidate level 
equation.  In the next section, the two types of statistical models are introduced.  I will 
discuss some of the estimation concerns originating from the characteristics of political 
contributions in the following section. 
 
2.1. Statistical Models 
Two levels of analysis are examined: state and candidate levels.  The state level 
analysis examines the relationship between contributions to all gubernatorial candidates 
in a state and that state’s contribution limits.  The candidate level analysis evaluates the 
relationship between contributions to each major party candidate and contribution limits.  
The candidate level analysis not only reinforces findings from the state level, but also 
enriches interpretation suggesting which type of candidates benefit or suffer from 
contribution limits.   
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In order to prevent impossible predictions (i.e., negative predictions of 
contributions), I take a natural logarithm of the standardized number and amount of 
contributions.  The preliminary analysis of contributions is performed using the 
contribution limitation and year dummy variables. For the state level analysis, the 
equation simply runs the dependent variable on the limitation with dummy variables for 
years.  
Contributioni = α0 + α1Limitationi + ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + εi   1) 
where Contribution is logged contributions and Limitation is campaign 
regulations.  YDj  is YD2 = 1992, YD3 = 1994, YD4 = 1995, YD5 = 1996, YD6 = 1997, 
YD7 = 1998, YD8 = 1999 and YD9 = 2000.  YD1 = 1990 is used as base category.   
The full statistical model involves political control variables and demographic 
control variables.  The equation can be stated as follows: 
Contributioni = α0 + α1Limitationi + α2IPCi,+ α3Gvernment Statusi  
+ α4Partisan Strengthi +  α5Open Seati + α6Incomei  
+ α7Collegei + ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ  + εi    2) 
where Contribution is logged contributions, Limitation is contribution limits, IPC 
is interparty competition, Government Status is whether or not government is divided, 
Partisan Strength is the level of partisan strength in a state, Open Seat is open seat 
election, Income is the wealth of states, College is the level of education, and YDj  is 
YD2 = 1992, YD3 = 1994, YD4 = 1995, YD5 = 1996, YD6 = 1997, YD7 = 1998, YD8 = 
1999 and YD9 = 2000.  YD1 = 1990 is used as base category.  The indicator “i” refers to 
state.   
A statistical model for the candidate level analysis is more complicated because of 
pooling observations, compared to the model for the state level analysis.  Since open seat 
elections comprise half of the observations (29 out of 58 elections), dropping open seat 
elections dramatically diminishes the degrees of freedom.  In addition, including open 
seat elections enriches interpretations because it makes a comparison of the effects of 
limitations for incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates possible.  To presuppose 
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different intercepts and slope coefficients, indicator variables are inserted and interacted 
with limitation variables.18  The basic equation for a preliminary analysis is as follows: 
Contributioni = β0 + β1Being Challengeri + β2Being Incumbenti  
+ β3Being Open*Limitationi + β4Being Challenger*Limitationi  
+ β5Being Incumbent*Limitationi + ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + εi.  3) 
where Contribution is logged contributions, and Limitation is contribution limits, 
Being Challenger (BC) is being a challenger, Being Incumbent (BI) is being an 
incumbent and the base category is Being Open seat candidate (BO).  Finally, YDj is 
YD2 = 1992, YD3 = 1994, YD4 = 1995, YD5 = 1996, YD6 = 1997, YD7 = 1998, YD8 = 
1999 and YD9 = 2000.  YD1 = 1990 is used as base category.  The basic equation can be 
represented below so that different intercepts and different effects of limitation by 
candidate status are articulated: 
(1) Equation for Open Seat Candidate 
Ci = β0 + β3Limitationi + ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + εi.     4) 
(2) Equation for Challenger  
Ci = (β0 + β1) + β4Limitationi + ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + εi.    5) 
(3) Equation for Incumbent 
Ci = (β0 + β2) + β5Limitationi + ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + εi.     6) 
The intercept refers to the difference resulting from different candidate statuses; 
the difference between incumbents and challengers is (β2 - β1), the difference between 
incumbents and open seat candidates is β2, and the difference between challengers and 
open seat candidates is β1.19    The effect of the limitation variable is β3 for an open seat 
candidate, β4 for a challenger, and β5 for an incumbent.   The differential effect in the 
                                                 
18 . See Berry and Feldman (1985) for the dummy variable interactive model, especially pp. 64 – 67. 
19 . When calculating the standard error of the linear combination of the estimated parameters, one needs 
consider the covariance between the estimated parameters as well as the variances of each 
parameter.  For example, the variance of the difference between incumbents and challengers is 
V(β2 - β1) = V(β2) + V(β1) - 2COV(β2, β1).   
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limitation variable is (β5 - β4) for an incumbent versus a challenger, (β5 - β3) for an 
incumbent versus an open seat candidate and (β4 - β3) for a challenger versus an open 
seat candidate.  The difference between the effects of limitation at the candidate level 
does not only reinforce the relationship between limits and the disparity between the 
numbers, but the amounts contributed to incumbents and challengers at the state level as 
well.  It enables us to compare the limitation effect between incumbents versus open seat 
candidates and challengers versus open seat candidates.  
The full statistical model for the candidate level analysis will include political and 
demographic variables, which can be stated as follows:   
Contributioni = β0 + β1Being Challengeri + β2Being Incumbenti  
+ β3Being Open*Limitationi + β4Being Challenger*Limitationi  
+ β5Being Incumbent*Limitationi + β6Partyi + β7Partisan Strengthi  
+ β8IPCi + β9Government Statusi + β10Incomei + β11Collegei  
+  ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + εi      7) 
where Being Challenger (BC) is being a challenger, Being Incumbent (BI) is being an 
incumbent and Being Open (BO) is being an open seat candidate, Limitation is 
contribution limits, Party is party affiliation, Partisan Strength is the level of partisan 
strength in a state, IPC is interparty competition, Government status is whether a 
government is unified by a candidate’s, Income is wealth of state, College is education 
level.  YDj is YD2 = 1992, YD3 = 1994, YD4 = 1995, YD5 = 1996, YD6 = 1997, YD7 = 
1998, YD8 = 1999 and YD9 = 2000.  YD1 = 1990 is used as base category. 20 
 
2.1. Methodological Concerns 
When considering a full model for the state and candidate level analyses, one 
concern emerges because of a reciprocal relationship between contributions and 
interparty competition or between contributions and a winning probability.  For the state 
level analyses; the closer the election, the more likely the contributors are to donate, and 
in turn the more competitive the election becomes.  For the candidate level analyses, I 
                                                 
20 . A statistical package used is Stata (version 7.0/SE). 
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showed that the winning probability is linearly related to the volume of contributions in 
Chapter Three (Snyder 1990 and 1993).  Further, contributions increase the winning 
probability via campaign spending (Goidel and Gross 1994; Green and Krasno 1988 and 
1990; Jacobson 1978 and 1990).  There is a reciprocal relationship between a winning 
probability and contributions; the higher the winning probability is, the more funds are 
raised and in turn the winning probability increases.   
The classical linear regression model (CLRM) is inappropriate to estimate 
reciprocal relationships.  The estimates of the endogenous variable are biased and 
inconsistent, because an endogenous variable in the right hand side is correlated with 
residuals in the equation (Goldberger 1991; Kmenta 1997).  An instrumental variable 
(IV) method is commonly recommended for estimating a reciprocal relationship (see 
Goldberger 1991 and Greene 2000 for different kinds of instrumental methods).  The 
logic of the IV method is to find an instrumental variable that is highly correlated with an 
endogenous variable in the right hand side of the equation but is not contemporaneously 
correlated with the residual.  One may use a substantive theory to find a proxy variable 
for an endogenous variable in the right hand side of the equation; one may use a 
statistical theory to predict an instrumental variable.   
I use a statistically driven IV method for the state level analysis, while a 
theoretically driven IV method is used for the candidate level analysis.  As discussed 
below in detail, because of multicollinearity and comparison difficulty, the candidate 
level analysis is forced to use a theoretically driven IV method.  
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is the most widely used technique in 
this situation.  2SLS method involves two steps of estimation.  The first step is to run 
CLRM using the endogeneous variable as the dependent variable on all the 
predetermined variables in the system of equations and get the predicted endogeneous 
variable.  The second step is to replace the endogeneous variable with the predicted 
endogeneous variable and then run CLRM again.  The equation for instrumental variable 
can be stated as follows: 
IPCi = π0 + π1Contributioni + π2IPC2i + π3Government Statusi  
+ π4Partisan Strengthi + π5Open Seati +  π6Spending Differencei  
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+ ∑
=
9
2j
jYDjθ + φiStatei + εi       8) 
Equation 8 is constructed for predicting an endogenous variable, that is, interparty 
competition, in the right hand side of Equation 2.  IPC2 is measured by an absolute 
difference in the percentage of the vote shares between the major party candidates in the 
last five gubernatorial elections, Spending Difference is a standardized spending 
difference between the major party candidates in a previous gubernatorial election, and 
State is state dummy variables (see Appendix A for a source of data and Appendix C for 
summary statistics).21 
On the other hand, one needs to consider a theoretically driven instrumental 
variable method for the candidate level analysis.  Since most incumbents are re-elected 
and thus most challengers lose elections, the predicted probability of winning an election 
is highly correlated with an indicator variable (candidate status).22  Therefore, putting 
candidate status and the predicted winning probability together generates a severe 
collinearity between them and thus either or both of the variables may have an 
insignificant relationship with contributions, even though the joint effect of the two 
variables is significant.  In addition, the predicted winning probability also has highly 
correlated interactive variables between candidate status and limitation.  Because of the 
severe multicollinearity, the estimates of candidate status and its interacted variables are 
inefficient so that the comparison between candidate statuses as well as limitation effects 
may generate statistical insignificance despite discernible difference.  Considering the 
plausible multicollinearity, a simultaneous equation model is not recommended.  I use 
candidate status as a proxy variable for the winning probability and perform CLRM. 
Second, the estimates may be biased because the number and amount of 
contribution records are truncated under the reporting threshold.  For example, in 1995 
and 1999, the state of Kentucky required itemized disclosures for contributions of more 
than $100.  If the contribution was less than $100, it did not have to be reported and thus 
may be systematically truncated.   
                                                 
21 .  I thank Thad Beyle and Jennifer M. Jensen for allowing me to use their campaign spending data. 
22 . Open seat elections are expected to be competitive and thus the winning probabilities of open seat 
candidates are between incumbents and challengers 
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The truncated proportion under the reporting threshold, however, is relatively 
small in number as well as amount of contributions.  Further, a systematic truncation does 
not seem to be a case.  Therefore, the incomplete information of contributions does not 
mislead the analyses (see Appendix B). The average truncated proportion for all 
contributions is 0.07 for the number of contributors and 0.01 for the amount of 
contributions.  The average truncated proportion for contributions to the major party 
candidates has similar figures: 0.07 for the number of contributors and 0.01 for the 
amount of contributions.  Particularistic contributions have less truncated proportion 
(0.02 for the number and 0.00 for the amount on average).  Universalistic contributions 
have more but not severely truncated proportion (0.11 for the number and 0.02 for the 
amount on average).   
For each election cycle, the truncated proportion fluctuates from 0.00 to 0.16 for 
total contributions, from 0.00 to 0.09 for particularistic contributions, and from 0.00 to 
0.23 for universalistic contributions.  In most cases, the number and amount of 
contributions under the reporting threshold are less than two decimal points.  Notably, 
every proportion for universalistic contributions is equal to or higher than that for 
particularistic contributions.  Universalistic contributors are more likely to donate under 
the reporting threshold than are particularistic contributors.  However, the proportions in 
universalistic contributions are likely to be less than two decimal points as well. 
The reason for small truncations may be that states have such low thresholds that 
contributions are reported.  Most states set the level of disclosure on itemization of 
contributions at $100.  In 1998/1999, 92% of states set the disclosure less than or equal to 
$100.23  Only 2 states required more than $200 for the disclosure (see Appendix B).24 
A third concern is the variance structure of residuals.  Analysis across states and 
over years may not produce a constant variance structure of residuals.  It may have 
                                                 
23 . The mode of distribution is $100, which is 32% of the amounts of disclosure.   
24 . One might use “a sample selection model,” because the number and amount of contributions are 
collected if the amount is more than the reporting threshold (Heckman 1979 and 1990). However, 
the sample selection bias is realized when some cases are systematically excluded from the sample 
(see Amemiya 1984 for a survey of Tobit model; Greene 2000, chapter 20; Heckman 1979; Long 
1997, chapter 7).  For example, when examining the relationship between political repression and 
economic sanctions, it may be a selection bias if repression data are collected only on sanctioned 
countries, because non-sanctioned countries are systematically excluded from the sample.  
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different variances because of temporal and/or spatial effects.25  The temporal effect 
refers to changing purchasing power over time, which changes the pool of contributors.  
The spatial effect refers to the larger pool of contributors in a state with more eligible 
voters.  I attempt to standardize campaign contribution data so that they are comparable 
across states and years.  The number of contributors is divided by the number of eligible 
voters in the state and thus the adjusted number of contributors is the number of 
contributors per eligible voter.26  The amount of contributions is divided by a deflator, 
which is 1995-based consumer price index, and by the number of eligible voters.27  The 
adjusted amount, therefore, becomes the constant amount of contributions per eligible 
voter.  Furthermore, I use dummy variables for years to control yearly difference.   
A final consideration is the problem of unknown proportions of contributions 
(Bailey 2002).  Because of ambiguity resulting from differing state reporting 
requirements, contribution records might contain a substantial proportion of unknown 
categories, thus generating biased estimates (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1990, pp.233-34).  
The average unknown proportion in this study, however, is 0.05 for the number and 0.04 
for the amount (see Appendix B).  Marginals for the unknown proportion within years 
range from 0.00 to 0.06 for the number and the amount.  The unknown proportions for 
each state are also relatively small, except Colorado and Nevada in 1998.  Most states 
have unknown proportions less than 0.10.   
After describing the characteristics of campaign contributions in Chapter Five, I 
run statistical models for political contributions in gubernatorial elections in Chapter Six.  
Campaign contributions in gubernatorial elections show a similar pattern found in 
presidential and congressional elections.  Universalistic contributions are the major 
source of contributions.  Contributors favor incumbents over challengers, although the 
difference disappears in close races.  In Chapter Six, I examine the relationship between 
                                                 
25 . Data are composed of 42 states and several election cycles.  Election cycles are 1990 (5 states), 1992 (2 
states), 1994 (5 states), 1995 (1 state), 1996 (2 states), 1997 (1 state), 1998 (30 states), 1999 (2 
states) and 2000 (10 states).   
26 .  Because of standardization, the number of contributors is no longer Poisson distribution.  In addition, to 
facilitate the interpretation, I multiply the numbers by 100 and, thus, the unit becomes the 
percentage of the number of contributors.   
27 . The deflator is acquired from World Development Indicator, 2002 (World Bank 2002).  The deflator 
reflects yearly changes in the cost of living.  The base year is 1995 which is coded as 1.  The 
amount of contributions is divided by the deflator in a year.   
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limits and contributions (total, particularistic, and universalistic) controlling for the 
confounding factors.  The findings suggest that campaign finance regulations should 
continue their current trend, because limits increase total and universalistic contributions 
and reduce the influence of particularistic contributors while limits do not result in 
exaggerating the bias that favors incumbents.  
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Chapter 5: The Patterns of Political Contributions 
 
A campaign contribution is one form of political participation (Verba, Schlozman 
and Brady 1995).  While it is a form of participation that is often controversial, it is also 
an activity that is not undertaken by most Americans.  Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) 
analysis based on the American National Election Studies’ survey data indicates that less 
than 10% of all American voters contributed to a political party or a candidate during the 
1980s.  The average amount per eligible voter is $2.32 for the House and $1.17 for the 
Senate in 1996, and $1.17 for the House and $1.18 for the Senate in 1998 (FEC 1997a 
and 1997b and 1999).1  In this chapter, I examine the general patterns of contributions to 
gubernatorial candidates.  In addition, general patterns of contributions to incumbents, 
challengers and open seat candidates are also analyzed.  All contributions are examined 
as well as patterns underlying particularistic and universalistic contributions. 
 
1. Patterns in Total Contributions 
As can be seen in Table 1, on average, less than 1% (0.57%) of all eligible voters 
contribute to any candidate for governor.  $2.61 per eligible voter is given, on average, to 
all candidates.  The major party candidates receive contributions from 0.45% of all 
eligible voters and they receive an average of $2.17 per eligible voter.  This can be 
contrasted with patterns seen in other American elections where less than 10% of eligible 
voters contribute.  However, considering that the average amount per voter to 
gubernatorial candidates is similar to the House and the Senate candidates, gubernatorial 
elections show a similar pattern seen in other American elections.   
 
                                                 
1 . The average amount per eligible voter is calculated by the author.  The average amount per eligible voter 
is the division of the total receipts, from which are subtracted candidate money and loans, by total 
voting populations. 
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Table 5.1. Total Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($)
Mean 0.57 (0.50) 2.61 (1.83) 0.45 (0.41) 2.17 (1.54) 
Median 0.35 2.20 0.29 1.76 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
As in the case of most other American elections, incumbents seem to have a 
decided advantage over challengers in the competition for contributors.  As can be seen 
in Table 5.2, 0.29% of all eligible voters contribute to incumbents while only 0.18% of 
all eligible voters contribute to challengers.  In terms of dollars and cents, incumbents 
receive, on average, $1.35 per eligible voter while challengers only receive an average of 
$0.71.  The difference in percentages is statistically significant at the .07 level while the 
difference in money is statistically different at the 0.001 level.  As shown in Table 5.3, 
the disparity in the number contributing, which is the mean of the ratios between the 
number of contributors donating to an incumbent and the number of contributors 
donating to a challenger, is 8.87 and the disparity in dollar amounts is 10.11.2, 3. 
                                                 
2 . The ratio of means [
)(
)(
YE
XE
] from Table 5.2 would be a different figure the mean of the ratios [ )(
Y
XE ] 
in Table 5.3, where X is figures for incumbents and Y is figures for challengers.  For example, the 
average number of contributors is 0.29% for incumbents and 0.18% for challengers.  The ratio 
between them is 1.61.  On the other hand, the mean of the ratios in the number in Table 5.3 is 8.87.  
Even though the standard errors of the estimate are taken into account, it seems to be too large 
difference between the ratio of means and the mean of the ratios.  However, this is because of the 
characteristics of ratio.  For example, let’s suppose that the number of contributions is 300 for 
incumbents and 100 for challengers in state A, 200 for incumbents and for challengers in state B, 
and 100 for incumbents and 300 for challengers in state C.  The ratio of means [
)(
)(
YE
XE
] is equal 
to 1 representing no biased contribution between incumbents and challengers.  On the other hand, 
the mean of ratios [ )(
Y
XE ] is 1.4 representing contributions are biased for incumbents.  Since 
students of campaign finance regulations concern the disparity, i.e., the ratio between an 
incumbent and a challenger in an election, this study focuses on the disparity measure.   
3 . It should be noted that there is a big difference between the mean and the median.  As shown in Table 
5.3, the disparity in the number is 8.87 on average and 1.61 in median, for example.  The 
difference comes from the influence of outliers which affect seriously the average measure but 
modestly the median measure.  It can be displayed as box plots (see Figure D.1. Total 
Contributions in Appendix D).  Furthermore, the distribution in lopsided elections shows a wider 
dispersion compared to in close elections.  The box plot for numbers shows that the three outliers 
appear in lopsided elections, whereas no outlier is shown in close elections.  Regarding the amount, 
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Table 5.2. Total Contributions: Candidate Level 
 Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.29 (0.25) 1.35 (0.88) 28 
 Lopsided Elections 0.28 (0.24) 1.25 (0.54) 27 
 Close Elections 0.33 (0.29) 1.67 (1.53) 7 
Challengers Total Elections 0.18 (0.22) 0.71 (0.76) 30 
 Lopsided Elections 0.15 (0.22) 0.56 (0.61) 21 
 Close Elections 0.24 (0.23) 1.06 (0.97) 9 
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.22 (0.22) 1.15 (0.88) 58 
 Lopsided Elections 0.15 (0.13) 0.97 (0.87) 16 
 Close Elections 0.25 (0.24) 1.22 (0.88) 42 
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.23 (0.24) 1.02 (0.87) 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.3. Disparity of Total Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 8.87 (16.70) 1.61 10.11 (18.69) 1.48 27 
Lopsided Elections 11.59 (18.74) 2.42 13.25 (20.93) 3.83 20 
Close Elections 1.10 (0.61) 0.82 1.14 (0.30) 1.07 7 
Figures are ratio. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
When electoral competition is considered, however, much of the incumbents’ 
advantages disappear.  As can be seen in Table 5.2, while both incumbents and 
challengers have more contributors, on a per eligible voter basis, in close elections than in 
lopsided elections, the increase is greater for challengers.    The same is true when one 
examines dollars per eligible voter. In neither case is there a statistically significant 
difference between incumbents and challengers in close races (p = 0.49 for numbers and 
p = 0.34 for dollars).  In the case of lopsided elections, incumbents are statistically more 
likely, (p = 0.08), to receive more contributions than challengers and more likely, (p = 
0.01), to receive more money than challengers.  If one examines the values for disparity 
in close elections versus those in lopsided elections, a similar pattern emerges (see Table 
                                                                                                                                                 
the four outliers appear in lopsided elections, whereas no outlier is shown in close elections.   
Without outliers, two means test can more confidently reject the null hypothesis that disparity is equal to 
one; p value for numbers is 0.021 with outliers and 0.017 without outliers, and p value for 
amounts is 0.018 with outliers and 0.007 without outliers.  The tests are two-tailed test.   
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5.3).   The disparity values for the number of contributors are 1.10 (p = 0.68) for close 
elections and 11.59 (p = 0.02) for lopsided elections.  Monetary disparity values are 1.14 
(p = 0.27) for close elections and 13.25 (p = 0.02) for lopsided elections.  Thus, in the 
case of gubernatorial elections, an incumbency advantage primarily exists in the case of 
lopsided elections. 
If one examines open seats elections, it is found that open seat candidates behave 
much like incumbents.  While incumbents, on average, have a greater number of 
contributors and receive more money than open seat candidates, there is no statistical 
difference between the two types of candidates, (p = 0.18 for the number of contributors 
and p = 0.32 for the amount of contributions).  On the other hand, open seat candidates 
receive a greater amount of contributions than challengers and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  But, once again, electoral competition does play 
an important role.  About two-thirds of the open seat elections were electorally close.  In 
close elections, there is no statistical difference between open seat candidates, 
incumbents, and challengers in both the number and the amount of contributions.  In the 
case of lopsided elections, on the other hand, open seat candidates look somewhat more 
like challengers than incumbents when considering the number of contributors per 
eligible voter.  Although there is a statistical difference (p = 0.07) between open seat 
candidates and incumbents, no statistical difference (p = 0.96) is found between open seat 
candidates and challengers.  In addition, there is no difference between open seat 
candidates and incumbents (p = 0.24) or open seat candidates and challengers (p = 0.104) 
when considering the amount of contributions per eligible voter. 
These overall patterns suggest that in many ways gubernatorial elections tend to 
operate much like other elections in America.   Incumbent candidates tend to be the 
advantaged group in America.  Gubernatorial incumbents tend to have more contributors 
and greater amounts of money than other candidates.  They have a clear advantage over 
those candidates that most concern incumbents, namely challengers. The existence of 
electoral competition, however, does fundamentally alter the nature of campaign 
contributions.4  Even though gubernatorial incumbents do have more contributors per 
                                                 
4 . At this time, the question of cause and effect cannot be answered.  That is to say, it cannot be clearly 
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eligible voter than either challengers or open seat candidates in close elections, there is no 
statistical difference among the three types of candidates.  Nor is there any statistically 
significant difference among the three types of candidates in close elections when one 
examines the money per eligible voter raised by the candidates.   It is in lopsided 
elections where incumbent gubernatorial candidates maintain their decided advantage.    
 
2. Patterns in Particularistic and Universalistic Contributions 
Particularistic contributors have a fundamentally different motivation for 
contributing than universalistic contributors.  As hypothesized in Chapter Three, this 
difference in motivation can be seen in alternative contribution strategies.  Thus, it is 
important to examine the overall patterns in universalistic contributing and particularistic 
contributing much as I just did for contributions in general.  A particularistic contributor 
is motivated by influencing policy, whereas a universalistic contributor is motivated by 
helping his or her favorite candidate.   
                                                                                                                                                 
specified whether it is the pattern of contributions that increases competition or whether it is the 
anticipation of competition that changes the patterns of contributions.  
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An examination of Tables 5.4 and 5.5 clearly shows that universalistic 
contributors are the major source of contributions for all types of candidates and elections. 
For elections with an incumbent, the number of universalistic contributors comprises 
89.49% of the total while it is 10.51% for particularistic contributors.  The total amount 
of money from universalistic contributions is 82.03% of the total while it is 17.97% for 
particularistic contributions (see Table 5.4).  A similar comparison for open seat elections 
is 86.06% and 13.94% for numbers and 77.54% and 22.46% for amounts.  This 
dominance of universalistic contributions is similar to what Ansolabehere and his 
colleagues found for federal elections in the year 2000 (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and 
Snyder 2002).  They estimated that almost 80% of the contributions to federal candidates 
came from individuals, which are universalistic contributions.   
The dominant importance of universalistic contributing exists for incumbents, 
challengers, and open seat candidates alike (see Table 5.5).  For gubernatorial incumbents, 
the percentage of the number of universalistic contributors is 88.43% while it is 11.57% 
for particularistic contributors.  A similar comparison for challengers is 86.32% and 
10.35% while it is 86.76% and 13.24% for open seat candidates.  For all three types of 
candidates, universalistic contributors give more than 85% of the contributions.  A 
similar pattern is shown in the amount of contributions.  For gubernatorial incumbents, 
the percentage of the amount of universalistic contributions is 80.15% while it is 13.89% 
for particularistic contributions.  A similar comparison for challengers is 80.11% and 
16.55% while it is 78.58% and 21.42% for open seat candidates. 
Besides the proportion of contributions, the percentage of contributors and the 
average amount of contributions, on a per eligible voter basis, also show that 
universalistic contributions are the major source of contributions.  For major party 
candidates, as shown in Table 5.6 and 5.7, the number of universalistic contributors per 
eligible voter is 0.41% while it is 0.04% for particularistic contributors.  The comparable 
dollar amount figures are $1.73 for universalistic contributors and $0.45 for 
particularistic contributors.   
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Table 5.6. Universalistic Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($)
Mean 0.52 (0.47) 2.10 (1.52) 0.41 (0.38) 1.73 (1.30) 
Median 0.34 1.70 0.26 1.33 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.7. Particularistic Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($)
Mean 0.05 (0.07) 0.51 (0.56) 0.04 (0.05) 0.45 (0.48) 
Median 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.24 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
The dominant importance of universalistic contribution appears for all types of 
candidates (see Table 5.8 and 5.9).  For gubernatorial incumbents, the number of 
universalistic contributors of all eligible voters is 0.27% while it is 0.02% for 
particularistic contributors.  A similar comparison for challengers is 0.16% and 0.01% 
while it is 0.20% and 0.02% for open seat candidates.  A similar pattern is shown in the 
amount of contributions.  For gubernatorial incumbents, the average amount of 
universalistic contributions per eligible voter is $1.08 while it is $0.27 for particularistic 
contributions.  A similar comparison for challengers is $0.58 and $0.13 while it is $0.90 
and $0.25 for open seat candidates.   
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Table 5.8. Universalistic Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.27 (0.24) 1.08 (0.72) 28 
 Lopsided Elections 0.26 (0.24) 1.01 (0.54) 21 
 Close Elections 0.30 (0.26) 1.29 (1.13) 7 
Challengers Total Elections 0.16 (0.21) 0.58 (0.62) 30 
 Lopsided Elections 0.14 (0.21) 0.47 (0.52) 21 
 Close Elections 0.22 (0.21) 0.84 (0.77) 9 
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.20 (0.20) 0.90 (0.78) 58 
 Lopsided Elections 0.14 (0.12) 0.68 (0.81) 16 
 Close Elections 0.22 (0.22) 0.99 (0.76) 42 
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.21 (0.23) 0.82 (0.71) 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.9. Particularistic Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.27 (0.31) 28 
 Lopsided Elections 0.02 (0.02) 0.24 (0.24) 21 
 Close Elections 0.04 (0.04) 0.38 (0.46) 7 
Challengers Total Elections 0.01 (0.02) 0.13 (0.20) 30 
 Lopsided Elections 0.01 (0.01) 0.08 (0.13) 21 
 Close Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.22 (0.28) 9 
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.25 (0.30) 58 
 Lopsided Elections 0.02 (0.01) 0.29 (0.38) 16 
 Close Elections 0.02 (0.04) 0.24 (0.26) 42 
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.20 (0.26) 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Incumbents raise more particularistic money and have more contributors, on a per 
eligible voter basis, than challengers.  As can be seen in Table 5.9, incumbents raise 
$0.27 per eligible voter from particularistic contributors while challengers raise $0.13 per 
eligible voter.  The number of contributors per eligible voter is 0.02% for incumbents and 
0.01% for challengers.  The difference in money between incumbents and challengers is 
statistically significant at the 0.07 level while the difference in numbers is statistically 
significant at the 0.04 level.   As shown in Table 5.10, the disparity is 8.25 for numbers 
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and 19.21 for dollars.7 
 
Table 5.10. Disparity in Particularistic Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 8.25 (20.75) 2.27 19.21 (58.88) 2.49 26 
Lopsided Elections 10.44 (23.34) 3.86 24.66 (66.52) 4.58 20 
Close Elections 0.96 (0.41) 1.06 1.04 (0.59) 0.93 6 
Figures are ratio. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Once again, however, the difference between incumbents and challengers is 
greatly modified by the closeness of the election (see Table 5.9).  While there is no 
statistically significant difference in the total amount of particularistic contributions (p = 
0.29) or in the number of such contributors (p = 0.25) between incumbents running in 
lopsided races and those running in close elections, challengers are statistically more 
likely to have more particularistic contributors (p = 0.05) and to receive more 
particularistic money (p = 0.08) when the election is close.  When the election is close, 
therefore, there is no statistically significant difference between gubernatorial incumbents 
and challengers.  This is also shown in the disparity measures where it is 10.44 in 
lopsided elections and 0.96 in close elections for the number, and 24.66 in lopsided 
elections and 1.04 in close elections for the amount (see Table 5.10).8   
Open seat candidates appear much like incumbents.  There is no statistically 
significant difference in particularistic contributing between incumbents and open seat 
                                                 
7 . Again, a big difference between the mean and the median appears.  As mentioned footnote 3, the 
difference is because of outliers in particularistic contributions.  As shown in Figure D.2. in 
Appendix D, there is a huge outlier; the outlier is for numbers (107) and amounts (297.81) in the 
2000 election of Utah.  Furthermore, the distribution in lopsided elections shows a wider 
dispersion compared to in close elections.  Without outliers, two means test can more confidently 
reject the null hypothesis; p value for numbers is 0.087 with outliers and 0.004 without outliers, 
and p value for amounts is 0.127 with outliers and 0.001 without outliers.  The tests are two-tailed 
test.   
8 . Without outliers, two means test can more confidently reject the null hypotheses that disparity is equal to 
one.  In lopsided elections, p value of disparity in numbers is 0.09 examining all observations and 
0.00 without outliers.  In lopsided elections, p value of disparity in amounts is 0.13 examining all 
observations and 0.01 without outliers.  On the other hand, in close elections the difference in p 
values between analyses with and without outliers is not noticeable; p value of disparity in 
numbers is 0.96 with outliers and 0.84 without outliers, and p value of disparity in amounts is 0.87 
with outliers and 0.87 without outliers. 
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candidates (p = 0.700 for numbers and p = 0.750 for dollars).  And, just like incumbents, 
open seat candidates are statistically more likely to receive more particularistic money, 
but not the numbers, from more particularistic contributors than challengers (p = 0.154 
for numbers and p = 0.042 for dollars).  The relationship is stronger in lopsided elections 
(p = 0.113 for numbers and p = 0.032 for dollars) while it breaks down when comparing 
open seat candidates and challengers in close elections (p = 0.944 for numbers and p = 
0.883 for dollars). 
The patterns in universalistic contributors and contributions behave much like 
those seen for particularistic contributions and contributions in general.  As shown in 
Table 5.8, incumbents receive more universalistic contributions, $1.08 per eligible voter, 
than challengers, $0.58 per eligible voter and they have more universalistic contributors, 
0.27%, than challengers, 0.16% (p = 0.089 for numbers and p = 0.006 for amounts).  The 
disparity between incumbents and challengers is 9.11 for numbers and 10.34 for amounts 
as shown in Table 5.11 below.9   
 
Table 5.11. Disparity in Universalistic Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 9.11 (17.26) 1.63 10.34 (18.72) 1.37 27 
Lopsided Elections 11.89 (19.39) 2.67 13.56 (20.91) 4.51 20 
Close Elections 1.14 (0.67) 0.79 1.14 (0.25) 1.10 7 
Figures are ratio. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
There is no statistical difference in either the number of contributors or in the 
average amount of contributions raised between incumbents and candidates in open seat 
elections (p = 0.177 for numbers and p = 0.304 for amounts).  In addition, candidates in 
open seat elections are more likely to raise, on average, more money (p = 0.054) than 
challengers, although it is not statistically likely to have more universalistic contributions 
                                                 
9 . As shown in total and particularistic contributions, there is a big difference between the mean disparity 
and the median disparity.  The difference stems from outliers as displayed in Figure D.3. 
Universalistic Contributions in Appendix D.  P value for two means test is 0.022 with outliers and 
0.032 without outliers in the disparity of the number; p value is 0.016 with outliers and 0.012 
without outliers in the disparity of the amount.   
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than challengers (p = 0.451).   
As was true in the case of particularistic contributions and contributions in general, 
in close elections there is no statistically significant difference between incumbents and 
challengers, incumbents and open seat candidates, and challengers and open seat 
candidates.  This holds whether one considers either the number of universalistic 
contributors or the amount of universalistic contributions.10  While incumbents do better 
than challengers in lopsided elections, as in the case of contributions in general, open seat 
candidates behave much more like challengers in lopsided elections.  In fact, when 
examining only lopsided elections, there is no statistical difference between challengers 
and open seat candidates in either the number of universalistic contributions (p = 0.942) 
or in the amount of such contributions (p = 0.350).  The disparity between incumbents 
and challengers, as shown in Table 5.11, is 11.89 for numbers and 13.56 for amounts in 
lopsided elections and 1.14 for both numbers and amounts in close elections. 
There is one difference, however, between the patterns underlying universalistic 
contributions and those seen underlying particularistic contributions and contributions in 
general.  Challengers are statistically more like to make greater particularistic 
contributors and to receive larger particularistic monies when the election is close.  In the 
case of universalistic contributions, challengers do not do statistically better in close 
elections.  If one compares challengers in close elections with those in lopsided elections, 
there is no statistically significant difference in either the number of contributors (p = 
0.37) or in the amount of the contributions (p = 0.14).  This appears to result from the 
wide dispersion in universalistic contributions depending upon whether or not the 
election is expected to be competitive.  The standard error of the difference in the number 
of universalistic contributors between close and lopsided for challengers is 0.08 while it 
is 0.24 when considering dollar amounts.  This can be compared to similar standard error 
values of 0.01 and 0.07 for particularistic contributions.  These standard error values 
indicate that the dispersion of contributions to challengers when comparing close and 
                                                 
10. P value for incumbents vs. challengers is 0.512 for numbers and 0.356 for amounts; p value for 
incumbents vs. open seat candidates is 0.439 for numbers and 0.361 for amounts; and p value for 
challengers vs. open seat candidates is 0.951 for numbers and p = 0.600 for amounts.   
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lopsided elections is much wider when considering universalistic contributions than when 
considering particularistic contributions.   
 
3. Conclusion 
The general patterns underlying universalistic contributions, particularistic 
contributions, and contributions in general are all very similar.  In all cases, incumbents 
have more contributors per eligible voter than challengers and receive more money per 
eligible voter than challengers.  The disparity measures also indicate a clear advantage for 
incumbents over challengers. Open seat candidates are much like incumbents and have 
more contributors per eligible voter and receive more money per eligible voter than 
challengers. 
The closeness of the election fundamentally affects the relationships among 
incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates.  The advantage of being an incumbent 
is most evident in lopsided elections.  In close elections there is no statistical difference 
between incumbents or challengers either in terms of the number of contributors or in 
terms of the total amount of contributions.  Likewise, in the case of close elections there 
is no statistical difference between challengers and those running in open seat elections.  
These two findings hold whether one examines universalistic contributions, particularistic 
contributions, or contributions in general.     
In the case of lopsided elections, incumbents are much more likely to have more 
contributors and higher total monetary contributions than challengers.  Incumbents also 
tend to do better, in the case of universalistic contributions and contributions in general, 
than candidates in lopsided open seat elections.  In lopsided elections, open seat 
candidates have values that are not statistically different from challengers in the case of 
universalistic contributions and contributions in general.  On the other hand, in the case 
of particularistic contributions, open seat candidates in lopsided elections have 
contribution levels similar to those of incumbents. 
It is clear that universalistic contributors and contributions dominate the 
gubernatorial finance system.  Seventy-five to eighty percent of the money raised tends to 
come from universalistic contributors.  The dominance of universalistic contributions 
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likely helps explain why the patterns for contributions in general more closely follow 
those for universalistic contributions as compared to those for particularistic contributions.   
The hypotheses generated in Chapter Three suggest that the motivational 
differences between universalistic and particularistic contributors ought to result in 
different contribution strategies particularly when comparing incumbents and challengers.  
It is interesting to note that the overall patterns comparing incumbents and challengers 
discussed in this chapter were the same whether one considered universalistic 
contributors or particularistic contributors.  Only the patterns for open seat candidates 
seemed to differ depending upon whether one was examining universalistic contributors 
or particularistic contributors.  When considering lopsided elections, open seat candidates 
had figures similar to incumbents in the case of particularistic contributions but figures 
similar to challengers in the case of universalistic contributions.  These findings suggest 
that future work should re-examine the motivational strategies underlying both 
universalistic and particularistic contributors. 
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Chapter 6: The Democracy of Political Contributions 
 
Supporters of campaign contribution limits argue that contribution limits reduce 
the influence of particularistic contributions and increase the participation of 
universalistic contributors.  Critics suggest that contribution limits have the unintended 
consequence of increasing financial bias in favor of incumbents.  In this chapter these 
claims are tested.  As argued in Chapter Three, it is important to consider the possibility 
that contribution limits can have different consequences for different types of 
contributors.  In particular, I argued that, in the case of particularistic contributors, 
contribution limits would reduce the number of contributors and the amount of 
contributions.  Further, contribution limits would have the effect of increasing the 
disparity in contributions between incumbents and challengers.  In the case of 
universalistic contributions, I argued that contribution limits would not affect either the 
number or amount of contributions.  Disparity between incumbents and challengers 
would also not be affected by the existence of contribution limits.  The overall effect of 
contribution limits cannot be determined unless it is possible to determine the balance 
between particularistic and universalistic contributors in any given setting.   
This chapter begins by analyzing total contributions at the state level followed by 
a candidate level analysis of total contributions.  I then turn to an examination of 
particularistic contributors.  The third major section of this chapter examines 
universalistic contributors. 
 
1. Total Contributions and Contribution Limits 
1.1. State Level Analyses 
Table 6.1 shows the results of a number of analyses examining the effects of 
contribution limits under different scenarios.1, 2  In all cases, Model 1 is a simplified 
analysis merely examining the effect of contribution limits while only using yearly 
dummy variables as a control for the effect of time.  Model 2 is a fully developed model 
                                                 
1 . Limitation on all contributions is the sum of particularistic and universalistic contribution limits.  The 
range is from 0 (no limitation) to 4 (restrictive limitation).   
2 . Because of the space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.1.  The 
full statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
 62
that includes theoretically important control variables. 
All of the signs of the coefficients associated with the limitation variable in Table 
6.1 support the arguments put forward by supporters of contribution limits.  Contribution 
limits appear to increase the number of contributors to all candidates, decrease the 
amount of money contributed, and decrease the dollar amount per contribution.3  Most of 
the coefficients in Table 6.1, however, are simply not statistically significant.   
If the initial discussion is confined to a consideration of the fully developed model 
(Model 2), then contribution limits appear to have little effect on the total amount of 
money contributed to candidates.4  While the coefficients are in the correct direction, 
their values are far from statistical significance, p = 0.88 for the analysis considering all 
candidates and p = 0.41 for the analysis involving only major party candidates.  Nor do 
contribution limits appear to have any statistical effect on the number of contributions 
given to major party candidates, p = 0.18.  When considering the number of contributions 
to all candidates, it appears that contribution limits do have an effect that is properly 
signed and statistically significant; a coefficient of 0.18, and a p value of 0.04.5 
                                                 
3 . Whether one utilizes a dummy variable or particularistic and universalistic contribution limits for total 
contribution limits does not make a difference to the importance of the limitation on all 
contributions.  The results are available from the author.   
In addition, I run random effects model, on a per capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since 
using that method does not affect the interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an 
examination on the results using 2SLS.  The results are available from the author.   
4 . This conforms with the analysis of Gross and Goidel (2003) that found that contribution limits were not 
related to the average expenditure of gubernatorial candidates. 
5 . Since the dependent variable (numbers and amounts) is transformed into natural logarithm, we can 
interpret the effect of one unit change of the independent variable on the dependent variable as a 
ratio change, 
B
BA
B
A
BA X
XX
X
XXX −≅=−=
ln
ln
lnln
^β , where AX  is the expectation of 
the dependent variable after one unit change in the independent variable and BX  is the 
expectation of the dependent variable before the change made.  To facilitate the interpretation, I 
use a percentage term in the main text after multiplying by 100.   On the other hand, the unit of the 
amount per contribution is a constant dollar per contribution.  I thank M. M. Ali for his comment 
on this regard.   
One caution should be made when interpreting the limitation variable.  Since the limitation variable is an 
ordinal variable, it is hard to provide the substantive meaning on the effect of limits given one unit 
change, because one may assign any arbitrary number to an ordinal level variable if the rank of 
order does not change.  For example, one can assign no limitation 1 and some limitation 2, or no 
limitation 100 and some limitation 200.  The different assignment scheme does not change the 
direction and significance of the limitation variable, but does change the effect of the limitation by 
1/100.  The other measurement scheme is to generate a dummy variable representing no limitation 
and some limitation.  However, in this way, some information in contribution limits will be lost.  
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An examination of the other variables shown in Table 6.1 indicates that most do 
not have a statistically significant effect on either the number of contributors nor the total 
amount of contributions.  The exception to this generalization is the effect of interparty 
competition on the total amount of contributions for all candidates.  In this case, more 
competition tends to result in greater amounts of money.6  If electoral competition moves 
from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the total amount of all contributions to 
all candidates increases by 30.48%. 7   This type of relationship between interparty 
competition and the levels of money raised in an election is not surprising.  Most existing 
research indicates such a relationship (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and 
Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980).  If there is any surprise in this analysis, it is that the 
interparty competition variable does not reach statistical significance for any of the other 
analyses.  
None of the remaining political variables in Table 6.1 has statistically significant 
effects.  Even though three of the four coefficients for the partisan strength variable do 
have a correct sign, contrary to the work of Snyder (1990), none of them is statistically 
significant.  The government status variable, indicating the absence or presence of a 
divided government, has no significant effect in any of the analyses, as shown in Table 
6.1.  Finally, whether or not the election has an open seat has no statistically significant 
effect.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Therefore, I keep the level of contribution limits ordinal and discuss the direction and significance 
of the limitation effect, while I discuss the substantive meaning of the other variables which have a 
meaningful unit.   
6. Interparty competition is measured by the absolute difference between the vote shares major party 
candidates receive.  The smallest difference indicates the most competitive election while the 
largest difference indicates the least competitive election.  The range of interparty competition in 
Table 6.1 is from 0.31 (most competitive) to 58.34 (least competitive).  Therefore, a negative 
value on the coefficient, -0.016, indicates a positive relationship, i.e. more competition leads to 
more contributions.   
7 . The expected value is computed by the difference in the interparty competition, i.e., 30.48% = 100*[-
0.016*(5.38 – 24.43)]. 
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In a similar vein, none of the demographic variables has statistically significant 
effects.  Income and education, often used as measures for the pool of potential 
contributors, do not even have coefficients that have consistent signs across the analyses.  
For example, education has a negative sign for the analysis examining the number of 
contributions for all candidates while it is positive for the analysis examining the number 
of contributions for the major party candidates.  All in all, the analyses discussed so far 
simply do not conform very well with expectations. 
Do contribution limits decrease the average amount of each contribution as 
supporters of contribution limits suggest?  Since contribution limits appear to increase the 
number of contributors, but do not appear to affect the total amount of contributions, it 
seems reasonable to expect that contribution limits would possibly reduce the average 
amount of each contribution.  To examine this possibility, the amount per contribution is 
calculated by taking the standardized amount of contributions to the major party 
candidates and dividing it by the standardized number of contributors to the major party 
candidates.8  The amount per contribution is then used as the dependent variable in an 
analysis using the same independent variables used in the previous analyses in this 
chapter.  The results are shown in Table 6.1.   
In the case of both models, contribution limits do tend to decrease the average 
amount per contribution for the major party candidates. 9   The coefficient for the 
limitation variable is negative, -1.509 for Model 2, and statistically significant at the 0.05 
level.  Thus, much as supporters of contribution limits had hoped, contribution limits do 
seem to reduce the average amount per contribution suggesting a possible democratizing 
effect.  While a number of the other substantive variables in the equation do have the 
correct sign, none of them achieves statistical significance. 
If the supporters of contribution limits are correct about the democratizing effect 
                                                 
8 . Standardized figures are used, instead of raw figures, because amounts should be adjusted by a deflator 
in order to eliminate time effect.  Except for the difference by the deflator, the amount per 
contribution is the same figure regardless of using standardized or raw figures, because eligible 
voters are cancelled out in standardized figures.  The unit of the amount per contribution is a 
constant dollar based on the year 1995.   
9 . Since no substantive difference is found between the results examined for all and the major party 
candidates, I will confine my discussion on the results for the major party candidates.  See I. 
Regression of Average Amount per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results 
for all candidates.    
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of contribution limits, as my findings suggest, what of the argument by critics that 
contribution limits increase a bias in favor of incumbents?  To examine this question, 
three disparity measures are examined.  Disparity in numbers is the number of 
contributors to the incumbent divided by the number of contributors to the challenger.  
Disparity in amounts is the total dollar value for all contributions to the incumbent 
divided by the total dollar value for all contributions to the challenger.  Finally, disparity 
of amount per contribution is the amount per contribution for the incumbent divided the 
amount per contribution for the challenger.10 
Each of the three disparity measures is regressed on the same variables used in the 
previous analyses in this chapter.  The results are shown in Table 6.2.11, 12  Since it seems 
to make little substantive difference in the importance of the limitation variable, I will 
confine my comments to a consideration of the results for Model 2.13   
Contribution limits are not statistically related to any of the three disparity 
measures.  Even the signs of the coefficients for the contribution limit variable are not 
consistent across the three measures of disparity.  It is positive for the case of disparity in 
numbers and negative for the other two disparity measures.  This suggests that there is no 
evidence to suggest that contribution limits increase bias in favor of incumbents. 
                                                 
10 . Raw figures are used to compute disparity measures for the number, the amount and the average amount 
per contribution.  Using raw or standardized figures does not make a difference on the disparity 
measures, because the number of eligible voters in denominator is cancelled out, and so does the 
deflator.   
11 . Because of the space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.2.  The 
full statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
12  . One may argue that contribution limits increase the difference between contributions donated to 
candidates.  To examine this possibility, I construct a difference measure, which is the absolute 
difference between contributions donated to the two major party candidates, and then divided by 
the sum of contributions donated to the two major party candidates.  The difference measure is 
used as the dependent variable in an analysis using the same independent variables used in the 
previous analyses when examining the disparity measure.  None of the difference measures are 
statistically significant whether one examines the number of contributors, the amount of 
contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are available from the author.   
13 . In addition, I confine my comments on a consideration of the results utilizing all observations, because 
there is little substantive difference in the importance of the limitation variable between the results 
with and without outliers.  See II. Regression of Disparity without Outliers in Appendix G for the 
statistical results using samples without outliers.   
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Table 6.2. Limitation and Disparity in Total Contributions  
  Number   Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Limitation 1.153 1.582 -0.420 -0.445 -0.155 -0.196 
  (1.664) (1.250) (2.168) (2.283) (0.187) (0.173) 
IPC   0.686***   0.521*  -0.009 
    (0.143)   (0.261)  (0.020) 
Partisan Strength   0.150   0.251  0.057** 
    (0.188)   (0.344)  (0.026) 
Government Status   -1.601   -5.959  0.489 
    (4.541)   (8.291)  (0.629) 
Income   -0.012   -0.015  -0.000 
    (0.013)   (0.023)  (0.002) 
College   -0.862*   -0.994  0.110 
    (0.461)   (0.842)  (0.064) 
Constant 4.362 -4.460 4.585 1.861 1.281 -2.047 
  (8.219) (11.595) (10.705) (21.170) (0.925) (1.607) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.63 0.86 0.50 0.64 0.22 0.57 
F Test 5.70 8.68 3.34 2.41 0.96 0.75 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.48 0.71 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Most of the other variables in the disparity analyses are not consistently related to 
the level of disparity between incumbents and challengers.  The exception is interparty 
competition.  In the case of disparity in numbers there is a positive coefficient, 0.69, that 
is statically significant indicating that the greater the competition the lower the disparity 
in numbers between incumbents and challengers.14  In a similar vein, when analyzing 
disparity in amounts, the positive, 0.521, and statistically significant coefficient for the 
interparty competition variable indicates that the greater the competition, the lower the 
disparity in the total amount of money raised by incumbents versus challengers.   These 
results are much as one would expect given previous findings on the relationship between 
competition and contribution patterns (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and 
Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980).  As Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell (2000) observed, 
contributors are more likely to donate when party competition becomes competitive, i.e., 
front-runners droop or prospective challengers rise, or both.   
Partisan strength in a state does seem to affect the disparity in the amount per 
contribution, but does not seem to have a statistically significant effect on either disparity 
in numbers or disparity in amounts.  All of the signs for the coefficients associated with 
partisan strength are in the correct direction, positive, but, only reaches significance in 
one of the three cases. Therefore, it would be inappropriate at this time to put much 
credence in the importance of partisan strength.  A similar argument can be made about 
the two demographic variables, which can be viewed as indirect measures of the pool of 
possible contributors.  The level of education variable behaves as expected in the case of 
disparity in numbers, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, but is not 
statistically significant in the case of the remaining two disparity measures.  Income is 
not statistically related to any of the disparity measures.  Thus, at this time, there is 
simply insufficient evidence to support the importance of either to the levels of disparity 
in gubernatorial elections. 
Up to this point, I have focused on the state as the level of analysis.  I have 
examined the number of contributors and the total amount of contributions to all 
                                                 
14 . Once again, interparty competition is measured as the smallest number refers to the most competitive 
elections while the largest number refers to the least competitive elections.  Therefore, given that 
elections gets more competitive, the disparity between incumbents and challengers lowers.   
 69
candidates or to the major party candidates in the state as a whole.  The analysis has 
provided some support to the proponents of contribution limits.  In the state as a whole, 
contribution limits do seem to increase the number of contributors and reduce the amount 
per contribution suggesting a possible democratization effect.  On the other hand, 
contribution limits do not seem to increase the disparity between incumbents and 
challengers.  Only in the case of interparty competition as it affects disparity, do any of 
my control variables seem to operate consistently in a manner expected.  In the next 
section of this chapter, I move to a consideration of candidate level data.  This will allow 
me to more precisely evaluate the importance of contribution limits, particularly in light 
of the potential effects of differences among incumbents, challengers, and open seat 
candidates. 
 
1.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 6.3 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of contributors per 
eligible voter and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for candidates.15  
Dummy variables are used to evaluate the differential effects of whether a candidate is an 
incumbent, a challenger or a candidate in an open seat election.  Finally, interaction terms 
are used to determine if any effects that are the result of contribution limits are dependent 
upon whether the candidate is an incumbent, a challenger or an open seat candidate.  
Once again, I will focus on the coefficients for Model 2. 
Being a Challenger (BC) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the candidate is a 
challenger and 0 otherwise.  Being an Incumbent (BI) is a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
candidate is an incumbent and 0 otherwise.  A base category is being an open seat 
candidate (BO).  The interaction term between BI and the limitation variable can be used, 
therefore, to estimate if the limitation variable has a statistically significant effect when 
the candidate is an incumbent.  In a similar vein, the interaction between BC and the 
limitation variable can be used to estimate if the limitation variable has a statistically 
significant effect on challengers.  Finally, the interactive term between BO and the 
limitation variable can be used to estimate if the limitation variable has a statistically 
                                                 
15 . Because of the space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.3.  The 
full statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
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different effect when the candidate is an open seat candidate.  
The limitation variable does seem to increase the number of contributors per 
eligible voter to open seat candidates.  The coefficient is positive, 0.18, and statistically 
significant.  The limitation variable does not seem to have a statistically significant effect 
on the amount per eligible voter contributed to open seat candidates.  On the other hand, 
the interaction terms for incumbents and challengers are not statistically significant.  As 
shown in Table 6.3, no differential effect of the limitation between incumbents and 
challengers is statistically supported in the number of contributors per eligible voter or 
the amount of contributions per eligible voter. 16   
The BI dummy variable is statistically significant in the analysis examining the 
number of contributors per eligible voter.  Since the coefficient is positive, 1.06, it seems 
that, all other things being equal, incumbents do have a larger number of contributors per 
eligible voter than open seat candidates.  Since the BC dummy variable is not statistically 
significant, it appears that challengers are not statistically more likely to receive more 
contributors per eligible voter than open seat candidates.   
                                                 
16 . The method of the linear combination is performed to estimate the difference in the limitation effect 
between incumbents and challengers.  The difference estimate is the difference between the effects 
for incumbents and challengers, (Limitation*BI – Limitation*BC).  The variance of the difference 
estimate takes into account the variance of each term and the covariance between them, i.e., V 
(Limitation*BI – Limitation*BC) = V (Limitation*BI) + V (Limitation*BC) - 2COV 
(Limitation*BI, Limitation*BC).  The expected differential effect of the limitation on the number 
of contributors is 0.090 = (-0.102 + 0.192) and its variance is 0.045 = [0.035 + 0.034 - 2*(.012)].  
Its p value is 0.670.  The expected difference on the amount of contributions is 0.149 and its p 
value is 0.420.  I use the linear combination method called “lincom” in Stata (version 7/SE).  The 
same method is utilized for particularistic and universalistic contributions when the linear 
combination of the limitation effects between incumbents and challengers is estimated.    
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Table 6.3. Limitation and Total Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number    Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.204 0.155 -0.815* -0.355 -6.226** -6.518** 
  (0.514) (0.515) (0.457) (0.450) (2.875) (2.974) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.746 1.060** 0.255 0.667 -4.723 -5.142* 
  (0.514) (0.515) (0.457) (0.450) (2.874) (2.976) 
Limitation*BO 0.181 0.180* -0.076 -0.076 -2.152*** -2.150*** 
  (0.111) (0.108) (0.098) (0.094) (0.619) (0.623) 
Limitation*BC -0.001 -0.013 -0.183 -0.160 -1.104 -0.887 
  (0.157) (0.154) (0.140) (0.134) (0.879) (0.887) 
Limitation*BI 0.097 0.077 -0.030 -0.010 -1.002 -0.771 
  (0.159) (0.156) (0.141) (0.136) (0.889) (0.898) 
Party   -0.200  -0.161   0.253 
    (0.221)  (0.193)   (1.277) 
Partisan Strength   -0.013  -0.009   0.010 
    (0.014)  (0.012)   (0.082) 
IPC   -0.027***  -0.033***   0.039 
    (0.010)  (0.009)   (0.058) 
Government Status   0.171  0.169   0.355 
    (0.187)  (0.163)   (1.080) 
Income   -0.001  0.000   0.010** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.005) 
College   0.012  -0.010   -0.126 
    (0.030)  (0.026)   (0.171) 
Constant -2.404*** -1.402 0.013 1.378 16.524*** 17.712*** 
  (0.429) (1.091) (0.381) (0.953) (2.400) (6.298) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.25 0.29 
F Test 2.47 2.50 3.74 3.71 2.56 2.09 
Probability > F  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  0.905   1.069**   1.377 BI - BC 
    (0.562)  (0.513)   (3.242) 
  0.090  0.153   0.116 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC    (0.211)   (0.193)   (1.219) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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If we turn our attention to the analysis of the amount per eligible voter, none of 
the dummy variables indicating candidate status is statistically significant.  The signs for 
the two dummy variables appear to be correct, suggesting that incumbents receive more 
money than candidates in open seat races and that challengers tend to receive less money 
than candidates in open seat races.  A statistically significant difference is found only 
between incumbents and challengers (see the bottom of Table 6.3).  Incumbents raise 
greater amounts compared to challengers, and the difference is statistically supported at 
the 0.05 level.17  Given the lack of statistical significance of the other comparisons, it 
appears that the comparison between incumbents and challengers can be seen as only a 
systematic difference in the amount of contributions per eligible voter.  
The interparty competition variable behaves much better in the candidate level 
analysis than it did in the state level analysis.  Whether one examines the number of 
contributors per eligible voter or the amount of contributions per eligible voter, interparty 
competition has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.027, for the number of 
contributors and -0.033, for the amount of contributions.  This is very much in line with 
findings of existing research.  As elections become more competitive, there tends to be an 
increase in the number of contributors and an increase in the size of a candidate’s war-
chest (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 
1980). 18   Based on the analysis shown in Table 6.3, if an election becomes more 
competitive, say from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, the number of contributors 
increases by 51.44% and the amount of contributions goes up by 62.87%.19  Other than 
the interparty competition variable, none of the other control variables has any consistent 
statistically significant effect on either the number of contributors nor the amount of 
contributions.  This is similar to what was seen in the state level analysis. 
If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 6.3, the amount per 
contribution, it is shown that the limitation variable behaves much as it did in the state 
                                                 
17. Once again, I performed the method of the linear combination to estimate the difference between 
incumbents and challengers.  The difference is 1.069 and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
18 . As mentioned before, interparty competition is measured as the smallest difference refers to the most 
competitive election while the largest difference refers to the least competitive election.   
19 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile (more competitive election) and 24.43 
for the 75th percentile (less competitive election).  The difference between the percentiles is 
multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.027 for the numbers and -0.033 for the amounts.   
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level analysis.  The operationalization of the amount per contribution variable is 
constructed in a manner similar to that in the state level analysis.  The only difference is 
that in this analysis each case represents a candidate, while in the state level analysis each 
case represented the sum of the two major party candidates.  The limitation variable has a 
negative effect on the amount per contribution for open seat candidates, and is 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  Contribution limits do seem to reduce the average 
amount per contribution that an open seat candidate receives.  Once again, this supports 
the argument put forward by advocates of contribution limits.  Since contribution limits 
do not seem to have a statistically significant effect on the average amount per 
contribution that incumbents or challengers receive, however, the effect is likely to be 
limited to open seat candidates.  This suggests that the democratic effect that is the result 
of the limitation is likely to be limited to open seat elections.   
If one focuses on the two dummy variables for being a challenger and for being 
an incumbent in the amount per contribution analysis in Table 6.3, it is shown that both 
tend to reduce the amount per contribution compared to that for candidates in open seat 
elections.   Being a challenger has a statistically significant negative coefficient, as does 
the variable representing being an incumbent.  The analysis suggests that, all other things 
being equal, candidates in open seat elections tend to receive the most amount of money 
per contribution while challengers tend, on average, to receive the least money per 
contribution.   
With the exception of the income variable, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.  The income variable 
suggests that a wealthy state tends to contribute a larger average amount per contribution 
compared to a poor state.20   Even though interparty competition seemed to affect both 
the number of contributors and the amount of contributions, it did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the amount per contribution.  This suggests that the traditional 
finding that party competition tends to be associated with more expensive races is 
perhaps the result of competition spurring greater numbers of contributors, rather than 
individuals giving more per contribution. 
                                                 
20 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
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The candidate level analysis is even more supportive of the arguments put 
forward by the advocates of contribution limits than the state level analysis.  The 
existence of campaign contribution limits does tend to significantly increase the number 
of contributors and to significantly decrease the average amount per contribution.  This 
clearly suggests a democratization effect: more contributors and the value of each 
contribution, with its potential for undue influence, are reduced.  Critics have suggested 
that contribution limits   may increase bias in favor of incumbents.  The state level 
analysis indicated that contribution limits had no statistically significant effect on the 
disparity between incumbents and challengers.  The candidate level analysis indicates 
that while incumbents did tend to have, on average, more contributors per eligible voter 
and greater contributions per eligible voter, contribution limits have no statistical effect 
that was dependent upon whether a candidate was an incumbent, a challenger, or an open 
seat candidate.  Further, while there was a statistically significant difference between 
being a challenger versus being an open seat candidate, and between being an incumbent 
versus being an open seat candidate in terms of the average amount per contribution, the 
differences were not affected in any statistically significant way by the presence or 
absence of contribution limits.  The suggestion that contribution limits tend to help 
incumbents is simply not supported by the findings in these analyses. 
The analyses to this point have focused on all contributions.  The theoretical 
discussion in Chapter Three, however, suggests that the effects of contribution limits 
ought to be different for particularistic contributors compared to universalistic 
contributors.  In the next section of this chapter, I focus on the effects of contribution 
limits for particularistic contributors. 
 
2. Particularistic Contributors and Contribution Limits 
In Chapter Three, I adopted a theoretical framework that emphasized the 
differential effects of regulations for two distinctive types of contributors.  Particularistic 
contributors, who have a motivation of influencing policy, are likely to be affected by 
contribution limits.  Universalistic contributors, who have a motivation of helping his or 
her favorite candidates, are not likely to be affected by contribution limits.  In this section, 
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four hypotheses are tested in the context of particularistic contributions.  First, the 
presence of contribution limits will reduce the number of particularistic contributions per 
eligible voter.  Second, the presence of contribution limits will reduce the amount of 
particularistic contributions per eligible voter.  Third, contribution limits will increase the 
disparity in the number of particularistic contributions between incumbents and 
challengers.  Fourth, contribution limits will increase the disparity in the amount of 
particularistic contributions between incumbents and challengers.  I begin with state level 
analyses and then move to a consideration of candidate level analyses. 
 
2.1. State Level Analyses 
The analyses shown in Table 6.4 support the first and second hypotheses. 21  
Whether one examines Model 1 or Model 2, or whether one examines all candidates or 
just the major party candidates, contribution limits decrease the number of particularistic 
contributions per eligible voter.22  The signs of the coefficients are negative and they are 
all statistically significant.  In a similar vein, contribution limits decrease the amount of 
particularistic contributions per eligible voter.  The signs of the coefficients are negative 
and statistically significant.   
Of all the substantively important control variables shown in Table 6.4, only 
interparty competition has a statistically significant effect on the number or amount of 
particularistic contributions; and, the effect is limited to the case of all candidates.  If the 
competitiveness of the elections is changed from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, 
then the number of contributions will be increased by 47.63% and the amount will be 
increased by 36.20%.23  Particularistic contributors can be seen as “investors,” or possible 
                                                 
21 . Because of space limitations, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.4.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
22 . Particularistic contribution limits are a composite variable of limitations on corporations, labor unions, 
and PACs.  The limitation variable is coded as 0 if no limitation is on PAC contributions 
regardless of corporation and labor union contribution limits, 1 if some limits are on corporations, 
labor unions and PACs, and 2 if corporations or labor unions are prohibited from contributing with 
some limits on PACs.   
23 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile and 24.43 for the 75th percentile.  The 
difference between the percentiles is multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.025 for the numbers 
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even “risk seekers.” Thus, as suggested in previous research, particularistic contributors 
might be more willing to contribute when elections are competitive because the value of 
contributions becomes higher (Austen-Smith 1995 and 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; 
Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Magar 1999; Jones and Hopkins 1985; 
Snyder 1990 and 1993; Stratmann 1998).24  This state level analysis, however, simply 
cannot determine whether this change is more advantageous to incumbents or challengers.  
As shown in Table 6.4, contribution limits do not have a statistically significant 
effect on the amount per particularistic contribution.25  This is very different from what 
was seen when the analysis focused on all contributions, as shown in Table 6.1, where 
limits did have a statistically significant negative effect.  The lack of an effect for 
contribution limits in the case of particularistic contributions is likely due to the fact that 
limits significantly reduce both the number and amount of particularistic contributions.  
Since both are reduced, the overall effect is insignificant when one examines the amount 
per contribution. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and -0.019 for the amounts.   
24 . The opposite concept is risk-averse, which refers to the increasing contributions with sure-bet because a 
contribution is seen as “insurance” (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Hinich 1977).  
25 . Since no substantive difference is found between the results examined for all and the major party 
candidates, I will discuss the results for the major party candidates.  See I. Regression of Average 
Amount per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results for all candidates.    
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What of hypotheses three and four?  The theory presented in Chapter Three 
suggested that regulations would increase the disparity between incumbents and 
challengers in favor of incumbents because the marginal benefit of donating to an 
incumbent is higher than in donating to a challenger.  With a smaller pie, due to 
regulations, incumbents are favored over challengers  (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Box-
Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hinich 1977).   
The results shown in Table 6.5 indicate that contribution limits affect the disparity 
between incumbents and challengers. 26 , 27   Contrary to the theoretical expectations 
expressed in hypotheses three and four, however, the effect of contribution limits 
decreases the disparity in particularistic contributions between incumbents and 
challengers. 28   When considering the disparity in the number of contributions, the 
coefficient of the contribution limit variable is negative, -8.772, and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient is also negative, -30.111, and statistically significant when 
considering disparity in the amount of particularistic contributions.  Contrary to  
expectations, these findings indicate that particularistic contribution limits help to level 
the playing field between incumbents and challengers. 
Interparty competition (IPC) tends to reduce the disparity in the number of 
particularistic contributions but not in the amount of particularistic contributions.  This 
suggests that the view of particularistic contributors as investors might be correct.  It was 
shown in Table 6.4 that increased interparty competition tended to increase the number of 
particularistic contributors.  It also decreases the disparity in the number of particularistic 
contributors, as shown in Table 6.5, suggesting that challengers may be receiving a larger 
share of the increase resulting from greater interparty competition.   Thus, as the playing 
field becomes more level, particularistic contributors are more willing to invest in 
challengers.   
                                                 
26 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.5.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
27 . None of the difference measures are statistically significant whether one examines the number of 
contributors, the amount of contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are 
available from the author.   
28 . When excluding outliers, the limitation variable is not statistically significant even at the 0.10 level.  In 
any case, however, the empirical evidence does not support the critics’ argument of increasing bias 
for incumbents.  See II. Regression of Disparity without Outliers in Appendix G in detail. 
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Table 6.5. Limitation and Disparity in Particularistic Contributions  
  Number   Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Limitation -5.812 -8.772* -22.123 -30.111* -0.802 -0.921 
  (6.078) (4.738) (16.884) (14.310) (0.534) (0.647) 
IPC   0.588*   1.260  0.010 
    (0.288)   (0.870)  (0.039) 
Partisan Strength   1.416***   3.968***  0.030 
    (0.406)   (1.228)  (0.056) 
Government Status   9.927   20.894  -0.538 
    (8.887)   (26.840)  (1.214) 
Income   -0.031   -0.083  -0.001 
    (0.025)   (0.074)  (0.003) 
College   0.321   0.095  -0.068 
    (0.993)   (2.999)  (0.136) 
Constant 6.917 -53.520** 5.336 -134.381* 0.994 1.381 
  (15.376) (23.088) (42.714) (69.725) (1.351) (3.154) 
Observations 26 26 26 26 26 26 
R2 0.17 0.67 0.20 0.62 0.15 0.18 
F Test 0.63 2.57 0.79 2.12 0.55 0.29 
Probability > F 0.71 0.05 0.59 0.09 0.76 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Partisan strength also affects the disparity of particularistic contributors.29  It has a 
statistically significant positive effect on both the disparity in the number of 
particularistic contributions and the disparity in the amount of particularistic 
contributions.  This is exactly as one would expect.  If particularistic contributors are 
investors, then they are more likely to invest in an incumbent when the incumbent's party 
is strong in a state.  Partisan strength does not, however, seem to have statistically 
significant effect on the disparity in the amount per contribution.  This is most likely 
results from a process similar to that seen in the case of contribution limits.  In the case of 
partisan strength, since it tends to increase the disparity in number and the disparity in 
amounts, the net effect is of no consequence for the amount per contribution.  None of the 
other controls variables in Table 6.5 has a statistically significant effect on disparity.  
The state level analyses presented so far indicate support for hypotheses one and 
two.  There is no support for hypotheses three and four; rather, the evidence suggests that 
contribution limits have the opposite effect than was hypothesized.  Once again, the 
evidence supports those who suggest the positive benefits of contribution limits.   
 
2.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 6.6 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of contributors per 
eligible voter and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for candidates.30  The 
limitation variable decreases the number of contributors per eligible voter for open seat 
candidates.  The coefficient is negative, -0.751 and statistically significant.  The 
limitation variable also decreases the amount of contributions per eligible voter for open 
seat candidates.  The coefficient is negative, -1.175, and statistically significant.  In 
addition, the limitation variable has a statistically significant effect on incumbents, as 
well as challengers, as it affects on open seat candidates.   The limitation does decrease 
the number of contributions per eligible voter, -0.773, and the amount of contributions 
per eligible voter, -0.982, for incumbents and they are all statistically significant at the 
                                                 
29 . Partisan strength at the state level is measured as an absolute difference between the vote shares of 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state; |the vote share 
of a Democratic presidential candidate – the vote share of a Republican presidential candidate|. 
30 . Because of the space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.6.  The 
full statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
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0.05 level.  The limitation also decreases the numbers and the amounts for challengers.  
The coefficients are -0.717 for the numbers and -0.785 for the amounts and they are all 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  This suggests that the limitation does decrease 
the numbers and the amounts to all types of candidates.   
As shown in Table 6.6, the limitation variable does not have a different effect 
between incumbents and challengers.  No differential effect of the limitation between 
incumbents and challengers is statistically supported in the number of contributors per 
eligible voter or the amount of contributions per eligible voter.31  
The BC dummy variable is statistically significant in the analysis examining the 
amount of contributions per eligible voter.  Since the coefficient is negative, -1.045, it 
seems that all other thing being equal, challengers do have a smaller amount of 
contributions per eligible voter than open seat candidates.  Since the BI dummy variable 
is not statistically significant, it appears that incumbents are not statistically likely to 
receive more contributions per eligible voter.  The difference between the amount of 
contributions per eligible voter contributed to incumbents (BI) and challengers (BC) is 
1.675 and statistically supported at the 0.05 level, suggesting that incumbents are likely to 
receive a larger amount of contributions per eligible voter.32  
On the other hand, neither of the dummy variables has a statistically significant 
effect on the number of contributors per eligible voter, suggesting incumbents or 
challengers are not statistically likely to receive more (or less) contributions than open 
seat candidates.  The difference between the numbers per eligible voter is only 
statistically supported between incumbents and challengers, 1.268, at the 0.10 level. 
                                                 
31 . The estimated difference in the limitation effects between incumbents and challengers is -0.056 for the 
numbers and -0.198 for the amounts, but neither is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  I use 
the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE).   
32 . I use the linear combination method to obtain the effect and its significance for dollars and for numbers. 
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Table 6.6. Limitation and Particularistic Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number    Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.906 -0.421 -1.609*** -1.045* -14.750** -12.953** 
  (0.615) (0.623) (0.611) (0.622) (5.990) (5.465) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.463 0.846 0.156 0.630 -10.065* -8.748 
  (0.619) (0.628) (0.616) (0.627) (6.035) (5.510) 
Limitation*BO -0.746*** -0.751*** -1.239*** -1.175*** -7.934*** -6.844*** 
  (0.283) (0.279) (0.282) (0.279) (2.763) (2.449) 
Limitation*BC -0.785** -0.717* -0.937** -0.785** -1.354 0.277 
  (0.374) (0.369) (0.372) (0.369) (3.644) (3.243) 
Limitation*BI -0.875** -0.773** -1.182*** -0.982*** -3.944 -1.882 
  (0.374) (0.370) (0.372) (0.369) (3.644) (3.244) 
Party   -0.062   0.050  4.281* 
    (0.289)   (0.289)  (2.539) 
Partisan Strength   0.003   0.008  0.057 
    (0.018)   (0.018)  (0.162) 
IPC   -0.040***   -0.040***  0.081 
    (0.013)   (0.013)  (0.117) 
Government Status   0.261   0.230  0.658 
    (0.245)   (0.244)  (2.149) 
Income   -0.001   0.001  0.050*** 
    (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.009) 
College   0.011   -0.038  -0.582* 
    (0.039)   (0.039)  (0.344) 
Constant -3.696*** -3.250** -0.788 0.351 24.187*** 28.589** 
  (0.557) (1.439) (0.554) (1.437) (5.433) (12.633) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.39 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.18 0.41 
F Test 5.05 4.31 7.47 5.96 1.76 3.54 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
  1.268*   1.675**  4.204 BI - BC 
    (0.664)   (0.663)  (5.830) 
  -0.056   -0.198  -2.160 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC    (0.502)   (0.502)   (4.411) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The interparty party competition variable behaves much better in the candidate 
level analysis than it did in the state level analysis.  Whether one examines the number of 
contributors per eligible voter or the amount of contributions per eligible voter, interparty 
competition has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.040, both for the number of 
contributors and for the amount of contributions.  This is very much line with previous 
research that finds that particularistic contributors might be more willing to contribute 
when elections are competitive because the value of contributions becomes higher 
(Austen-Smith 1995 and 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 
1992; Cox and Magar 1999; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Snyder 1990 and 1993; Stratmann 
1998).33  Furthermore, this tendency is shown also in the analysis examining the total 
contributions.  Based on the analysis shown in Table 6.6, if an election becomes more 
competitive, say from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the number of 
contributors, as well as the amount of contributions, increase by 76.2%.34 
If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 6.6, the amount per 
contribution, it is seen why the limitation variable does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the amount per contribution.  The limitation variable decreases the amount per 
contribution for open seat candidates.  However, the limitation increases the amount per 
contribution for challengers compared to open seat candidates.  The coefficient for open 
seat candidates is -6.844 and the coefficient for challenger is 0.277, and the difference 
between them is statistically significant.35  As we concerned in chapter 4, the combining 
two opposite slope coefficients may generate an insignificant relationship of the 
limitation on the amount per contribution.36  On the other hand, no differential effect of 
the limitation is found between incumbents and challengers. 37     
If one focuses on the two dummy variables for being a challenger and for being 
                                                 
33 . Once again, interparty competition is measured as the smallest difference refers to the most competitive 
election while the largest difference refers to the least competitive election.   
34 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile and 24.43 for the 75th percentile.  The 
difference between the percentiles is multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.04 for both the 
numbers and the amounts.   
35 . I use the linear combination to obtain the difference and its significance in Stata (version 7/SE).  The 
difference is 7.122 that is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
36 . This kind of relationship is known as “uncorrelatedness” (Goldberger 1991;  and also see Jin and Eom 
2001). 
37 . I use the linear combination method to obtain the difference between incumbents and challengers.  The 
difference in the limitation effect is 4.204 that is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
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for being an incumbent in the amount per contribution analysis in Table 6.6, it is shown 
that challengers tend to receive the smaller amount per contribution compared to 
candidates in open seat elections.  The BI dummy variable does not have a statistically 
significant effect suggesting incumbents are not statistically likely to receive the smaller 
amount per contribution than open seat candidate.  Finally, no difference is found 
between the amount per contribution donated to incumbents and challengers.38   
With exception of the party variable, none of the political control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.  The party variable suggests 
that a Democratic Party candidate receives a larger average amount per contribution than 
a Republican Party candidate. 39    The coefficient is positive, 4.28, and statistically 
significant at the 10% level.   
All of the demographic variables have a statistically significant effect on the 
amount per contribution.  Interestingly, income and education, often used as measures for 
the pool of potential contributors, have opposite effects.  The income variable suggests 
that a wealthy state tends to contribute more per contribution compared to a poor state.40  
The education variable suggests that a state with more college graduates tends to donate 
less per contribution compared to a less educated state.41  Considering that these two 
indicators are often used to measure a pool of contributors, the opposite directions seem 
to be surprising and warrant further research.   
This candidate level analysis tends to be even more supportive of the arguments 
put forward by the advocates of contribution limits than the state level analysis.  The 
existence of campaign contribution limits does significantly reduce the number of 
contributors and decrease the amount of contributions.  If one equates contributions and 
influence, then this clearly suggests the reduction of undue influence in political 
contributions.  Critics of contribution limits have suggested that limits can increase bias 
in favor of incumbents.  The state level analysis indicated that contribution limits do 
                                                 
38 . I use the linear combination method to obtain the difference between incumbents and challengers.  The 
difference of the amount per contribution is -2.160 and statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level. 
39 . The party variable is coded as 0 if a candidate is from the Republican Party and 1 if a candidate is from 
the Democratic Party.   
40 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
41 . The education variable is measured by the percentage of college graduate or more in a state.   
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affect the disparity between incumbents and challengers.  However, contrary to the 
argument by critics, the limitation decreases the disparity in the numbers and in the 
amounts of contributions.  The candidate level analysis indicated that while incumbents 
did tend to have, on average, more contributors per eligible voter and greater 
contributions per eligible voter, contribution limits had no statistically significant effect 
that was dependent on whether a candidate was an incumbent, a challenger or an open 
seat candidate.  Furthermore, while there was a statistically significant difference 
between being a challenger versus being an open seat candidate, in terms of the average 
amount per contribution, the presence of contribution limits does not affect the difference.  
The suggestion that contribution limits tend to help incumbents is not supported by the 
analysis as is in the analysis examining total contributions.   
The analyses to this point have focused on particularistic contributions.  The 
theoretical discussion in Chapter Three, however, suggested that the effects of 
contribution limits ought to be different for universalistic contributors compared to 
particularistic contributors.  In the next section, I focus on the effects of contribution 
limits for universalistic contributors. 
 
3. Universalistic Contributors and Contribution Limits 
In Chapter Three, I explained why universalistic contributors, whose motivation is 
helping their favorite candidates, are not likely to be affected by contribution limits.  In 
this section, four hypotheses are tested in the context of universalistic contributions.  First, 
the presence of contribution limits is not likely to affect the number of universalistic 
contributions per eligible voter.  Second, the presence of contribution limits is not likely 
to affect the amount of universalistic contributions per eligible voter.  Third, contribution 
limits are not likely to influence the disparity in the number of universalistic 
contributions between incumbents and challengers.  Fourth, contribution limits are not 
likely to influence the disparity in the amount of universalistic contributions between 
incumbents and challengers.  I begin with the state level analyses and then move to a 
consideration of candidate level analyses.   
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3.1. State Level Analyses 
The analyses shown in Table 6.7 put forward mixed signals. 42 , 43   The first 
hypothesis is rejected in the analysis examining the number of contributions to all 
candidates, suggesting contribution limits increase the number of contributions per 
eligible voter for all candidates.44  However, the first hypothesis is not rejected in the 
analysis examining the number of contributions to only the major party candidates, 
suggesting that contribution limits do not affect the number of contributions per eligible 
voter for the major party candidates.  Regarding the second hypothesis, whether one 
examines Model 1 or Model 2, or whether one examines all candidates or only the major 
party candidates, contribution limits do not affect the amount of contributions per eligible 
voter. 
Of all the substantively important control variables shown in Table 6.7, only 
interparty competition has a statistically significant effect on the amount; and, the effect 
is limited to the case of all candidates.  As previous research indicates (Fuchs, Adler and 
Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980), if the electoral 
competition moves from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the amount of 
contributions to all candidates increases by 36.20%.45   
                                                 
42 . Since it seems to make little substantive difference in the importance of the limitation variable, I will 
confine my comments to a consideration of the results for model 2.   
43 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.7.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
44. Universalistic contribution limits are coded 0 if individuals and party contributions are not constrained 
from contributing, 1 if some limits are on either of them and 2 if some limits are on both of them.   
45 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest number refers to the most competitive elections and 
the largest number refers to the least competitive election.  The expected value is that the 
difference between the percentiles is multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.019; 36.20% = 100*[-
0.019*(5.38 – 24.43)].   
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As shown in Table 6.7, contribution limits  have a statistically significant effect 
on the amount per universalistic contribution.46   This finding is very different from what 
was seen when the analysis focused on particularistic contributions, Table 6.4, where 
limits did not have a statistically significant effect.  Much as supporters of contribution 
limits have claimed, contribution limits do seem to reduce the average amount per 
contribution, suggesting a possible democratizing effect.   
With the exception of partisan strength, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.  Partisan strength in a state 
does seem to affect the average amount per contribution by 0.155.47  Given the difference 
in partisan strength moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the average 
amount per contribution is likely to increase by $1.938.48   
What of hypotheses three and four?  The theory presented in Chapter Three 
suggested that regulations would not likely affect the disparity between incumbents and 
challengers in favor of incumbents because the expected utility of universalistically 
donating is a small and widely disposed utility (i.e., public goods) and thus the utility of 
donating is not much different from non-donating (Morton and Cameron 1992).   
The results shown in Table 6.8 indicate that contribution limits support the 
hypotheses. 49 , 50   Contribution limits are not statistically related to any of the three 
disparity measures.51  Even the signs of the coefficients for the contribution limit variable 
are not consistent across the three measures of disparity.  It is positive for the case of 
                                                 
46 . Since little substantive difference is found in the importance of the limitation variable between the 
analyses for all candidates and the major party candidates, I will confine my comments on a 
consideration of the results for the major party candidates.  See I. Regression of Average Amount 
per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results for all candidates.   
47 . Partisan strength at the state level is measured as an absolute difference between the vote shares of 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state 
48 . The expected value is the multiplication of the difference in partisan strength by the slope coefficient 
for partisan strength, i.e., 1.938 = 0.155*(18.2 – 5.7).   
49 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.8.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
50 . None of the difference measures are statistically significant whether one examines the number of 
contributors, the amount of contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are 
available from the author.   
51 . Since little substantive difference between analyses with or without outliers is found in the importance 
of the limitation variable, I will confine my comments on a consideration of the results utilizing all 
observations.  See II. Regression of Disparity without Outliers in Appendix G for the statistical 
results using samples without outliers.   
 89
disparity in numbers and amounts, and negative for disparity in the amount per 
contribution.  This indicates that there is no evidence to suggest that contribution limits 
increase contribution bias in favor of incumbents. 
Most of the control variables in the disparity analyses are not consistently related 
to the level of disparity between incumbents and challengers.  The exception is interparty 
competition.  As in the analyses for all contributions, interparty competition levels the 
playing field between incumbents and challengers.  When considering the disparity in the 
number of contributors, the coefficient is 0.771, and is statistically significant, thus 
indicating that the greater the competition the lower the disparity in the numbers between 
incumbents and challengers. 52   Similarly, when analyzing disparity in amounts, the 
positive (0.558) and statistically significant coefficient for the interparty competition 
variable indicates that the greater the competition, the lower the disparity in the amount 
of contributions raised by incumbents and challengers.  These results are much as one 
would expect given previous findings on the relationship between competition and 
contribution patterns (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 
2001; Welch 1980). 
                                                 
52 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest number refers to the most competitive elections and 
the largest number refers to the least competitive election.   
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Table 6.8. Limitation and Disparity in Universalistic Contributions  
  Number   Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Limitation 2.477 4.160 1.571 2.452 -0.180 -0.191 
  (3.305) (2.378) (3.978) (4.081) (0.364) (0.337) 
IPC   0.771***  0.558**   -0.010 
    (0.150)  (0.258)   (0.021) 
Partisan Strength   0.155  0.241   0.065** 
    (0.195)  (0.336)   (0.028) 
Government Status   -1.210  -5.510   0.546 
    (4.717)  (8.097)   (0.668) 
Income   -0.013  -0.009   0.000 
    (0.013)  (0.022)   (0.002) 
College   -0.852*  -1.107   0.096 
    (0.478)  (0.820)   (0.068) 
Constant 2.432 -10.206 3.834 1.946 1.463 -1.776 
  (8.982) (12.199) (10.812) (20.939) (0.988) (1.727) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.60 0.86 0.50 0.66 0.19 0.54 
F Test 4.95 8.59 3.39 2.61 0.80 1.11 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.58 0.38 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Partisan strength in a state seems to affect the disparity in the amount per 
contribution, but does not have a statistically significant effect on either disparity in 
numbers or disparity in amounts. 53  Just as in the analyses in all contributions, it would 
be inappropriate at this time to put much credence in the importance of partisan strength, 
because the appropriate coefficient only reaches statistical significance in one of three 
cases.  A similar argument can be made about the two demographic variables, which can 
be considered as indirect measures of the pool of possible contributors.  The education 
level variable has a statistically significant effect on the disparity in the numbers, but is 
not statistically significant in the case of the remaining two disparity measures.  None of 
the income variables is statistically significant in any of the disparity measures.  At this 
time, therefore, there is simply insufficient evidence to support the importance of either 
as to the levels of disparity in gubernatorial elections. 
The state level analyses presented thus far indicate support for hypotheses one for 
the major party candidates and hypothesis two for all and the major party candidates.  
However, contribution limits, contrary to the theoretical expectations, increase the 
number of contributors per eligible voter for all candidates suggesting a democratizing 
effect of contribution limits, as supporters of contribution limits have claimed.  On the 
other hand, the state level analyses indicate support for hypotheses three and four.  
Contrary to the claim of critics that contribution limits increase bias in favor of 
incumbents, my findings indicate that limits do not affect any of the three disparity 
measures.  Once again, the evidence supports those who suggest the positive benefits of 
contribution limits.   
 
3.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 6.9 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of contributors per 
eligible voter, and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for the major party 
candidates.54  None of the limitation variables has a statistically significant effect on the 
                                                 
53 . Partisan strength at the state level is measured as an absolute difference between the vote shares of 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state, |the vote share 
of Democratic candidate – the vote share of Republican candidate|. 
54 . Because of the space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 6.9.  The 
full statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
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numbers and on the amounts of contributions.  The limitation variable does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the number and amount of contributions to open seat 
candidates.  The effect of contribution limits on incumbents is not statistically supported 
for either the number of contributors, nor the amount of contributions.  The same can be 
said for the effect of contribution limits on challengers.  No differential contribution 
limitation effect is found between incumbents and challengers.55     
The BI dummy variable is statistically significant in the analysis examining the 
number of contributors per eligible voter.  Since the coefficient is positive, 0.954, it 
seems that all other thing being equal, incumbents do have a larger number of 
contributors per eligible voter than open seat candidates.  Since the BC dummy variable 
is negative but not statistically significant, it appears that challengers are not likely to 
receive a smaller number of contributors than open seat candidates.  The difference in the 
number of contributors between incumbents and challengers is positive, 0.960, and 
statistically significant at the 0.11 level, suggesting incumbents are likely to receive a 
larger number of contributors than challengers.56 
On the other hand, neither of the candidate status dummy variables is statistically 
significant in the analysis examining the amount of contributions per eligible voter.  This 
indicates that incumbents are not likely to receive greater contributions than open seat 
candidates, and challengers are not likely to receive smaller contributions than open seat 
candidates.  The difference in the amount of contributions between incumbents and 
challengers, however, is positive, 0.927, and statistically supported at the 0.10 level.  This 
indicates that incumbents are likely to receive larger universalistic contributions than 
challengers. 
 
                                                 
55 . The differential effects between incumbents and challengers are 0.118 for numbers and 0.326 for dollars 
and neither of them is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  I use the linear combination 
method in Stata (version 7/SE).  
56 . I use the linear combination method to obtain the effect and its significance for numbers and for dollars. 
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Table 6.9. Limitation and Universalistic Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number    Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.419 -0.006 -0.842* -0.307 -4.087* -4.149 
  (0.534) (0.543) (0.465) (0.460) (2.371) (2.501) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.591 0.954* 0.137 0.619 -2.698 -2.895 
  (0.536) (0.544) (0.466) (0.461) (2.380) (2.507) 
Limitation*BO 0.293 0.302 -0.016 -0.035 -2.508*** -2.638*** 
  (0.214) (0.210) (0.186) (0.178) (0.949) (0.968) 
Limitation*BC 0.154 0.072 -0.171 -0.218 -1.741 -1.474 
  (0.303) (0.297) (0.264) (0.252) (1.345) (1.368) 
Limitation*BI 0.283 0.190 0.157 0.109 -1.467 -1.133 
  (0.316) (0.310) (0.275) (0.263) (1.403) (1.428) 
Party   -0.224  -0.234   -0.620 
    (0.234)  (0.198)   (1.078) 
Partisan Strength   -0.011  -0.008   0.038 
    (0.015)  (0.013)   (0.069) 
IPC   -0.026**  -0.034***   0.006 
    (0.011)  (0.009)   (0.049) 
Government Status   0.153  0.145   0.180 
    (0.198)  (0.168)   (0.912) 
Income   -0.001  -0.000   0.007* 
    (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.004) 
College   0.016  -0.007   -0.103 
    (0.031)  (0.026)   (0.143) 
Constant -2.832*** -2.057* -0.763* 0.540 12.082*** 12.599** 
  (0.446) (1.149) (0.388) (0.973) (1.981) (5.292) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.23 0.32 0.30 0.41 0.22 0.25 
F Test 2.40 2.36 3.35 3.49 2.16 1.67 
Probability > F 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 
  0.960  0.927*   1.254 BI – BC 
    (0.588)  (0.498)   (2.706) 
  0.118  0.326   0.341 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC    (0.416)   (0.352)   (1.915) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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The interparty competition variable behaves much better in this candidate level 
analysis than it did in the state level analysis.  Both in the number of contributors per 
eligible voter and in the amount of contributions per eligible voter, interparty competition 
has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.026 for the number of contributors, and -
0.034 for the amount of contributions.  This suggests  that as elections become more 
competitive, there tends to be an increase in the number of contributors and the amount of 
contributions (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; 
Welch 1980).57  This is seen from the analyses on total and particularistic contributions.  
Based on the analysis shown in Table 6.9, if an election becomes more 
competitive, say from the 75th percentile and to the 25th percentile, then the number of 
contributors increases by 49.53% and the amount of contributions goes up by 64.77%.58 
Other than the interparty competition variable, none of the other control variables has any 
statistically significant effect on either the number of contributors or the amount of 
contributions.  This is similar to what was found in the state level analysis. 
If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 6.9, the amount per 
contribution, it is shown that the limitation variable behaves much as it did in the state 
level analysis.  The limitation variable has a negative coefficient, -2.638, and is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Contribution limits reduce the average amount 
per contribution for open seat candidates. Once again, this supports the argument put 
forward by advocates of contribution limits.  The effect is limited to open seat candidates, 
however, because limits do not seem to reduce the average amount per contribution that 
incumbents or challengers receive.  The effect of the limitation variable on incumbents is 
not statistically supported at the 0.10 level, nor is the effect of the limitation variable on 
challengers statistically significant.  In addition, the difference between incumbents 
versus challengers is not statistically supported.  This suggests that the democratic effect 
that is the result of the contribution limits is likely to be limited to open seat candidates.   
If one focuses on the two dummy variables for being a challenger (BC) and being 
                                                 
57 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest difference refers to the most competitive election 
while the largest difference refers to the least competitive election.   
58 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile (more competitive election) and 24.43 
for the 75th percentile (less competitive election).  The difference between the percentiles is 
multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.026 for the numbers and -0.034 for the amounts.   
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an incumbent (BI) in the amount per contribution analysis in Table 6.9, it is shown that 
neither of the variables has a statistically significant effect on the average amount per 
contribution.  In addition, no difference is found between being a challenger and being an 
incumbent.59   
With the exception of the income variable, none of the control variables seems to 
have a statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.   The income 
variable suggests that a wealthy state tends to contribute a larger average amount per 
contribution compared to a poor state.60  Even though interparty competition seemed to 
affect both the number of contributors and the amount of contributions, it did not have a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.  This suggests that the 
traditional finding that party competition tends to be associated with more expensive 
races results because competition spurs greater numbers of contributors, rather than 
individuals giving more per contribution.  
This candidate level analysis tends to support the argument put forward by the 
advocates of contribution limits.  The existence of contribution limits does tend to 
significantly reduce the average amount per contribution.  Along with findings from the 
state level analyses, this clearly suggests a democratization effect: the number of 
contributors is increased and the value of each contribution is decreased.  Critics of 
contribution limits have suggested that limits can increase bias in favor of incumbents.  
The state level analyses indicated that contribution limits did not influence disparity 
between incumbents and challengers in terms of the numbers, the amounts and the 
average amount per contribution.  The candidate level analyses showed that while 
incumbents did tend to have, on average, more contributors per eligible voter and greater 
contributions per eligible voter than challengers, the effect of contribution limits did not 
depend on whether a candidate was an incumbent or a challenger.   
  Based on analyses conducted on all contributions, particularistic contributions, 
and universalistic contributions, I found that contribution limits show varying support by 
which type of contributions is examined.  There is simply no evidence to support the 
                                                 
59 . The difference between incumbents and challengers is -1.251 = (-4.149 + 2.898) and statistically 
insignificant at the 0.10 level.  I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE). 
60 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
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critics’ argument that contribution limits increase bias in favor of incumbents, according 
to my findings.  In the next section, I summarize the findings and compare the patterns 
between particularistic and universalistic contributions.   
 
3. Conclusion 
The intention of campaign finance regulations seems to work without increasing 
bias in favor of incumbents.  In the state level analyses, I found that contribution limits 
increase the number of all contributors per eligible voter, reduce the number of 
particularistic contributions per eligible voter and the amount of such contributions per 
eligible voter, and increase the number of universalistic contribution per eligible voter.  
Furthermore, contribution limits decrease the average amount per contribution examining 
the analyses in all contributions and universalistic contributions.  This suggests a 
democratization effect of more universalistic contributors, less particularistic 
contributions, and the value of each contribution is reduced which thus reduces the 
potential for undue influence. 
According to my results, the intentional consequence of campaign finance 
regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of incumbent bias, as critics 
of contribution limits have suggested.  None of the contribution limits variables has a 
statistically significant and positive effect on disparity between incumbents and 
challengers.  Indeed, the limitation variable has a statistically significant and negative 
impact on disparity in the numbers and in the amounts for particularistic contributions, 
suggesting the limitation variable lowers the disparity between the numbers as well as the 
amounts.   
The candidate level analyses reinforce the findings from the state level analyses.  
Contribution limits increase the number of contributions per eligible voter, especially for 
open seat candidates when examining all contributions and universalistic contributions.  
Contribution limits, furthermore, reduce the number of particularistic contributions per 
eligible voter and the amount of particularistic contributions per eligible voter for 
incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates.  Regarding the increase of bias in 
favor of incumbents, no differential effect of the limitation variable is found between 
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incumbents versus challengers, incumbents versus open seat candidates, and challengers 
versus open seat candidates when any type of contribution is examined.  Therefore, I 
conclude that campaign finance regulations work without the unintentional consequence 
feared by its critics.  
What of the political and demographic variables?  Do they have a different affect 
regarding particularistic and universalistic contributors?  First, interparty competition 
seems to increase the amount of both particularistic and universalistic contributions per 
eligible voter in the state level analyses.  Interparty competition behaves much better in 
the candidate level analyses than in the state level analyses.  In both type of contributions, 
interparty competition increases the number of contributors per eligible voter and the 
amount of contributions per eligible voter for the major party candidates.  Therefore, both 
types of contributors seem to respond to the level of interparty competition at the same 
rate.  Second, most of the other political control variables do not have a statistically 
significant effect on particularistic contributions and universalistic contributions.  
Partisan strength, government status, and open seat election variables do not affect either 
the number or the amount of particularistic and universalistic contributions.  In addition, 
the demographic variables (income and college), which are often used to measure the 
pool of contributors, do not behave differently for particularistic contributions than for 
universalistic contributions.  Furthermore, the income and college variables do not affect 
the number and amount of particularistic and universalistic contributions in the state and 
candidate level analyses in a consistent manner.   
As I mentioned in Chapter Three, the overall effect of contribution limits can not 
be determined unless it is possible to determine the balance between particularistic and 
universalistic contributors in any given setting.  If universalistic contributions prevail 
over particularistic contributions, total contributions are likely to follow the relationship 
between universalistic contributions and contribution limits, and vice versa.  Since the 
relative weight of particularistic and universalistic contributions is unknown, I confined 
the relationship to the empirical part.   
In Chapter Five, I demonstrated that universalistic contributions are the major 
source of contributions, 87.78% in the number of contributions and 79.79% in the amount 
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of contributions.  Therefore, one expects the relationship between all contributions and 
contribution limits is much like the relationship between universalistic contributions and 
contribution limits.  The comparable results are shown in Table 6.1 vs. Table 6.7 
examining the analyses of contributions and the limitation variable at the state level.  
Table 6.2 vs. Table 6.8 shows the results of the analyses of disparity and the limitation 
variable, and Table 6.3 vs. Table 6.9 shows the results of the analyses of contributions 
and the limitation variable at the candidate level.  As expected, the relationship between 
all contributions and contribution limits looks much like the relationship between 
universalistic contributions and contribution limits.  Contribution limits increase the 
number of contributors per eligible voter, but do not affect the amount of contributions 
per eligible voter.  Furthermore, limits reduce the average amount per contribution.  The 
limitation variable does not affect the disparity between the numbers as well as the 
amounts donated to incumbents and challengers.   
To this point, empirical evidence supports the argument by advocates of 
contribution limits.   Contribution limits increase the number of all contributions and 
universalistic contributions per eligible voter, but reduce the average amount of 
contributions.  Furthermore, limits reduce the number and amount of particularistic 
contributions per eligible voter.  The democratization effect is not accompanied by the 
unintentional consequence, the increasing bias of contributions for incumbents.  None of 
the disparity measures is positively and significantly related to contribution limits.  
Indeed, limits do have a statistically significant negative effect on the disparity of 
particularistic contributions.  The next chapter examines the relationship between 
contribution limits and the sub-categories of particularistic and universalistic 
contributions: corporation and labor union contributions, and individual, party and 
ideological PAC contributions.  A series of analyses will examine whether corporations 
and labor unions behave like particularistic contributors and whether individuals, parties 
and ideological PACs behave like universalistic contributors.   
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Chapter 7: Contribution Limits and Dynamics of Political Contributions 
 
Supporters of campaign contribution limits argue that contribution limits reduce 
the influence of special interest groups and increase the number of citizen contributors.  
Critics suggest that contribution limits have the unintended consequence of increasing 
financial bias in favor of incumbents.  In Chapter Six, I showed that the argument of 
advocates of contribution limits was supported while the argument by critics of 
contribution limits had no support. 
This chapter examines the sub-categories of particularistic and universalistic 
contributions.  By definition, the sub-categories of particularistic contributors are 
corporations and labor unions and the sub-categories of universalistic contributors are 
individuals, parties and ideological PACs (see Chapter Three for a more detailed 
discussion).  This chapter examines whether corporations and labor unions behave like 
particularistic contributors in general and whether individuals, parties and ideological 
PACs behave like universalistic contributors in general.   
I begin by examining patterns of contributions to gubernatorial elections.  General 
patterns of contributions to incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates are also 
analyzed for each type of contribution.  I then turn to an examination of the effect of 
contribution limits on each type of contribution at the state level followed by a candidate 
level analysis.   
 
1. The Dynamic Patterns of Political Contributions 
An examination of the proportions for each type of contribution makes it clear 
that individual contributors are the major source of contributions for all types of 
candidates and elections (see I. The Proportion of Contributions in Appendix E).  For 
elections with an incumbent running, the number of individual contributions comprises 
88.57% of the total amount of contributions.  The second larges proportion of total 
contributions is much lower at 9.77% for corporate contributions.  The total amount of 
money from individual contributions is 70.59% of the total, while it is 15.26% for 
corporate contributions.  A similar comparison for open seat elections is 85.13% and 
12.86% for the number of contributions and 68.03% and 19.14% for the total amount of 
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contributions.  This dominance of individual contributions is similar to what 
Ansolabehere and his colleagues found for federal elections in the year 2000 
(Ansolabehere, Figueiredo and Snyder 2002; and also see Brown, Powell and Wilcox 
1995).  They estimated that almost 80% of the contributions to federal candidates came 
from individuals.  On the other hand, party contributions, labor contributions and 
ideological PAC contributions comprise a small proportion of the total; 0.83% for 
number of contributions, 10.48% for amount of party contributions, 0.73% and 2.71% for 
labor union contributions, and 0.09% and 0.96% for ideological PAC contributions.   
The importance of individual contributions exists for incumbents, challengers, 
and open seat candidates alike (see I. The Proportion of Contributions in Appendix E).  
For gubernatorial incumbents, the percentage of the total for the number of individual 
contributions is 87.60% while it is 10.75% for corporate contributions, which is the 
second largest proportion of the total.  A similar comparison for challengers is 83.50% 
and 9.38%, while it is 85.51% and 12.10% for open seat candidates.  A similar pattern is 
shown in the amount of contributions.  For gubernatorial incumbents, the percentage of 
the total for the amount of individual contributions is 68.61% while it is 16.50% for 
corporate contributions.  A similar comparison for challengers is 64.82% and 13.49%, 
while it is 67.40% and 17.82% for open seat candidates.   
Once again, other types of contributions make up a small proportion of total 
contributions.  For gubernatorial incumbents, party contributions comprise 0.75% of the 
total number of contributors and 11.23% of the total amount of contributions.  A similar 
figure for labor union contributions is 0.82% and 3.35%, while it is 0.08% and 0.32% for 
ideological PAC contributions.  A similar comparison for challengers is 2.65% and 
13.42% for party contributions, 0.97% and 3.06% for labor union contributions and 
0.17% and 1.87% for ideological PAC contributions.  For open seat candidates, a similar 
comparison is 1.09% and 10.78% for party contributions, 1.13% and 3.60% for labor 
union contributions and 0.16% and 0.40% for ideological PAC contributions. 
Besides the proportion of contributions, the percentage of contributors and the 
average amount of contributions per eligible voter, also show that individual 
contributions are the major source of contributions (see the state level analyses in II. The 
Descriptive Statistics of Political Contributions: Sub-Category in Appendix E).  For the 
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major party candidates, the number of individual contributors per eligible voter is 0.41% 
while it is 0.04% for corporation contributions, 0.003% for labor union contributions, 
0.003% for party contributions and 0.0004% for ideological PAC contributions.   The 
comparable dollar amount figures are $1.45 for individual contributors, and $0.38 for 
corporate contributions, $0.068 for labor union contributions, $0.265 for party 
contributions and $0.0104 for ideological PAC contributions.   
The importance of individual contributions appears for all types of candidates (see 
the candidate level analyses in II. The Descriptive Statistics of Political Contributions: 
Sub-Category in Appendix E).  For gubernatorial incumbents, the number of individual 
contributions per eligible voter is 0.27% while it is 0.02% for corporate contributions, 
0.002% for labor union contributions, 0.0015% for party contributions and 0.0001% for 
ideological PAC contributions.  A similar comparison for challengers is 0.16%, 0.01%, 
0.001%, 0.0013% and 0.0002% while it is 0.20%, 0.02%, 0.002%, 0.0018% and 0.0003% 
for open seat candidates.  A similar pattern is shown in the amount of contributions.  For 
gubernatorial incumbents, the average amount of individual contributions per eligible 
voter is $0.93 while it is $0.23 for corporate contributions, $0.038 for labor union 
contributions, $0.1441 for party contributions and $0.0032 for ideological contributions.  
A similar comparison for challengers is $0.48, $0.11, $0.018, $0.0951 and $0.0092.  And, 
a similar comparison of open seat candidates is $0.75, $0.21, $0.040, $0.1463 and 
$0.0041.   
It is clear that incumbents raise larger amounts of money and have more 
contributors from corporate contributions and individual contributions than challengers.  
It is not clear, however, that incumbents are likely to receive a larger number of 
contributions and larger contributions in dollars from labor unions, parties and 
ideological PACs.  Incumbents raise $0.93 per eligible voter from individual contributors 
and $0.23 from corporation contributions, while challengers raise $0.48 from individual 
contributors and $0.11 from corporation contributions.  The number of contributors per 
eligible voter for corporation and individual contributors respectively is 0.02% and 
0.27% for incumbents and 0.01% and 0.16% for challengers.  The difference in money 
and in numbers is statistically significant at the 0.10 level for individual contributions.  
For corporate contributions, however, the difference in money is statistically significant 
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at the 0.10 level, but the difference in number of contributors falls short from the 
traditional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.138).  As shown in the analyses of 
disparity in Appendix E, the disparity is 9.71 in numbers and 17.11 in amounts for 
corporation contributions, and 9.83 in numbers and 11.79 in amounts for individual 
contributions.1 
The difference between incumbents and challengers, however, is greatly modified 
by the closeness of the election.  When the election is close, there is no statistically 
significant difference between gubernatorial incumbents and challengers, while there is 
likely to be a statistical significant difference in lopsided elections.2  This is also shown in 
the disparity measures where it is 12.44 in lopsided elections and 1.10 in close elections 
for the number of corporate contributions, and 22.09 in lopsided elections and 1.36 in 
close elections for the amount of corporate contributions.  A similar comparison for 
individual contributions is 12.87 in lopsided elections and 1.14 in close elections for 
numbers, and 15.53 in lopsided elections 1.12 in close elections for amounts. 
Open seat candidates appear much like incumbents regarding corporation and 
individual contributions.  There is no statistically significant difference in corporation and 
individual contributing between incumbents and open seat candidates at the 0.10 level.3   
Similarly to incumbents, open seat candidates are statistically more likely to receive 
greater amounts of money, but not greater numbers of contributors, from corporation and 
individual contributions than challengers.4  The relationship for corporation contributions 
                                                 
1 . A big difference between the mean and the mean is shown in disparity measures for individual and 
corporate contributions.  The difference is because of outliers in corporation and individual 
contributions.  As shown in Figure F1 and F3 in Appendix F, there are a couple of outliers.  
Without outliers, two means test can more confidently reject the null hypothesis that disparity is 
equal to one indicating no disparity.  P value for disparity of corporate contributions is 0.056 with 
outliers and 0.019 without outliers for numbers and 0.175 with outliers and 0.019 without outliers 
for amounts.  P value for disparity of individual contributions is 0.020 with outliers and 0.016 
without outliers for numbers and 0.014 with outliers and 0.024 without outliers for amounts.   
2 . P value for corporation contributions is 0.576 for numbers and 0.310 for amounts in close election while 
a comparable figure is 0.047 and 0.037 in lopsided elections.  P value for individual contributions 
is 0.540 for numbers and 0.376 for amounts in close elections while a comparable figure is 0.122 
and 0.000 in lopsided elections.   
3 . P value for corporation contributions is 1.000 for numbers and 0.757 for dollars while it is 0.158 for 
numbers and 0.256 for dollars for individual contributions.   
4 . P value for corporation contributions is 0.104 for numbers and 0.077 for dollars while it is 0.384 for 
numbers and 0.055 for dollars for individual contributions 
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is more significant in lopsided elections,5 while it breaks down when comparing open 
seat candidates and challengers in close elections. 
The patterns in labor union, party and ideological PAC contributions behave 
much differently from those seen for corporation and individual contributions in general 
(see the candidate level analyses in II. The Descriptive Statistics of Political 
Contributions: Sub-Category in Appendix E).  Although incumbents are not likely to 
receive more contributions than challengers, incumbents appear to receive more 
contributions, $0.038 per eligible voter, than challengers, $0.018 per eligible voter.  The 
difference between incumbents and challengers, however, is not statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level.  A similar comparison for party contributions is $0.1441 for incumbents 
and $0.0951 for challengers while it is $0.0032 and $0.0092 for ideological PAC 
contributions.  None of the differences is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  A 
similar pattern is shown in the percentage of the number of contributions.  Incumbents 
appear to receive more contributions, 0.0015%, than challengers, 0.0013% from party 
contributions, while it is 0.0001% for incumbents and 0.0002% for challengers for 
ideological PAC contributions.  None of the differences between incumbents and 
challengers is statistically significant.  The statistically significant difference is found 
only for labor union contributions from which incumbents receive more contributions, 
0.002%, than challengers, 0.001%.  This difference is statistically significant at the 0.10 
level.  Whether an election is competitive or lopsided, most of the types of contributions 
do not show a statistically significant difference between incumbents and challengers.6   
This pattern is also shown in the disparity measures (see the disparity analyses in 
II. The Descriptive Statistics of Political Contributions: Sub-Category in Appendix E).  
Except for party contributions in the number of contributors, it is not possible reject the 
                                                 
5 . P value for corporation contributions is 0.0005 for numbers and 0.082 for dollars in lopsided elections, 
while it is 1.000 for numbers and 0.823 for dollars in close elections.  The difference in individual 
contributions between open seat candidates and challengers disappears in lopsided elections as 
well as close elections (p = 0.866 for numbers and p = 0.319 for amounts in lopsided elections, 
and p =1.000 for numbers and p = 0.846 for dollars in close elections). 
6  . The exception is the amount of labor union contributions.  In lopsided elections, labor union 
contributions are more given to incumbents than challengers and the difference is statistically 
supported at the 0.05 level.  In lopsided elections, p value for labor union contributions is 1.000 
for numbers and 0.0178 for dollars while it is 0.594 and 0.531 for party contributions and 0.287 
and 0.247 for ideological PAC contributions.  In close elections, p value for labor union 
contributions is 0.519 for numbers and 0.563 for dollars while it is 0.178 and 0.635 for party 
contributions and 1.000 and 0.583 for ideological PAC contributions.   
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null hypothesis that disparity is equal to one for any of the disparity measures. 7  This 
pattern does not depend on whether an election is lopsided or competitive.8  Therefore, it 
would be inappropriate at this time to put much credence in the significant difference 
between incumbents and challengers for labor union, party and ideological PAC 
contributions.   
It is clear that there is a difference between the patterns underlying corporation 
and individual contributions and those seen underlying labor union, party and ideological 
PAC contributions.  In the case of the former, there is a significant difference in numbers 
and amounts of contributions between incumbents and challengers. This is especially true 
in lopsided elections, but the difference disappears in close elections.  On the other hand, 
in the case of the latter, the difference between incumbents and challengers is generally 
not statistically supported whether an election is competitive or lopsided.   
Individual contributions, and possibly corporate contributions, dominate the 
gubernatorial finance system.  Sixty-four to seventy percent of the money raised tends to 
come from individual contributions, and thirteen to nineteen percent of the money raised 
tends to come from corporate contributions.  In addition, the two types of contributions 
systematically show a significant difference in numbers and amounts of contributions 
between incumbents and challengers.  The dominance of the two contributions, therefore, 
helps to explain why incumbents enjoy a financial advantage over challengers.   
In Chapter Six, I found that contribution limits increase the number of all 
contributions and universalistic contributors, with a reduced average amount per 
contribution, but decrease the number and amount of particularistic contributions.  The 
findings in this section demonstrate that the sub-categories of political contributions 
showed the dynamic patterns in the numbers, the amounts, and the difference between 
incumbents and challengers.  This suggests that contribution limits may show a dynamic 
                                                 
7 . P value for party contributions is 0.057 for numbers and 0.278 for dollars.  P value for labor union 
contributions is 0.296 for numbers and 0.197 for dollars while it is 0.331 and 0.253 for ideological 
PAC contributions.   
8 . In lopsided elections, p value for labor union contributions is 0.296 for numbers and 0.197 for dollars 
while it is 0.542 and 0.374 for party contributions and 0.719 and 0.682 for ideological PAC 
contributions.  In close elections, p value for labor union contributions is 0.310 for numbers and 
0.210 for dollars while it is 0.079 and 0.295 for party contributions and 0.370 and 0.228 for 
ideological PAC contributions.  In addition, as shown in Appendix F, the distribution of the 
disparity measures for labor unions, parties and ideological PACs do not look much different 
between lopsided elections and close elections.   
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effect on the sub-categories of contributions.  The next section begins by analyzing 
corporation contributions at the state level followed by a candidate level analysis of 
corporation contributions.  I then turn to an examination of labor union contributions.  
The third section examines individual contributions, followed by examinations of party 
and ideological PAC contributions. 
 
2. The Dynamic Relationships of Political Contributions 
2.1. Corporate Contributions and Contribution Limits 
2.1.1. State Level Analyses 
The analyses shown in Table 7.1 show a similar pattern as was found in the 
analyses of particularistic contributions.9  Whether one examines all candidates or just the 
major party candidates, contribution limits decrease the number of corporation 
contributions per eligible voter.10  The signs of the coefficients are negative and they are 
all statistically significant.  In a similar vein, contribution limits decrease the amount of 
particularistic contribution per eligible voter.  The signs of the coefficients are negative 
and statistically significant.   
Of all the substantively important control variables shown in Table 7.1, only party 
strength and government status have a statistically significant effect on the amount of 
corporate contributions.11  As expected, if government is unified, the amount of corporate 
contributions increases (Cox and Magar 1999; Fiorina 1995).  On the other hand, 
contrary to  expectations, a state with strong partisan control receives a smaller amount of 
contributions than a state with competitive partisanship (but see Snyder 1993).     
                                                 
9 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.1.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
10  . Corporate contribution limitation is coded as 0 if PAC contributions are not limited, 1 if some 
limitations are imposed on corporations and PACs, and 2 if corporate contributions are prohibited 
and some limitation is on PACs.  The range is from 0 (loose limitation) to 2 (restrictive limitation).   
11 . Partisan strength at the state level is an absolute difference between the vote shares of Democratic and 
Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state.  Government status at the state 
level is coded 1 if either of the parties controls all branches of government and 0 otherwise.   
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As shown in Table 7.1, contribution limits do not seem to have a statistically 
significant effect on the amount per corporate contribution. 12  The lack of an effect for 
contribution limits in the case of corporate contributions is likely due to the fact that 
limits significantly reduce both the number and amount of corporate contributions.  Since 
both are reduced, the overall effect is insignificant when one examines the amount per 
contribution.  With the exception of the income variable, none of the control variables is 
statistically significant.  The income variable suggests that a wealthy state tends to 
receive more per contribution compared to a poor state.13   
What of the argument by critics regarding bias in favor of incumbents?  The 
results shown in Table 7.1 indicate that contribution limits do not affect the disparity 
between incumbents and challengers.14, 15 This is a very different finding from what was 
seen for particularistic contributions.  Those findings indicated that limits have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the disparity, which suggests limits help to level 
the playing field between incumbents and challengers.   
Partisan strength also affects the disparity of corporate contributions, as is seen in 
the analysis examining particularistic contributions.  It has a statistically significant 
positive effect on the disparity in the number of corporate contributions, in the disparity 
in the amount of corporate contributions, and in the average amount per corporate 
contribution.  This is exactly as expected.  If corporate contributors are investors, then 
they are more likely to invest a larger amount per contribution in an incumbent when the 
incumbent's party is strong in a state.  None of the other control variables shown in Table 
7.1 has a statistically significant effect on any of the three disparity measures.  It is 
                                                 
12 . Since no substantive difference is found between the results examined for all and the major party 
candidates, I discuss the results for the major party candidates.  See I. Regression of Average 
Amount per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results for all candidates.    
13 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
14 . Since there is little substantive difference in the importance of the limitation variable between the 
results with and without outliers, I will confine my comments on a consideration of the results 
utilizing all observations.  See II. Regression of Disparity without Outliers in Appendix G for the 
statistical results using samples without outliers.   
15  . One may argue that contribution limits increase the difference between contributions donated to 
candidates.  To examine this possibility, I construct difference measure which is the absolute 
difference between contributions donated to the two major party candidates, and then divided by 
the sum of contributions donated to the two major party candidates.  The difference measure is 
used as the dependent variable in an analysis using the same independent variables used in the 
previous analyses when examining the disparity measure.  None of the difference measures are 
statistically significant whether one examines the number of contributors, the amount of 
contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are available from the author.   
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especially surprising that the interparty competition variable does not have a statistically 
significant effect on any of the three disparity measures.   
The state level analyses presented thus far indicate a similar effect of contribution 
limits as shown in particularistic contributions; limits reduce the number and amount of 
corporate contributions.  There is no support of increased bias for incumbents.  Once 
again, the evidence supports of those who suggest the positive benefits of contribution 
limits. 
 
2.1.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 7.2 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of contributors per 
eligible voter and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for the major party 
candidates.16  The limitation variable decreases the number of contributors per eligible 
voter, -0.884, and the amount of the contributions per eligible voter, -1.301, for open seat 
candidates.  The coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  In addition, the 
limitation variable has a statistically significant effect on incumbents as well as on 
challengers as it affects on open seat candidates.  The limitation decreases the number of 
contributions, -0.854, or the amount of contributions, -1.060, for incumbents, and they 
are all statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The limitation also decreases the number 
and amount of contributions for challengers by -0.829 and -1.028 respectively and they 
are all statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  This suggests that the negative effect of 
the limitation on corporation contributions does not depend on whether a candidate is an 
incumbent, a challenger, or an open seat candidate.   
On the other hand, the limitation variable does not have an effect between 
incumbents or challengers.  No differential effect of the limitation between incumbents 
and challengers is statistically supported in the number of contributors per eligible voter 
or the amount of contributions per eligible voter, although the difference indicates that 
incumbents are likely to suffer more damage than challengers. 17 
                                                 
16 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.2.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
17 . I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the difference in the limitation 
effects between incumbents and challengers.   
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Table 7.2. Limitation and Corporate Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.463 -0.915 -9.470* 
  (0.685) (0.728) (5.333) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.913 0.720 -5.470 
  (0.690) (0.734) (5.377) 
Limitation*BO -0.884*** -1.301*** -4.756** 
  (0.307) (0.326) (2.390) 
Limitation*BC -0.829** -1.028** 2.265 
  (0.406) (0.432) (3.165) 
Limitation*BI -0.854** -1.059** -1.222 
  (0.406) (0.432) (3.166) 
Party -0.448 -0.477 1.648 
  (0.318) (0.338) (2.478) 
Partisan Strength -0.004 -0.002 0.035 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.158) 
IPC -0.041*** -0.040** 0.080 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.114) 
Government Status 0.344 0.338 0.199 
  (0.269) (0.286) (2.097) 
Income -0.001 0.001 0.038*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) 
College 0.009 -0.038 -0.645* 
  (0.043) (0.046) (0.335) 
Constant -2.725* 0.922 29.668** 
  (1.582) (1.682) (12.328) 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.45 0.53 0.30 
F Test 4.17 5.66 2.20 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.01 
1.375* 1.635* 4.000 BI - BC 
  (0.730) (0.777) (5.690) 
-0.024 -0.031 -3.488 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC  (0.552) (0.587) (4.304) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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None of the dummy variables is statistically significant, indicating incumbents are 
not likely to receive more numbers of contributions and greater amounts of contributions 
compared to open seat candidates. Conversely, challengers are not likely to receive 
smaller numbers and amounts of contributions than open seat candidates.  The difference 
between incumbents and challengers, however, is consistently and statistically supported 
suggesting incumbents are likely to receive more numbers and larger amounts of 
contributions than challengers.  The difference in numbers is 1.375 and statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level, and the difference in amounts is 1.635 and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
The interparty competition variable behaves much better in the candidate level 
analysis than it did in the state level analysis.  Whether one examines the number of 
contributors per eligible voter or the amount of contributions per eligible voter, interparty 
competition has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.041, for the number of 
contributors and -0.40 for the amount of contributions. 18   This is very much line with 
previous research that has shown that  corporate contributors might be more willing to 
contribute when elections are competitive because the value of contributions becomes 
higher (Austen-Smith 1995 and 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-Steffensmeier and 
Dow 1992; Cox and Magar 1999; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Snyder 1990 and 1993; 
Stratmann 1998). Based on the analysis shown in Table 7.2, if an election becomes more 
competitive, say from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the number of 
contributors increases by 78.10% and the amount of contributions increases by 76.20%.19  
Unlike the findings in the state level analyses, partisan strength and government status do 
not have a statistically significant effect on the number and amount of contributions for 
the major party candidates.20  None of the other control variables has a statistically 
significant effect.   
                                                 
18 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest difference refers to the most competitive election 
while the largest difference refers to the least competitive election.   
19 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile and 24.43 for the 75th percentile.  The 
difference between the percentiles is multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.041 for the numbers 
and -0.040 for the amounts.   
20 . Note that the measurement of partisan strength and government status is different between the state 
level analysis and the candidate level analysis, although it attempts to measure the same concept.  
Partisan strength at the state level is an absolute difference between the vote shares of Democratic 
and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state while partisan strength at the 
candidate level is the percentage of a candidate’s party’s vote share in the latest presidential 
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If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 7.2, the amount per 
contribution, it is seen why the limitation variable does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the amount per contribution.  The limitation variable decreases the amount per 
contribution for open seat candidates.  The limitation, however, increases the amount per 
contribution for challengers.  The coefficient for open seat candidates is -4.756 and the 
coefficient for challengers is 2.265, and the difference between them is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level.21  As was shown in Chapter Four, combining two opposite 
slope coefficients may generate an insignificant relationship of the limitation on the 
amount per contribution.22  Finally, no differential effect of the limitation is statistically 
supported between incumbents and challengers.     
If one focuses on the BC dummy variable in the amount per contribution analysis 
in Table 7.2, it is seen that challengers tend to receive a smaller amount per contribution 
compared to candidates in open seat elections.  The BI dummy variable, however, does 
not have a statistically significant effect suggesting incumbents are not statistically likely 
to receive smaller amounts per contribution than open seat candidates.  Finally, no 
difference is found between the amount per contribution donated to incumbents and 
challengers.23   
With the exception of the income variable, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.  The income variable 
suggests that a wealthy state tends to receive more per contribution compared to a poor 
state.24    
This candidate level analysis tends to be even more supportive of the arguments 
put forward by the advocates of contribution limits than the state level analysis.  The 
existence of campaign contribution limits does tend to significantly reduce the number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
election in a state.  Government status at the state level is coded as 1 if either of the parties 
controls all branches of government and 0 otherwise while government status at the candidate 
level is coded as 1 if a candidate’s party controls every branch of governments, 0 if either of the 
parties does not control every branch of governments and -1 if his or her opponent’s party controls 
every branch of governments.   
21 . I use the linear combination in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the difference and its significance.  The 
difference is 7.021 that is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
22 . This kind of relationship is known as “uncorrelatedness” (Goldberger 1991;  and also see Jin and Eom 
2001). 
23 . I use the linear combination method to obtain the difference between incumbents and challengers.   
24 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
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corporate contributors and decrease the amount of corporate contributions.  Furthermore, 
the limitation effect does not depend on whether a candidate is an incumbent, a 
challenger, or an open seat candidate.  If one equates contributions and influence, then 
this clearly suggests the reduction of undue influence in political contributions.  This is 
also found in particularistic contributions.  Unlike the findings in particularistic 
contributions, however, limits do not decrease the disparity in numbers and amounts 
between incumbents and challengers either.  No differential effect of the limitation 
variable is found between incumbents and challengers.  The bottom line is that the 
argument by critics is neither supported in the state level analyses nor the candidate level 
analyses.   
The analyses to this point have focused on one of particularistic contributions: 
corporate contributions.  In the next section, I focus on the effects of contribution limits 
on the other particularistic contributions: labor union contributions.  I examine whether 
labor union contributions behave more like corporate contributions or particularistic 
contributions in general. 
 
2.2. Labor Union Contributions and Contribution Limits 
The analyses shown in Table 7.3 show quite different patterns compared to those 
found in the analyses for corporate contributions.25  Labor union contribution limits do 
not affect the number of labor union contributions per eligible voter for all and the major 
party candidates.26  Limits do not affect the amount of labor union contributions per 
eligible voter for all candidates.  The statistically significant effect of the limitation 
variable is only found in the amount of labor union contributions for the major party 
candidates.  The coefficient is negative, -0.694, and statistically significant at the 0.10 
level.   
                                                 
25 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.3.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
26 . Labor union contribution limitation is coded 0 if there is no restriction on PACs, 1 if 1 some limitations 
are imposed on labor unions and PACs, and 2 if labor union contributions are prohibited and some 
limitation is on PACs.  The range is from 0 (loose limitation) to 2 (restrictive limitation).   
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Of all the substantively important control variables shown in Table 7.3, only 
interparty competition has a statistically significant effect on the number or amount of 
particularistic contributions.  If the competitiveness of the elections is changed from the 
75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the number of contributions for the major party 
candidates increases by 60.96% and the amount of contributions increases by 78.11%.27  
Labor union contributors can be seen as “investors,” or possible even “risk seekers,” as is 
seen in corporate contributions.  Labor unions and corporations are more like to 
contribute a larger amount to candidates when elections are competitive.  This state level 
analysis, however, simply cannot determine whether this change is more advantageous to 
incumbents or challengers.  
As shown in Table 7.3, contribution limits have a statistically significant effect on 
the amount per labor union contribution.28  This is very different from what was seen 
when the analysis focused on corporate contributions, shown in Table 7.1, where limits 
did not have a statistically significant negative effect.  This suggests that, much as 
supporters of contribution limits have claimed, that contribution limits do seem to reduce 
the average amount per labor union contribution suggesting a possible democratizing 
effect.   
                                                 
27 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile and 24.43 for the 75th percentile.  The 
difference between the percentiles is multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.032 for the numbers 
and -0.041 for the amounts.   
28 . Since no substantive difference is found between the results examined for all and the major party 
candidates, I discuss the results for the major party candidates.  See I. Regression of Average 
Amount per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results for all candidates.    
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If the supporters of contribution limits are correct about the democratizing effect 
of contribution limits, what about the argument by critics that contribution limits work to 
increase bias in favor of incumbents?  The results shown in Table 7.3 indicate that 
contribution limits do not affect any of the three disparity measures between incumbent 
and challengers. 29 , 30   This is a very much different finding from particularistic 
contributions where limits decrease the disparity in the numbers and the amounts of 
contributions.  This is very much same finding, however, compared to corporate 
contributions where limits do not affect the disparity between incumbents and challengers.  
None of the control variables affects the disparity. 
The state level analyses presented so far indicate support for the argument of 
contribution limits; contribution limits decrease the amount of contributions per eligible 
voter for the major party candidates and reduce the average amount per contribution.  
There is no support for the argument of critics that limits increase bias in favor of 
incumbents.  Once again, the evidence from labor union contributions supports of those 
who suggest the positive benefits of contribution limits. 
 
2.2.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 7.4 shows the effect of labor union contribution limits on the number of 
contributors per eligible voter and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for 
the major party candidates.31  Neither the numbers nor the amounts are affected by the 
presence of contribution limits whether a candidate is an incumbent, a challenger or an 
open seat candidate.32 
The BI dummy variable is statistically significant in the analysis examining the 
amount of contributions per eligible voter.  Since the coefficient is positive, 1.596, it 
                                                 
29 . Since there is little substantive difference in the importance of the limitation variable between the 
results with and without outliers, I will confine my comments on a consideration of the results 
utilizing all observations.  See II. Regression of Disparity without Outliers in Appendix G for the 
statistical results using samples without outliers.   
30  . None of the difference measures is statistically significant whether one examines the number of 
contributors, the amount of contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are 
available from the author.   
31 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.4.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
32 . I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the difference in the limitation 
effects between incumbents and challengers.   
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indicates that, all other thing being equal, incumbents do have a greater amount of 
contributions per eligible voter than open seat candidates.  Since the BC dummy variable 
is not statistically significant, challengers are not statistically more likely to receive 
smaller numbers per eligible voter or smaller dollars per eligible voter than open seat 
candidates. The difference between incumbents and challengers, however, is positive, 
2.663, and statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the amounts as well as for the 
numbers of contributions.   
The party identification variable has a statistically significant effect on the 
number of labor union contributions per eligible voter and the amount of labor union 
contributions per eligible voter.  This suggests that Democratic candidates are greater 
beneficiaries of labor union contributions compared to Republican candidates.  If a 
gubernatorial candidate is from the Democratic Party, he or she tends to receive 295.7% 
larger numbers of contributions and 356.2% larger amounts of contributions than a 
candidate from the Republican Party.  This is very different from any other contributions.  
Indeed, the statistically significant effect of the party variable is shown only in labor 
union contributions.   
The interparty competition variable behaves much better in the candidate level 
analysis than it did in the state level analysis.  Whether one examines the number of 
contributors per eligible voter or the amount of contributions per eligible voter, interparty 
competition has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.031, for the number of 
contributors, and -0.042 for the amount of contributions.  The statistically significant 
effect of interparty competition is a consistent finding across corporation and 
particularistic contributions.33  Based on the analysis shown in Table 7.4, if an election 
becomes more competitive, say from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the 
number of contributors increase by 59.06% and the amount of contributions goes up by 
80.01%.34  None of the other control variables has a statistically significant effect.   
                                                 
33 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest difference refers to the most competitive election 
while the largest difference refers to the least competitive election.   
34 . The value of interparty competition is 5.38 for the 25th percentile and 24.43 for the 75th percentile.  The 
difference between the percentiles is multiplied by the slope coefficient, -0.031 for the numbers 
and -0.042 for the amounts.   
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Table 7.4. Limitation and Labor Union Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.688 -1.067 -13.335 
  (0.639) (0.812) (13.408) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.987 1.596* 18.884 
  (0.643) (0.817) (13.490) 
Limitation*BO -0.118 -0.576 -14.275** 
  (0.327) (0.416) (6.872) 
Limitation*BC 0.280 0.189 -2.593 
  (0.440) (0.559) (9.233) 
Limitation*BI 0.113 -0.490 -22.047** 
  (0.441) (0.561) (9.264) 
Party 2.957*** 3.562*** 14.552** 
  (0.302) (0.383) (6.329) 
Partisan Strength -0.018 -0.015 0.421 
  (0.019) (0.025) (0.406) 
IPC -0.031** -0.042** -0.238 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.288) 
Government Status 0.086 0.174 -1.158 
  (0.255) (0.324) (5.349) 
Income 0.000 0.002 0.072*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.023) 
College 0.029 -0.014 -0.682 
  (0.042) (0.053) (0.882) 
Constant -8.027*** -4.528** 14.701 
  (1.531) (1.946) (32.121) 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.58 0.56 0.29 
F Test 6.87 6.52 2.03 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.01 
1.675** 2.663*** 32.219** BI - BC 
  (0.685) (0.871) (14.377) 
-0.167 -0.679 -19.454 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC  (0.597) (0.760) (12.526) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 118
If one focuses on the last analysis reported in Table 7.4, the amount per 
contribution, it is seen that the limitation variable behaves much as it did in the state level 
analysis.  The limitation variable has a negative coefficient, -14.275, and is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, regarding its effect on the amount per labor union 
contribution.  Contribution limits are shown to reduce the average amount per 
contribution for open seat candidates.  Once again, this supports the argument put 
forward by supporters of contribution limits.  The negative effect of limitations is also 
evident on incumbents.  The limits reduce the average amount per contribution for 
incumbents.   The limitation variable, however, does not have a statistically significant 
effect on challengers.  Furthermore, it is not clear that the difference in the limitation 
effect is statistically significant between incumbents and challengers.   
The two dummy variables, BI and BC, do not have a statistically significant effect 
on the average amount per contribution. This suggests that incumbents are not 
statistically likely to receive a larger amount per contribution than open seat candidates. 
Nor are challengers statistically likely to receive a smaller amount per contribution than 
open seat candidates holding the other variables constant.  Incumbents, however, are 
likely to receive a larger amount per contribution than challengers, 32.219, and it is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.   
The party identification variable has a statistically significant effect on the 
average amount per contribution.  As shown in the analyses for numbers and amounts of 
contributions, Democratic candidates benefit more from labor union contributions than 
Republican candidates.  If a gubernatorial candidate is from the Democratic Party, he or 
she receives a larger average amount per contribution, $14.552, than a candidate from the 
Republican Party.  This is quite different from any other contributions.  Indeed, it is only 
in labor union contributions that the party variable shows a statistically significant effect 
on the average amount per contribution. 
 With the exception of the income variable, and of course the party variable, none 
of the control variables has a statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.  
The income variable suggests that a wealthy state tends to receive a larger amount per 
contribution compared to a poor state.35   
                                                 
35 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
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This candidate level analysis tends to better support the arguments put forward by 
advocates of contribution limits, as in the state level analysis.  The existence of 
contribution limits reduces the average amount per contribution.  The effect is 
statistically significant for open seat candidates and incumbents.  It is not clear, however, 
that challengers are likely to receive a smaller average amount per contribution given the 
presence of contribution limits.  The argument by critics is neither supported in the state 
level analyses nor the candidate level analyses.   
The analyses up to this point have focused on the two types of particularistic 
contributions: corporate contributions and labor union contributions.  The two types of 
particularistic contributions show substantially different patterns.  Contribution limits 
have a statistically significant negative effect on the number or amount of corporate 
contributions.  The effect is evident for all and the major party candidates.  Limits, 
however, do not affect the average amount per contribution.  On the other hand, 
contribution limits do not have a statistically significant effect on the number of labor 
union contributions for all and the major party candidates, or on the amount of labor 
union contributions for all candidates, although the sign of the limitation variables is 
negative.  The statistically significant effect of limitations is found only on the amount of 
labor union contributions for the major party candidates and on the average amount per 
labor union contribution.  A similar pattern between corporate and labor union 
contribution is also found.  None of the disparity measures is affected by contribution 
limits, either in corporate contributions or in labor union contributions.   
The empirical findings in Chapter Six suggest that the effect of contribution limits 
is different between particularistic contributions and universalistic contributions.  Limits 
have a democratic effect of increasing the number of contributors, although the effect is 
limited to all candidates.  Furthermore, limits do not increase bias for incumbents.  Do the 
sub-categories of universalistic contributions have the same patterns as those found for 
universalistic contributions?  Or do some of the sub-categories follow the patterns found 
for particularistic contributions?  In the next section, I examine the effect of contribution 
limits on the sub-categories of universalistic contributions. Universalistic contributions 
are composed of three kinds of contributions: individual, party, and ideological PAC 
contributions.  I begin by analyzing individual contributions at the state level followed by 
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a candidate level analysis of individual contributions.  I then turn to an examination of 
party contributions followed by ideological contributions. 
 
2.3. Individual Contributions and Contribution Limits 
2.3.1. State Level Analyses 
The analyses shown in Table 7.5 suggest that contribution limits increase the 
number of individual contributors per eligible voter and the amount of individual 
contributions per eligible voter.36, 37  The limitation effect, however is restricted to all 
candidates, because the limitation variable does not have a statistically significant effect 
for the major party candidates.38   
Of all the substantively important control variables shown in Table 7.5, only 
interparty competition seems to have a statistically significant effect on the amounts; and, 
the effect is limited to the case of all candidates.  As previous research indicates (Fuchs, 
Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980), if the 
                                                 
36 . Individual contribution limits are specified in Campaign Finance Law (Feigenbaum and Palmer 1990-
2000).  Difficulties with using campaign regulations in themselves are “no limit.”  No limit 
literally means “no limitation” on contributions.  We may exclude those “no limit” values, double 
them to the maximum amount of contribution within the category or put an arbitrarily extreme 
contribution limit like 9,999,999 (Gross, Goidel and Shields 2002).  The exclusion of no limit 
values generates a systematic bias, because it excludes the analysis of an unregulated setting.  The 
second suggestion (doubling) makes an arbitrary assumption on contribution limits, because 
regulations are influenced by the amount of contributions.  The final suggestion puts an arbitrarily 
extreme number.  This idea comes from the nature of no limit (i.e., infinity).  If a continuous 
variable has some unbounded values and thus unbounded variation, assigning a large value, which 
practically represents “infinity”, would not change the nature of variation of the variable.  I thank 
M. M. Ali for his useful comment on this regard.  Therefore, in the following analyses utilizing 
regulations themselves as contribution limits, I assign an arbitrary number (9,999,999) to no limit.  
The number of election cycles without limitation on individuals is 17 out of 58 election cycles.  To 
ease the interpretation and have a consistency with other limitation variables, I divide individual 
contribution limits by -1,000,000.  Therefore, the lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation 
and the highest figure is the most restrictive limitation.  The positive sign means that restrictive 
contribution limits increase individual contributions.   
37 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.5.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
38 . For a consistency with other limitation variables, I also perform the analyses utilizing a dummy variable 
which is coded as 1 if some limitation is on individual contributions or 0 if no limitation is 
imposed on.  Using that dummy variable does not affect the interpretation of the limitation 
variable.  The results are available from the author.   
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electoral competition moves from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, then the 
amount of contributions to all candidates increases by 34.29%.39   
As shown in Table 7.5, contribution limits do not have a statistically significant 
effect on the amount per individual contribution. 40  This is very different from what was 
when the analysis focused on universalistic contributions, as shown in Table 6.7, where 
limits did have a statistically significant effect.  The lack of an effect for contribution 
limits in the case of individual contributions is likely due to the fact that limits 
significantly reduce both the number and amount of individual contributions for all 
candidates.  Since both are reduced, the overall effect is insignificant when one examines 
the amount per contribution.  None of the control variables has a statistically significant 
effect on the average amount per contribution.   
The results relevant to the argument of critics of contribution limits are also 
shown in Table 7.5.  The results indicate that contribution limits are not statistically 
related to any of the three disparity measures.41 , 42  There is no evidence to support the 
argument that contribution limits increase bias in contributions in favor of incumbents. 
                                                 
39 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest number refers to the most competitive elections and 
the largest number refers to the least competitive election.  The expected value is the difference in 
the expected dependent variables given interparty competition moves from the 75th percentile to 
the 25th percentile holding the other variable constant, i.e., 34.29% = 100*[-0.018*(5.38 – 24.43)].   
40 . Since little substantive difference is found in the importance of the limitation variable between the 
analyses for all candidates and the major party candidates, I will confine my comments on a 
consideration of the results for the major party candidates.  See I. Regression of Average Amount 
per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results for all candidates.   
41 . Since little substantive difference between analyses with or without outliers is found in the importance 
of the limitation variable except the average amount per contribution, I will confine my comments 
on a consideration of the results utilizing all observations.  See II. Regression of Disparity without 
Outliers in Appendix G for the statistical results using samples without outliers.   
42 . None of the difference measures are statistically significant whether one examines the number of 
contributors, the amount of contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are 
available from the author.   
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Most of the control variables in the disparity analyses are not consistently related 
to the level of disparity between incumbents and challengers.  The exception is interparty 
competition.  As in the analyses for universalistic contributions, interparty competition 
levels the playing field between incumbents and challengers.  When considering the 
disparity in the number of contributors, the coefficient is 0.784 and statistically 
significant, thus indicating that the greater the competition the lower the disparity in the 
numbers between incumbents and challengers. 43   In a similar vein, when analyzing 
disparity in amounts, the coefficient is positive, 0.773, and statistically significant for the 
interparty competition variable. This finding indicates that the greater the competition, 
the lower the disparity in the amount of contributions raised by incumbents and 
challengers.  These results are much as one would expect given previous findings on the 
relationship between competition and contribution patterns (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 
2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980). 
The college variable affects the disparity in the number of individual contributors, 
but does not have a statistically significant effect on either disparity in amounts or 
disparity in the average amount per contribution.44  It would be inappropriate at this time 
to put much credence in the importance of the education level in a state, because the 
appropriate coefficient only reaches statistical significance in one of three cases.   
The state level analyses presented thus far indicate that contribution limits 
increase the number and amount of individual contributions per eligible voter.  This 
suggests a democratizing effect of contribution limits, as supporters of contribution limits 
have claimed.  Contrary to the argument of critics, limits do not affect any of the three 
disparity measures.  Once again, the evidence supports those who suggest the positive 
benefits of contribution limits.   
 
2.3.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 7.6 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of contributors per 
eligible voter and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for the major party 
                                                 
43 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest number refers to the most competitive elections and 
the largest number refers to the least competitive election.   
44 . The college variable is the percentage of college graduate or more in a state. 
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candidates.45  None of the limitation variables has a statistically significant effect either 
on the numbers or on the amounts of contributions. 46  The limitation variable does not 
have a statistically significant effect either on the number or amount of contributions to 
open seat candidates.  The effect of contribution limits on incumbents is not statistically 
supported for either the number of contributors or the amount of contributions.  The same 
can be said for the effect of contribution limits on challengers.  No differential 
contribution limitation effect is found between incumbents and challengers.    
The BI dummy variable is statistically significant in the analysis examining the 
number of contributors per eligible voter and in the analysis examining the amount of 
contributions per eligible voter.  Since the coefficient is positive, 0.777, for numbers and 
0.872 for amounts, it seems that all other thing being equal, incumbents do have a larger 
number of contributors per eligible voter and do receive larger amounts of contributions 
per eligible voter than open seat candidates.   
Since the BC dummy variable is negative, -0.637, and statistically significant, it 
seems that challengers are likely to receive a smaller amount of contributions than open 
seat candidates.  Since the BC dummy variable does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the numbers, however, challengers are not likely to receive a smaller number of 
contributors than open seat candidates.  On the other hand, the difference between 
incumbents and challengers is evident in the number of contributors and in the amount of 
contributions.  The difference is positive, 1.161 for numbers and 1.509 for dollars, and 
they are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  This suggests that incumbents are 
likely to receive a larger number of contributions and a greater amount of contributions 
than challengers.47 
                                                 
45 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.6.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
46 . For a consistency with other limitation variables, I also perform the analyses utilizing a dummy variable 
which is coded as 1 if some limitation is on individual contributions or 0 if no limitation is 
imposed on.  Using that dummy variable does not affect the interpretation of the limitation 
variable.  The results are available from the author.   
47 . I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the effect and its significance for 
numbers and for dollars. 
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Table 7.6. Limitation and Individual Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.384 -0.637* -1.894 
  (0.415) (0.370) (1.444) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.777* 0.872** -0.679 
  (0.423) (0.377) (1.472) 
Limitation*BO 0.045 0.009 -0.265* 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.135) 
Limitation*BC 0.043 0.009 -0.110 
  (0.056) (0.050) (0.196) 
Limitation*BI 0.050 0.063 0.068 
  (0.057) (0.051) (0.199) 
Party -0.206 -0.187 0.117 
  (0.239) (0.213) (0.832) 
Partisan Strength -0.013 -0.010 -0.004 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.053) 
IPC -0.026** -0.035*** 0.005 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.038) 
Government Status 0.159 0.164 0.071 
  (0.202) (0.180) (0.703) 
Income -0.001 -0.000 0.005* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
College 0.011 -0.022 -0.167 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.113) 
Constant -1.499 0.763 11.934*** 
  (1.218) (1.087) (4.241) 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.32 0.36 0.26 
F Test 2.41 2.87 1.78 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.04 
1.161*** 1.509*** 1.215 BI - BC 
  (0.390) (0.348) (1.359) 
0.007 0.054 0.179 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC  (0.078) (0.070) (0.273) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The interparty competition variable behaves much better in the candidate level 
analysis than it did in the state level analysis.  Both in the number of contributors per 
eligible voter and in the amount of contributions per eligible voter, interparty competition 
has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.026 for the numbers and -0.035 for the 
amounts of contributions, suggesting that when elections become more competitive there 
tends to be an increase in the number of contributors and the amount of contributions 
(Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 2000; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 2001; Welch 1980).48  
This is also true for universalistic contributions.  Based on the analyses shown in Table 
7.6, if an election becomes more competitive, say from the 75th percentile and to the 25th 
percentile, then the number of contributor’s increases by 49.53% and the amount of 
contributions goes up by 66.68%.49  Other than the interparty competition variable, none 
of the other control variables has any statistically significant effect on either the number 
of contributors or the amount of contributions.  This is similar to what was seen in the 
state level analysis. 
If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 7.6, the amount per 
contribution, it is seen that the limitation variable behaves much as it did in the state level 
analysis.  The limitation variable has a negative coefficient, -0.265, and is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. 50   Contribution limits reduce the average amount per 
contribution for open seat candidates. Once again, this supports the argument by 
supporters of contributions limits.  The effect, however, is limited to open seat candidates, 
because limits do not seem to reduce the average amount per contribution that 
incumbents or challengers receive.  The effect of the limitation variable on incumbents is 
not statistically supported at the 0.10 level, and neither does the effect of the limitation 
variable on challengers.  In addition, the difference is not statistically supported between 
incumbents versus challengers, incumbents versus open seat candidates, and challengers 
versus open seat candidates.51  This suggests that the democratic effect resulting from 
                                                 
48 . Interparty competition is measured as the smallest difference refers to the most competitive election 
while the largest difference refers to the least competitive election.   
49 . The difference between the 25th percentile (5.38) and the 75th percentile (24.43) is multiplied by the 
slope coefficient, -0.026 for the numbers and -0.035 for the amounts.   
50 . Individual contribution limits are measured as the lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation and the 
highest figure is the most restrictive limitation.   
51 . As shown in Table 7.6, the difference of the limitation effect between incumbents and challengers is 
0.007 for the numbers and 0.054 for the amounts and neither is statistically significant at the 0.10 
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contribution limits is likely to be present, but the effect appears to be limited to open seat 
candidates.   
If one focuses on the two dummy variables for being a challengers (BC) and 
being an incumbent (BI) in the amount per contribution analysis in Table 7.6, it is shown 
that neither of the variables has a statistically significant effect on the average amount per 
contribution.  In addition, no difference is found between being a challenger and being an 
incumbent.52   
With the exception of the income variable, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.   The income variable 
suggests that a wealthy state tends to receive the larger average amount per contribution 
compared to a poor state.53  Even though interparty competition seems to affect both the 
number of contributors and the amount of contributions, it did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the amount per contribution.  This suggests that, similarly to 
universalistic contributions, the traditional finding that party competition tends to be 
associated with more expensive races results from competition spurring greater numbers 
of contributors. 
This candidate level analysis supports the argument put forward by advocates of 
contribution limits.  The existence of contribution limits significantly increases the 
number of individual contributors and reduces the average amount per contribution.  
Critics of contribution limits have suggested that they can increase bias in favor of 
incumbents.  The candidate level analyses showed that while incumbents did tend to have, 
on average, more contributors per eligible voter and greater contributions per eligible 
voter than challengers, the effect of contribution limits did not depend upon whether a 
candidate was an incumbent, a challenger, or an open seat candidate.   
In the analyses on individual contributions, I found that contribution limits 
increase the number of individual contributors per eligible voter and the amount of 
contributions per eligible voter for all candidates.  In addition, limits tended to reduce the 
                                                                                                                                                 
level.  The difference of the limitation effect between incumbents and open seat candidates is 
0.004 for the numbers and 0.053 for the amounts while it is -0.003 for the numbers and -0.001 for 
the amounts between challengers and open seat candidates.  None of them are statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level.  I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain 
the difference and its significance.   
52 . I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE). 
53 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
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average amount per contribution.  On the other hand, the argument of critics of 
contribution limits were not supported by my findings.  Neither of the three disparity 
measures was related to contribution limits in the state level analyses.  No differential 
effect was found between incumbents versus challengers, incumbents versus open seat 
candidates, and challengers versus open seat candidates in the candidate level analyses.  
In the next section, I examine the relationship between contribution limits and the other 
universalistic contributions: party contributions. 
 
2.4. Political Party Contributions and Contribution Limits 
2.4.1. State Level Analyses 
The analyses shown in Table 7.7 suggest that parties behave much differently 
from individual contributors given the presence of contribution limits.54  The limitation 
on party contributions has a statistically significant effect on the amount of party 
contributions per eligible voter.  The limitation, however, decreases the amount of party 
contributions rather than increasing the amounts shown in individual contributions.55, 56  
This is the case for all and the major party candidates.  On the other hand, the limitation 
does not affect the number of party contributions for all and the major party candidates. 
Of all the substantively important control variables shown in Table 7.7, only 
interparty competition has a statistically significant effect on the amounts.  Like 
individual contributors, parties also increase the amount of contributions if elections are 
competitive.  For example, if the electoral competition moves from the 75th percentile to 
                                                 
54 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.7.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
55 . The limitation on political party contribution is specified in Campaign Finance Law (Feigenbaum and 
Palmer 1990-2000).   As mentioned above, I assign an arbitrary number (9,999,999) to no limit.  
The number of election cycles without limitation is 22 out of 58 election cycles.  To ease the 
interpretation and have a consistency with other variables, I divide the limits by -1,000,000.  
Therefore, the lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation and the higher figure is the more 
restrictive limitation indicating that the negative sign means that restrictive contribution limits 
decrease contributions.   
56 . For a consistency with other limitation variables, I also perform the analyses utilizing a dummy variable 
which is coded as 1 if some limitation is on party contributions or 0 if no limitation is imposed on.  
Using that dummy variable does not affect the interpretation of the limitation variable.  The results 
are available from the author.   
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the 25th percentile, then the amount of contributions for the major party candidates 
increases by 80.01%.57   
As shown in Table 7.7, contribution limits affect the average amount per 
contribution.  The coefficient is negative, -9.048, and it is statistically significant 
suggesting contribution limits reduce the average amount per contribution.  This is 
different from what was seen when the analysis focused on individual contributions 
where limits do not affect the average amount per contribution.  This is very similar, 
however, when examining universalistic contributions.   
Partisan strength in a state affects the average amount per contribution by $3.833, 
suggesting that given strong partisanship in a state, parties contribute a greater average 
amount per contribution, holding the other variables constant.58  If the difference in 
partisan strength moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the average amount 
per contribution is likely to increase by $1.938.59  None of the political control variables 
influences the average amount per party contribution.   
 
                                                 
57 . The difference between the 25th percentile (5.38) and the 75th percentile (24.43) is multiplied by the 
slope coefficient, -0.042 for the amounts for the major party candidates.  
58 . Partisan strength at the state level is measured as an absolute difference between the vote shares of 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state 
59 . The expected value is the multiplication of the difference by the slope coefficient for partisan strength, 
i.e., 1.938 = 0.155*(18.2 – 5.7).   
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Table 7.7 also shows results relevant to critics’ arguments that contribution limits 
create financial bias in favor of incumbents.  The results indicate that contribution limits 
are not statistically related to any of the three disparity measures. 60, 61  There is simply no 
evidence to support the contention that contribution limits increase bias in favor of 
incumbents. 
Most of the control variables are not consistently related to the level of disparity 
between incumbents and challengers.  The income variable affects the disparity in the 
numbers of contributions, but does not have a statistically significant effect on either 
disparity in the amount of contributions nor the average amount per contribution.  Since 
the coefficient only reaches significance in one of the three cases, it would be 
inappropriate at this time to claim income is an important indicator.   
Partisan strength has a statistically significant effect on the three disparity 
measures, but the effects show different directions.62  Partisan strength has a statistically 
significant positive effect, 0.082, on the disparity in numbers of contributions, suggesting 
that incumbents receive a larger number of party contributions than challengers when the 
incumbent’s party is strong in a state.  It has a statistically negative effect, however, on 
the disparity in the amounts (-12.366), and, the average amount per contribution (-3.210), 
suggesting that incumbents receive a smaller amount of party contributions and a smaller 
average amount per contribution than challengers when the incumbent’s party is strong in 
a state.  This suggests that, although incumbents receive a larger number of contributions 
from parties, challengers are the major beneficiary of party contributions when the 
incumbent’s party is strong. 
The state level analyses presented so far indicate that contribution limits decrease 
the amount of party contributions.  This behavior is markedly different from individual 
                                                 
60 . Since little substantive difference between analyses with or without outliers is found in the importance 
of the limitation variable except the average amount per contribution, I confine my comments on a 
consideration of the results utilizing all observations.  See II. Regression of Disparity without 
Outliers in Appendix G for the statistical results using samples without outliers.   
61  . None of the difference measures is statistically significant whether one examines the number of 
contributors, the amount of contributions or the average amount per contribution.  The results are 
available from the author.   
62 . Partisan strength at the state level is measured as an absolute difference between the vote shares of 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state. 
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contributions.  Again, there is no evidence to support the critics’ argument that limits 
increase bias in favor of incumbents. 
 
2.4.2. Candidate Level Analyses. 
Table 7.8 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of contributors per 
eligible voter, and on the amount of contributions per eligible voter for the major party 
candidates.  The limitation variable has a statistically significant effect on the amount of 
contributions per eligible voter for open seat candidates.63, 64   The coefficient is negative, 
-0.190, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  This suggests that contribution 
limits decrease the amount of party contributions for open seat candidates given the 
presence of restrictive contribution limits.  The effect of contribution limits on 
incumbents is statistically significant and negative, -0.237, suggesting incumbents receive 
a smaller amount of contributions given the presence of restrictive contribution limits.   
Limitations, however, do not affect the amount of contributions for challengers.  No 
differential limitation effect is found in the amounts between incumbents versus 
challengers, incumbents versus open seat candidates, and challengers versus open seat 
candidates.65 
The limitation on contributions is not likely to influence the number of party 
contributions per eligible voter.  Limits do not affect the numbers for open seat 
candidates.  Neither is the numbers for challengers affected by limits.  The statistically 
significant effect is found only on the number of contributions for incumbents.  On the 
other hand, no differential limitation effect is found in the numbers between incumbents 
                                                 
63 . The limitation on party contributions is measured as the lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation 
and the highest figure is the most restrictive limitation.  For a consistency with other limitation 
variables, I also perform the analyses utilizing a dummy variable which is coded as 1 if some 
limitation is on party contributions or 0 if no limitation is imposed on.  Using that dummy variable 
does not affect the interpretation of the limitation variable.  The results are available from the 
author.   
64 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.8.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
65 . As shown in Table 7.8, the difference of the limitation effect on the amounts between incumbents and 
challengers is -0.177 and it is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The difference of the 
limitation effect on the amounts between incumbents and open seat candidates is -0.047 while it is 
and 0.130 between challengers and open seat candidates.  None of them are statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level.  I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the 
difference and its significance.   
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versus challengers, incumbents versus open seat candidates, and challengers versus open 
seat candidates.66 
 None of the dummy variables is statistically significant on the numbers or on the 
amounts of contributions.  Challengers are not likely to receive a smaller number or a 
larger amount of contributions than open seat candidates.  Incumbents are not likely to 
receive a smaller number or a smaller amount of contributions than open seat candidates.  
No difference is found between the numbers as well as the amounts donated to 
incumbents and challengers. 
The interparty competition in the candidate level analyses behaves much like in 
the state level analyses.  Both in the number of contributors and in the amount of 
contributions, interparty competition has a statistically significant negative impact, -0.018 
for numbers and -0.044 for dollars.  This suggests that when elections become more 
competitive, there tends to be an increase in the number of contributors and the amount of 
contributions.  If the competitiveness of the election moves from the 75th percentile to 
25th percentile, party contributions increase for the numbers by 34.29% and go up by 
83.82% for dollars. 67  Other than the interparty competition variable, none of the other 
control variables has any statistically significant effect either on the number of 
contributors nor on the amount of contributions.  This is similar to what was seen in the 
state level analysis. 
 
                                                 
66 . As shown in Table 7.8, the difference of the limitation effect on the numbers between incumbents and 
challengers is -0.072 and it is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The difference of the 
limitation effect on the numbers between incumbents and open seat candidates is -0.081 while it is 
-0.009 between challengers and open seat candidates.  None of them are statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level.  I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the difference 
and its significance.   
67 . The difference between the 25th percentile (5.38) and the 75th percentile (24.43) is multiplied by the 
slope coefficient, -0.018 for the numbers and -0.044 for the amounts.   
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Table 7.8. Limitation and Party Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.045 0.226 -22.478 
  (0.479) (0.827) (64.069) 
Being Incumbent (BI) -0.446 -0.498 66.739 
  (0.507) (0.874) (67.749) 
Limitation*BO -0.007 -0.190*** -10.221** 
  (0.037) (0.064) (4.947) 
Limitation*BC -0.017 -0.060 -1.924 
  (0.049) (0.085) (6.555) 
Limitation*BI -0.088* -0.237*** 0.159 
  (0.052) (0.089) (6.920) 
Party -0.160 -0.258 -38.191 
  (0.233) (0.402) (31.153) 
Partisan Strength -0.014 -0.011 3.027 
  (0.015) (0.026) (1.990) 
IPC -0.018* -0.044** -0.320 
  (0.011) (0.018) (1.416) 
Government Status 0.083 -0.131 -36.039 
  (0.197) (0.340) (26.374) 
Income -0.000 0.002 0.215* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.111) 
College -0.031 -0.047 2.815 
  (0.031) (0.054) (4.178) 
Constant -4.750*** -1.867 -206.003 
  (1.182) (2.038) (157.972) 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.23 0.37 0.36 
F Test 1.51 2.97 2.81 
Probability > F 0.10 0.00 0.00 
-0.401 -0.724 89.217 BI - BC 
  (0.526) (0.907) (70.332) 
-0.072 -0.177 2.083 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC (0.068) (0.117) (9.057) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 7.8, the amount per 
contribution, it is seen that the limitation variable behaves much as it did in the state level 
analysis.  The limitation variable has a negative coefficient, -10.221, and is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level.68  The findings indicate that contribution limits reduce the 
average amount per contribution for open seat candidates.  The effect, however, is limited 
to open seat candidates, because limits do not appear to reduce the average amount per 
contribution that incumbents or challengers receive.  The effect of the limitation variable 
on incumbents is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level, and neither is the effect of 
the limitation variable on challengers.  In addition, the difference between incumbents 
versus open seat candidates and challengers versus open seat candidates is not 
statistically significant either.69 
The two dummy variables, BC and BI, do not have a statistically significant effect 
on the average amount per contribution.  This suggests that incumbents or challengers are 
not likely to receive a greater (or smaller) average amount per contribution than open seat 
candidates.  No difference in the amount per contribution is found between incumbents 
and challengers.   
With the exception of the income variable, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the amount per contribution.   The income variable 
suggests that a wealthy state tends to receive the larger average amount per contribution 
compared to a poor state.70   
Party contributions behave quite differently than individual contributions or 
universalistic contributions.  Contribution limits reduce the amount of party contributions 
per eligible voter.  Party contributions, however, behave much like individual 
contributions or universalistic contributions, in that limits reduce the average amount per 
contribution.  No evidence is found to support the critics’ argument that limits favor 
incumbents.  Limits do not have a statistically significant effect on any of the three 
                                                 
68 . The limitation on party contributions is measured as the lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation 
and the highest figure is the most restrictive limitation.   
69 . As shown in Table 7.8, the difference of the limitation effect on the amount per contribution is 2.083 
between incumbents and challengers, 10.380 between incumbents and open seat candidates and 
8.296 between challengers and open seat candidates.  None of them are statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level.  I use the linear combination method in Stata (version 7/SE) to obtain the difference 
and its significance.   
70 . The income variable is measured by personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.   
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disparity measures, and no differential limitation effect is found between incumbents 
versus challengers, incumbents versus open seat candidates, and challengers versus open 
seat candidates.  In next section, I examine ideological PAC contributions at the state 
level followed by an analysis at the candidate level.   
 
2.5. Ideology PAC Contributions and Contribution Limits 
2.5.1. State Level Analyses 
Ideological PACs behave much like parties, but different than individual 
contributions.  The analyses shown in Table 7.9 suggest that contribution limits decrease 
the amount of ideological PAC contributions per eligible voter. 71 , 72   The limitation, 
however, does not have a statistically significant effect on the number of ideological PAC 
contributions. 
None of the substantively important control variables is consistently related to the 
number or the amount of contributions.  Interparty competition affects the number of 
contributions for all candidates, but does not affect the number of contributions for the 
major party candidates or the amount of contributions for all and the major party 
candidates. It would be inappropriate at this time to put much credence in the importance 
of interparty competition, because the coefficient only reaches significance in one of four 
cases.   
A similar argument can be made about the partisan strength variable and the 
income variable.  The partisan strength variable has a statistically significant effect on the 
amount of contributions for the major party candidates, but is not statistically significant 
in the case of the amounts for all candidates or the numbers for all and the major party 
                                                 
71 . The limitation on ideology PAC contributions is specified in Campaign Finance Law (Feigenbaum and 
Palmer 1990-2000).   As mentioned above, I assign an arbitrary number (9,999,999) to no limit.  
To ease the interpretation and have a consistency with other variables, I divide the limits by -
1,000,000.  Therefore, the lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation and the higher figure is 
the more restrictive limitation indicating that the negative sign means that restrictive contribution 
limits decrease contributions.  Furthermore, for a consistency with other limitation variables, I also 
perform the analyses utilizing a dummy variable which is coded as 1 if some limitation is on party 
contributions or 0 if no limitation is imposed on.  Using that dummy variable does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable.  The results are available from the author.   
72 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.9.  The full 
statistical results are found in Appendix H.  In addition, I run random effects model, on a per 
capita base, in order to capture state differences.  Since using that method does not affect the 
interpretation of the limitation variable, I will confine an examination on the results using 2SLS.  
The results are available from the author.   
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candidates.  Furthermore, the income variable is statistically significant for the numbers 
for all candidates, but not for the numbers for the major party candidates, nor the amount 
for all and major party candidates.  At this time, therefore, there is simply insufficient 
evidence to support the importance of either regarding the levels of ideological PAC 
contributions in gubernatorial elections. 
As shown in Table 7.9, contribution limits do have a statistically significant effect 
on the amount per contribution. 73  The coefficient is negative, -12.196, and statistically 
significant suggesting contribution limits decrease the average amount per contribution.  
This is very different from what was seen when the analysis focused on individual 
contributions where the results indicated that limits do not affect the average amount per 
contribution.  This is very similar, however, to what was seen when I examined party 
contributions and universalistic contributions.   
With the exception of the college variable, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on the average amount per contribution. 74  The college 
variable suggests that a state with more college graduates tends to donate less compared 
to a less educated state. 
                                                 
73. Since little substantive difference is found in the importance of the limitation variable between the 
analyses for all candidates and the major party candidates, I will confine my comments on a 
consideration of the results for the major party candidates.  See I. Regression of Average Amount 
per Contribution to All Candidates in Appendix G for the results for all candidates.   
74 . The college variable is measured as the percentage of college graduate or more in a state. 
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 The results displayed in Table 7.9 indicate that contribution limits are not 
statistically related to any of the three disparity measures, which, again, contradicts the 
claims of critics of contribution limits. 75  In addition, none of the control variables has a 
statistically significant effect on any of the three disparity measures.76 
The state level analyses presented so far indicate that contribution limits decrease 
the amount of ideological PAC contributions per eligible voter.  Once again, the 
argument by critics regarding contribution limits is not supported. One should be careful 
when examining the disparity measures in ideological PAC contributions, however, 
because the results of the disparity analyses are based on a small number of observations. 
 
2.5.2. Candidate Level Analyses 
Table 7.10 shows the effect of contribution limits on the number of ideological 
PAC contributions per eligible voter and on the amount of ideological PAC contributions 
per eligible voter.77  Contribution limits do not have a statistically significant effect on 
the numbers of contributions or on the amounts for incumbents or challengers.  This 
suggests that neither incumbents nor open seat candidates are not likely to receive larger 
(or smaller) contributions given the presence of contribution limits.78  No differential 
limitation effect is found between incumbents and challengers.  The difference in the 
limitation effect between incumbents and challengers is 0.077 for numbers and 0.137 for 
dollars, but neither is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  The statistically significant 
effect of limitations is found only in the amount of ideological PAC contributions for 
                                                 
75 . Contribution limits have a statistically significant effect, however, on the difference of ideological PAC 
contributions when examining the difference in the amount and the average amount per 
contribution.  In the presence of restrictive limitation, the difference between candidates tends to 
get smaller.  The results are available from the author.   
76 . Note that the number of observations is 17 in the analyses of disparity.  The number of parameters is 11 
including the variance estimates and, thus, the small N problem in the disparity analyses is 
prevailed.  It would be inappropriate, therefore, to put too much credence on the significant test. 
77 . Because of space limitation, the estimates for year dummy variables are dropped in Table 7.10.  The 
full statistical results are found in Appendix H. 
78 . The lowest figure is the least restrictive limitation and the higher figure is the more restrictive limitation 
indicating that the negative sign means that restrictive contribution limits decrease contributions.  
Furthermore, for a consistency with other limitation variables, I also perform the analyses utilizing 
a dummy variable which is coded as 1 if some limitation is on party contributions or 0 if no 
limitation is imposed on.  Using that dummy variable does not affect the interpretation of the 
limitation variable.  The results are available from the author.   
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challengers.  The coefficient is negative, -0.182, and statistically significant suggesting 
that limits reduce the amount of contributions for challengers.   
None of the dummy variables is statistically significant.  This suggests that open 
seat candidates are likely to receive as much from ideological contributions as 
incumbents or challengers receive.  No difference is found between incumbents and 
challengers, indicating incumbents are not likely to receive a larger number or a greater 
amount of contributions than challengers.  Furthermore, none of the control variables has 
a statistically significant effect. 
If attention is focused on the last analysis reported in Table 7.10, the amount per 
contribution, it is seen that the limitation variable behaves much as it did in the state level 
analysis.  Limitations have a statistically significant effect on challengers.  The 
coefficient is negative, -26.605, and statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  This 
suggests that challengers receive a smaller average amount per contribution, given the 
presence of contribution limits.    In addition, the differential limitation effect is found 
between incumbents and challengers indicating challengers are more likely to be harmed 
by restrictive contribution limits than incumbents.  On the other hand, contribution limits 
are not likely to affect incumbents or open seat candidates.  Limitations doe not have a 
statistically significant effect either on open seat candidates or on incumbents.  The 
coefficient is -3.222 for open seat candidates and -3.249 for incumbents, but neither is 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
With the exception of the college variable, neither the dummy variables nor the 
control variables are statistically significant.  The college variable suggests that a state 
with more college graduates tends to donate less compared to a less educated state. 
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Table 7.10. Limitation and Ideological PAC Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.377 -0.101 -38.297 
  (0.506) (0.709) (59.716) 
Being Incumbent (BI) -0.079 0.456 -30.932 
  (0.521) (0.730) (61.445) 
Limitation*BO -0.029 -0.085 -3.222 
  (0.049) (0.069) (5.791) 
Limitation*BC -0.084 -0.182** -26.605*** 
  (0.065) (0.091) (7.663) 
Limitation*BI -0.007 -0.044 -3.749 
  (0.066) (0.093) (7.816) 
Party 0.078 -0.070 -29.961 
  (0.293) (0.411) (34.571) 
Partisan Strength 0.001 -0.008 -1.642 
  (0.019) (0.026) (2.206) 
IPC -0.017 -0.025 1.962 
  (0.013) (0.019) (1.571) 
Government Status -0.056 0.204 12.165 
  (0.248) (0.347) (29.241) 
Income -0.001 0.001 -0.083 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) 
College 0.039 0.030 7.909* 
  (0.040) (0.056) (4.710) 
Constant -9.120*** -6.691*** -178.870 
  (1.514) (2.123) (178.722) 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.27 0.24 0.16 
F Test 1.83 1.58 0.99 
Probability > F 0.03 0.08 0.48 
0.298 0.558 7.365 BI - BC 
  (0.501) (0.702) (59.123) 
0.077 0.137 22.856** Limitation*BI –  
Limitation*BC  (0.089) (0.125) (10.483) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 142
Thus far, I have conducted analyses on corporation, labor union, individual, party, 
and ideological PAC contributions.  I found that contribution limits show varying support 
depending on which type of contribution is examined.  There is simply no evidence, 
however, to support critics’ arguments that contribution limits increase bias in favor of 
incumbents.  In the next section, I summarize the findings and compare the patterns 
among corporation, labor union, individual, party, and ideological PAC contributions. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The argument put forward by proponents of contribution limits are generally 
supported without increasing bias in favor of incumbents.  As shown in particularistic 
contributions, contribution limits decreased the number and amount of corporate 
contributions.  The negative effect of limitations did not depend on whether a candidate 
was an incumbent, a challenger, or an open seat candidate.  A similar pattern was found 
for labor union contributions.  Limitations decreased the amount of labor union 
contributions for the major party candidates.  The effect of limitations was especially 
evident on open seat candidates and incumbents.  As shown in universalistic 
contributions, contribution limits increased the number of individual contributions.  
Contribution limits reduced the average amount per contribution for parties and 
ideological PACs. 
If the supporters of contribution limits appeared to be correct about the 
democratizing effect of contribution limits, what about the argument by critics that 
contribution limits increase bias in favor of incumbents?  In the state level analyses, none 
of the contribution limit variables showed a statistically significant effect on any of the 
three disparities between incumbents and challengers.  No differential effect of the 
limitation was found between incumbents versus challengers, incumbents versus open 
seat candidates, or challengers versus open seat candidates examining any type of 
contributions in the candidate level analyses.79 
Contribution limits showed a dynamic effect on the sub-categories of 
contributions.  As a sub-category of particularistic contributions, corporate contributions 
                                                 
79 . The exception is the limitation effect on the amount per contribution for ideological PAC contributions.  
Challengers did receive smaller per contribution than incumbents given the presence of restrictive 
contribution limits.   
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showed a much different pattern than labor union contributions.  Both the number and the 
amount of corporate contributions were reduced by contribution limits, but only the 
amount of labor union contributions was reduced by contribution limits.  Furthermore, 
limits did not affect the average amount per corporate contribution, while they did affect 
the average amount per labor union contribution.  The lack of an effect for contribution 
limits in the case of corporate contributions was likely due to the fact that limits 
significantly reduce both the number and amount of corporate contributions.  On the 
other hand, the significant effect for contribution limits in the case of labor union 
contributions was likely due to the fact that limits significantly reduce only the amount of 
labor union contributions.  This suggests that, given the presence of contribution limits, 
corporations decide not to contribute, but labor union contributions continue to donate in 
smaller amounts.   
The relationship between corporate contributions and contribution limits looked 
similar to the relationship between particularistic contributions and contribution limits.  
The reason is obvious when the proportion of corporate contributions of the total 
particularistic contributions is examined.  The proportion for the number of corporate 
contributions is the number of corporate contributions divided by the total number of 
particularistic contributions.  The proportion for the amount of corporate contributions is 
the amount of corporate contributions divided by the total amount of particularistic 
contributions.  To facilitate the interpretation, I multiply the proportions by 100 and the 
unit becomes the percentage.  The same method is applied when calculating the 
proportion of labor union contributions.   
As shown in Table 7.11, for elections with an incumbent, the number of corporate 
contributions comprises 82.63% of the total number of particularistic contributions, while 
it is 13.92% for labor union contributions.  The total amount of money from corporate 
contributions is 78.24% of the total, while it is 13.92% for labor union contributions.  A 
similar comparison for open seat elections is 84.95% and 15.05% for the number of 
contributors and 78.18% for the total amount of contributions.  The dominant proportion 
of corporate contributions is why the relationship between corporate contributions and 
contribution limits look much like the relationship between particularistic contributions 
and contribution limits.   
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Table 7.11. Proportion of Sub-Categories: Out of Particularistic Contributions80 
    Number (%) Amount (%) N 
   Mean  Median Mean  Median   
Corporations 82.63 (23.51) 92.09 78.24 (23.83) 87.44 29 Incumbent-
Running  Labor Unions 13.92 (17.54) 6.36 13.92 (17.54) 6.36 29 
Corporations 84.95 (17.70) 92.60 78.18 (22.83) 88.74 29 
Open Seat  Labor Unions 15.05 (17.70) 7.40 15.05 (17.70) 7.40 29 
Corporations 83.79 (20.66) 92.43 78.21 (23.13) 87.80 58 
All Elections  Labor Unions 14.49 (17.47) 7.26 14.49 (17.47) 7.26 58 
Figures are percentage 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
A dynamic relationship between contribution limits and political contributions 
was more evident in the sub-categories of universalistic contributions, which are 
comprised of individual, party, and ideological PAC contributions.  The limitation on 
individuals increased the number of contributors and the amount of contributions, even 
though the effect was limited to all candidates.  On the other hand, the presence of 
contribution limits decreased the amount of contributions for parties and ideological 
PACs, although limits did not affect the number of contributors.  The negative effect did 
not depend on whether one examined all candidates or only the major party candidates.  
Furthermore, limits reduced the average amount per contribution for parties and 
ideological PACs, but did not affect the average amount per contribution for individuals.  
This suggests that, given the presence of contribution limits, parties and ideological 
PACs continue to donate though in smaller amounts, while individuals are likely to 
donate larger numbers of contributions.  A different pattern was also found between 
parties and ideological PACs.  In the candidate level analyses, contribution limits 
reduced the amount of party contributions for incumbents and open seat candidates, but 
did not affect the amount of party contributions for challengers.  On the other hand, 
limits reduced the amount of ideological PAC contributions only for challengers.  This 
suggests that, given the presence of contribution limits, parties behave differently than 
ideological PACs.  When limitations are imposed, and thus the amount of givable 
contributions is shrunken, parties are likely to decrease contributions for incumbents or 
open seat candidates, but are not likely to do so for challengers.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
80 . Proportions in Table 7.11 are the average proportions of particularistic contributions over election 
cycles.  See footnote 2 in chapter 5 for the mean of the ratios.   
 145
when limitations are imposed, ideological PACs are likely to decrease their 
contributions for challengers, but are not likely to stop contributing to incumbents or 
open seat candidates.   This evidence suggests a   need to re-examine the motivational 
strategies underlying contribution by individuals, parties, and ideological PACs in the 
future. 
The relationship between individual contributions and contribution limits looks 
much like the relationship between universalistic contributions and contribution limits.  
The reason is clear when the proportion of individual contributions of the total 
universalistic contributions is examined.  As mentioned above, the proportion for the 
number of individual contributions is the number of individual contributions divided by 
the total number of universalistic contributions.  And, the proportion for the amount of 
individual contributions is the amount of individual contribution divided by the total 
amount of universalistic contributions.  To facilitate the interpretation, I multiply the 
proportions by 100 and the unit becomes the percentage.    The same method is applied 
when calculating the proportion of party contributions and ideological PAC contributions. 
 
Table 7.12. Proportion of Sub-Categories: Out of Universalistic Contributions81 
    Number (%) Amount (%) N 
   Mean  Median Mean  Median   
Individuals 98.53 (3.65) 99.47 85.22 (20.85) 94.39 29 
Parties 1.31 (3.23) 0.41 12.96 (20.44) 4.32 29 Incumbent-
Running  Ideological PACs 0.16 (0.44) 0.05 1.82 (6.75) 0.14 29 
Individuals 98.72 (1.26) 99.13 87.57 (12.33) 90.15 29 
Parties 1.05 (1.01) 0.69 11.84 (12.34) 9.51 29 
Open Seat Ideological PACs 0.23 (0.36) 0.10 0.60 (1.05) 0.32 29 
Individuals 98.63 (2.71) 99.32 86.39 (17.02) 93.11 58 
Parties 1.18 (2.37) 0.54 12.40 (16.75) 5.68 58 
All Elections  Ideological PACs 0.19 (0.40) 0.07 1.21 (4.83) 0.21 58 
Figures are percentage 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
As shown in Table 7.12, for elections with an incumbent, the number of 
individual contributions comprises 98.53% of the total number of universalistic 
contributions, while it is 1.31% for party contributions and 0.16% for ideological PAC 
contributions.  The total amount of money from individual contributions is 85.22% of the 
                                                 
81 . Proportions in Table 7.12 are the average proportions of universalistic contributions over election cycles.  
See footnote 2 in chapter 5 for the mean of the ratios.   
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total amount of universalistic contributions, while it is 12.96% for party contributions and 
1.82% for ideological PAC contributions.  A similar comparison for open seat elections is 
98.72%, 1.05% and 0.23% for the number of contributors, and 87.57%, 11.84% and 
0.60% for the amounts. The dominant proportion of individual contributions is why the 
relationship between individual contributions and contribution limits look much like the 
relationship between universalistic contributions and contribution limits.   
 
 147
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that the structure of political contributions in the 
American states has affected campaign finance regulations.  Focusing on gubernatorial 
elections, a theory based on utility functions is able to account for the volume of political 
contributions in general.  Below, I recap the theory and the results in more detail, 
focusing not only on the expected findings but also on new findings.    
 
1. Improving American Democracy  
This study adopted a theoretical framework that emphasized the differential 
effects of campaign finance regulations on two distinctive types of contributors: a 
particularistic contributor and a universalistic contributor.  A particularistic contributor, 
whose motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits.  
Since the regulations decrease the expected utility of donating, the number and amount of 
particularistic contributions decrease with restrictive limits.  The regulations, however, 
increase the disparity of contributions between incumbents and challengers in favor of 
incumbents because the marginal benefit in donating to incumbents is higher than for 
donating to challengers.  With a smaller pie, due to regulations, incumbents are favored 
over challengers.   
Specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical considerations were introduced in 
Chapter Three.  Hypothesis 1.1 stated that the presence of contribution limits will reduce 
the number of particularistic contributions.  Hypothesis 1.2 posited that the presence of 
contribution limits will reduce the amount of particularistic contributions.  Hypothesis 1.3 
stated that contribution limits will increase the disparity in the number of particularistic 
contributions between incumbents and challengers.  Finally, Hypothesis 1.4 suggested 
that contribution limits will increase the disparity in the amount of particularistic 
contributions between incumbents and challengers. 
On the other hand, a universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her 
favorite candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations; nor is the disparity of 
contributions affected by limits.  Since the expected utility of universalistically donating 
is a small and widely disposed utility (i.e., public good), the utility of donating is not 
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much different from not donating.  Specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical 
considerations were also introduced in Chapter Three.  Hypothesis 2.1 stated that the 
presence of contribution limits is not likely to affect the number of universalistic 
contributions.  Hypothesis 2.2 posited that the presence of contribution limits is not likely 
to affect the amount of universalistic contributions.  Hypothesis 2.3 stated that 
contribution limits are not likely to influence the disparity in the number of universalistic 
contributions between incumbents and challengers.  Finally, Hypothesis 2.4 suggested 
that contribution limits are not likely to influence the disparity in the amount of 
universalistic contributions between incumbents and challengers.   
Based on gubernatorial elections from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states, I found evidence 
that supports advocates of contribution limits: there are more universalistic contributors 
than particularistic contributions, and the value of each contribution, with its potential for 
undue influence, was reduced by the presence of contribution limits.  As expected utility 
based on my theory, the relationship between particularistic contribution limits and 
contributions was empirically supported in the numbers and the amounts of contributions.  
Particularistic contribution limits are likely to decrease the number of particularistic 
contributors per eligible voter (hypothesis 1.1) and to reduce the amount of particularistic 
contributions per eligible voter (hypothesis 1.2), according to my results in the state level 
analyses.  The candidate level analysis was even more supportive of the arguments put 
forward by advocates of contribution limits than the state level analysis.  The existence of 
campaign contribution limits significantly reduced the number of contributors and 
decreased the amount of contributions.  This effect, furthermore, did not depend on 
whether a candidate was an incumbent, a challenger, or an open seat candidate.   
The behavior of universalistic contributors was different from that of 
particularistic contributors.  Most of the universalistic contribution limits did not 
influence the number and amount of universalistic contributions at the state or candidate 
levels (hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2).  A statistically significant effect of limitations was found 
only in the number of contributors for all candidates and the average amount per 
contribution.  Universalistic contribution limits increased the number of universalistic 
contributions per eligible voter for all candidates, and reduced the average amount per 
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contribution for all and major party candidates.1  This suggests a democratizing effect, 
though limited, of contribution limits, as supporters of contribution limits often claim. 
What about the overall effect of contribution limits?  In Chapter Three, I 
explained that the overall effect of contribution limits can be determined if it is possible 
to determine the balance between particularistic and universalistic contributors in a given 
setting.  In Chapter Five, I found that universalistic contributions are the major source of 
contributions, 87.78% in the numbers and 79.79% in the amounts of contributions.  As 
expected, the relationship between all contributions and contribution limits looked much 
like the relationship between universalistic contributions and contribution limits.  The 
contribution limits increased the number of all contributors for all candidates and reduced 
the average amount per contribution. Similarly to the relationship between universalistic 
contribution limits and universalistic contributions, however, the overall effect of 
contribution limits did not have a statistically significant effect either on the number of 
contributors for the major party candidates nor on the amount of contributions for all and 
the major party candidates.   
The findings in the analyses of all, particularistic, and universalistic contributions 
suggest that campaign finance regulations achieve their goal of increasing universalistic 
contributors, decreasing particularistic contributions, and decreasing the value of each 
contribution with its potential for undue influence.  Therefore, the expanded pool of 
contributors resulting from campaign finance regulations cultivates political participation 
while reducing the influence of special interest groups, and thus the regulations 
contribute to solidify the sovereignty of American democracy (Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995).   
What about the argument by critics that contribution limits increase bias in favor 
of incumbents?  As shown in Chapter Six, campaign finance regulations do not create the 
unintentional consequence of favoring incumbents.  None of the three disparity measures 
(the numbers, the amounts and the average amount per contribution) were significantly 
and positively related to contributions limits suggesting that contribution limits do not 
increase bias in favor of incumbents.  Universalistic contribution limits do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the disparity of universalistic contributions between 
                                                 
1 . I will discuss the reason of this new finding in the next section.   
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incumbents and challengers (hypotheses 2.3 and 2.4).  In addition, the overall effect of 
contribution limits did not have a statistically significant effect on the disparity of all 
contributions.  In fact, particularistic contribution limits decreased the disparity of 
particularistic contributions in terms of the numbers and the amounts of contributions, 
contrary to the theoretical expectations expressed in Hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 above.2  Just 
as in the state level analyses, the candidate level analyses did not support the incumbency 
protection effect of contribution limits.  In addition, no differential effect of the limitation 
variable was found between incumbents versus challengers, incumbents versus open seat 
candidates, or challengers versus open seat candidates examining any type of 
contributions.   
What about the sub-category of contributions?  Do corporations and labor unions 
behave in a similar fashion to particularistic contributors?  Do contribution limits affect 
individuals, parties, and ideological PACs in a similar manner as found in the analyses 
examining universalistic contributors?  Chapter Seven showed a dynamic effect of 
contribution limits on the sub-categories of contributions.   
Corporations behaved much like particularistic contributors, but labor unions 
showed a markedly different behavior compared to particularistic contributors.  This 
pattern was expected, however, considering that corporate contributions comprise more 
than 75% of the total in both numbers and amounts (see Chapter Seven).  Contribution 
limits had a statistically significant negative effect on corporate contributions, suggesting 
that both the number and amount of corporate contributions, on a per eligible voter basis, 
were reduced by the presence of contribution limits.  On the other hand, contribution 
limits had a statistically significant negative effect only on the amount of labor union 
contributions and the average amount per labor union contributions, suggesting the 
amounts and the average amount per contribution are reduced by contribution limits.  
This indicates that, given the presence of contribution limits, corporations are likely not 
to contribute, but labor unions continue to donate though in smaller amounts.   
A dynamic relationship between contribution limits and political contributions is 
more evident in the sub-categories of universalistic contributions, which are comprised of 
individual, party, and ideological PAC contributions.  Considering that individual 
                                                 
2 . The possible reason will be discussed in the next section. 
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contributions comprise more than 85% of the total number and amount of universalistic 
contributions, it makes sense that individuals behave much like universalistic contributors. 
Parties and ideological PACs, however, show a different pattern than universalistic 
contributors.  As shown in universalistic contributions, contribution limits did not affect 
the number of contributions for major party candidates and the amount of individual 
contributions for all and the major party candidates.  Limitations had a statistically 
significant positive effect on the number of individual contributions only for all 
candidates.   
On the other hand, parties and ideological PACs behaved much differently from 
individuals and universalistic contributors.  Limitations on parties and ideological PACs 
did not affect the number of contributions, but did affect the amount of contributions and 
the average amount per contribution.  This suggests that, given the presence of 
contribution limits, they continue to contribute though in smaller amounts.  Furthermore, 
a different pattern is also found between parties and ideological PACs.  In the candidate 
level analyses, contribution limits reduced the amount of party contributions for 
incumbents and open seat candidates, but did not affect the amount of party contributions 
for challengers.  On the other hand, limits reduced the amount of ideological PAC 
contributions only for challengers.   
One of the possible reasons can be seen in the candidate level analyses.  When the 
limitation is imposed and, thus the amount of givable contributions is shrunken, parties 
are likely to decrease contributions to incumbents or open seat candidates, but are not 
likely to touch contributions for challengers.  On the other hand, when the limitation is 
imposed, ideological PACs are likely to decrease their contributions to challengers, but 
are not likely to stop contributing to incumbents or open seat candidates.  Therefore, 
contribution limits reduce the amount of party and ideological PAC contributions, but the 
reduction comes from different places.  These findings suggest a need to re-examine the 
motivations underlying universalistic contributors in the future.  
If contribution limits show a dynamic pattern in the sub-categories of 
contributions, is a dynamic pattern also found in the disparity measures?  The analyses in 
Chapter Seven showed that there is simply no evidence to support the critics’ argument of 
the increased bias in favor of incumbents.  In the state level analyses, contribution limits 
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did not have a statistically significant effect on any of the three disparity measures for 
any type of the sub-categories of contributions.  For corporations and labor unions, 
contribution limits had a negative effect on all the three disparity measures suggesting 
limits tend to decrease the disparities, though none was statistically significant.   
For individuals, parties, and ideological PACs, contribution limits did not have a 
consistent sign on all the three disparity measures, and none of them reached statistical 
significance.  In the candidate level analyses, with the exception of the amount per 
ideological PAC contributions, none of the differences was statistically significant 
between incumbents and challengers in terms of the numbers, the amounts, or the average 
amount per contribution.  Therefore, contribution limits did not show a dynamic pattern 
on the disparity measures, suggesting limits do not increase financial bias in favor of 
incumbents. 
Supporters of contribution limits argue that contribution limits reduce the 
influence of special interest groups and encourage citizen participation.  On the other 
hand, critics of contribution limits argue that contribution limits do not work because 
strategic donors adapt to regulations and find loopholes in the regulations.  Furthermore, 
regulations increase bias in favor of incumbents because contribution limits make it more 
difficult for challengers to raise funds.  The results of this study indicate that contribution 
limits should remain in place because they are effective and have no major unintentional 
consequences.  Contribution limits decrease the influence of special interest groups 
represented by particularistic contributors, such as corporations and labor unions.  On the 
other hand, contribution limits increase citizen participation represented by universalistic 
contributors, such as individuals.3  There was simply no evidence to support the critic’s 
argument regarding incumbent advantage; none of the disparity measures were 
statistically and positively related to contribution limits.   
 
2. Limitations of This Research 
This dissertation has some theoretical limitations and a new finding that should be 
further tested in future research.  First, when drawing theoretical implications from a 
                                                 
3 . As mentioned above, limits tended to reduce the amount of party and ideological PAC contributions but 
did not affect the number of such contributions.   
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particularistic and universalistic model, the theory developed in Chapter Three has a 
limitation of trying to explain the effect of campaign finance reforms in an extreme 
regulatory setting, that is, below lower limits or above upper limits.  For the sake of 
argument, suppose a contribution limit is $0.5, which is below lower limits.  Even though 
the limit is changed to $0.2, the effect of the campaign finance reform is not likely to 
happen because a contributor does not contribute in either of the regulatory settings.  
Conversely, suppose a contribution limit is $2 billion dollars. Even though the limit is 
changed to $1 billion dollars, which is above upper limits, the effect of the campaign 
finance reform is not likely to happen either, because a contributor is not likely to 
contribute more than upper limits.  Therefore, one may argue that neither of the limits has 
a significant relationship with contributions, even though the relationship exists between 
lower and upper limits.  The model for particularistic and universalistic contributors 
contains this theoretical limitation.   
This theoretical limitation, however, is likely to be a theoretical proposition.  The 
statistically significant relationship shown for both  particularistic and universalistic 
contributions is evidence that contribution limits are between lower limits and upper 
limits, and thus the effects of campaign finance reform is observable.   
Second, the range of all, particularistic, and universalistic contribution limits also 
show that the limits are likely to be between lower and upper limits, because the limits 
range from prohibition to loose limitation for particularistic contributions, and from tight 
limit to no limit for universalistic contributions.4  Therefore, extreme regulatory settings 
are likely to reside in a theoretical world rather than in a real world. 
One may ask, however, when contribution limits do not have a statistically 
significant effect on contributions, how to distinguish the theoretical limitation from no 
real relationship as a reason for the insignificant relationship?  This might be the case for 
universalistic contributions.  In Chapter Three, I theorized that universalistic contributors 
are not likely to respond to regulations; nor is the disparity of contributions affected by 
limits.  I found in Chapter Six that universalistic contribution limits do not have a 
                                                 
4 . Note that particularistic contribution limits are operationalized by the limitations on corporations, labor 
unions and PACs.  The range of the limitations is from prohibition to $750,000 for corporations, 
from prohibition to $960,000 for labor unions and from $400 to $1,600,000 for PACs.   Note that 
universalistic contribution limits are operationalized by the limitations on individuals and parties.  
The range of the limitations is from $400 to no limit for both individuals and parties. 
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statistically significant effect on any type of contributions except the number of 
contributors for all candidates.  How can one ascertain whether the lack of statistical 
significance comes from the theoretical limitation or is a legitimate finding? 
From a methodological perspective, when testing no relationship as an alternative 
hypothesis, one needs to be cautious in the case when a significant relationship in the 
population is masked (Type II error), rather than when a non-significant relationship is 
concealed (Type I error). 5   The conservative method of significance testing for no 
relationship as an alternative hypothesis, therefore, is to set up an error level larger than a 
conventional cut-off point in order to avoid Type II error.  Following this suggestion, if 
the error level is more generous, such as 0.25, some of the relationships are beyond the 
error level and the other relationships are not.  This suggestion, however, strengthens a 
democratic effect rather than weakens the argument of supporters of contribution limits, 
because limits bring in more contributors and do not result in an increased bias in the 
amount of contributions for incumbents.  At the 0.25 level, universalistic contribution 
limits becomes a statistically significant positive effect on the number of contributors for 
the major party candidates suggesting limits increase the number of universalistic 
contributors for the major party candidates.  In addition, at the 0.25 level, limits do not 
show a statistically significant effect on the disparity in the amounts.  This  indicates that 
limits do not increase  bias of the amount of contributions for incumbents, even though 
limits becomes a statistically significant positive effect at the 0.25 level on the number of 
contributors for the major party candidates.  
The other theoretical limitations are to explain the increase of universalistic 
contributors and the decrease of disparities in particularistic contributions, given the 
presence of restrictive contribution limits.  These theoretical limitations may suggest that 
a particularistic-universalistic contribution model (PUCM) inaccurately describes the 
structure of political contributions.   
Contrary to my theoretical expectation (Hypothesis 2.1), the presence of 
restrictive contribution limits increases the number of universalistic contributors for all 
candidates.  I hypothesized that universalistic contribution limits do not affect the number 
and amount of universalistic contributions nor their disparity in the numbers and the 
                                                 
5 . I am thankful for Will H. Moore’s comment on this regard.   
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amounts.  The findings in Chapter Six generally support the hypotheses, but new findings 
indicated that limits increase the number of contributors for all candidates.  One of the 
possible explanations is a candidate’s fund-raising effort (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 
1995).  Given the relatively fixed level of campaign spending in an election, candidates 
need to raise funds from the broader public in order to compensate for the loss in the 
amounts resulting from regulations, as intended by the Federal Election Campaign 
Finance Act of 1974.  Therefore, restrictive limits increase the number of contributors but 
do not affect the amount of contributions.  This ad hoc explanation, however, remains to 
be tested in future studies.   
Another theoretical limitation is that particularistic contribution limits have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the disparity in particularistic contributions 
between incumbents and challengers, contrary to my theoretical expectations 
(Hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4).6  This indicates that the presence of contribution limits lowers 
the disparity between incumbents and challengers in terms of the numbers and the 
amounts.  Why do limits decrease the disparities in particularistic contributions?   
In Chapter Six, I found that contribution limits decreased both the number and 
amount of particularistic contributions in the state level analyses, and the decreasing 
effect of contribution limits does not depend on whether a candidate is an incumbent, a 
challenger, or an open seat candidate from the candidate level analyses.  This suggests 
that the lowered disparity does not result from the fact that challengers receive more 
contributors and larger contributions, but from the fact that incumbents receive fewer 
contributors and smaller contributions, given some restrictions on particularistic 
contributions.  Therefore, one may rephrase the meaning of the new finding to ask why 
do contribution limits hurt incumbents more than challengers?   
One of the possible explanations is that, if severe restrictions are imposed, 
particularistic contributors are likely to emphasize the aspect of “buying insurance” in 
return for contributions rather than the aspect of “influencing policy.”  Therefore, a 
particularistic contributor is likely to contribute the minimum amount allowed by law to 
both candidates.  Since an incumbent has a higher winning probability than a challenger, 
                                                 
6 . However, no differential effect of the limitation is found between an incumbent and a challenger when 
examining the numbers or the amounts in the candidate level analysis. 
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the difference in contributions between an incumbent and a challenger is still evident, but 
the limitation is imbued with a differential effect in favor of challengers over incumbents 
as shown in the analyses examining the particularistic contributions at the candidate level.  
This ad hoc explanation, however, remains to be tested in future research.   
A new finding is that demographic variables (income and education), which are 
often used to measure the pool of potential contributors (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 
1995; Shields and Goidel 2000; Snyder 1993), generally do not have a statistically 
significant effect on contributions.  The income and education variables do not affect 
particularistic contributions or universalistic contributions. This suggests that, contrary to 
Snyder’s observation (1993), the income and education variables are not factors that aid 
in  distinguishing universalistic contributors from particularistic contributors.  In addition, 
the two variables frequently show the opposite directions.  For example, even though it is 
not statistically significant, the income variable shows a positive effect on the amount of 
individual contributions, while the education variable shows a negative effect on the 
amount of individual contributions.  In the other words, a wealthy state receives a larger 
amount of individual contributions than a poor state, but a state with more educated 
citizens receives a smaller amount of individual contributions than a state with fewer 
educated citizens.  This suggests that the two variables are not equally to measure the 
pool of potential contributors.   
 
3. Future Research 
The theory developed in this dissertation can be extended to other electoral 
settings.  For example, one can apply the theory to the members of state legislatures.  Do 
contribution limits reduce the influence of special interest groups and increase the 
number of citizen contributors?  Does this democratizing effect result in increasing 
financial bias in favor of incumbents?  Furthermore, analyses of state legislatures would 
provide a good place to test whether a candidate, especially an incumbent, would 
generate larger numbers of contributions when restrictive limitations are imposed. This is 
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because a legislator’s term is generally shorter than a governor’s term, and thus data on 
state legislature elections are more longitudinal than data on gubernatorial elections.7   
In addition, the finding from my  dissertation may help resolve the debate on 
“buying Congress” (see Chappell (1982) and, especially, Constant (2002) for interest 
group’s influence on policy making).  One of the well-known debates in campaign 
finance studies is whether or not interest group contributions influence Congressional 
policy decisions or increase access to members of Congress.  As shown in Chapters Six 
and Seven, the influence of special interest groups varies depending on the level of 
campaign finance regulations.  If contribution limits are imposed, the influence of interest 
group contributions would be limited and interest groups would not attempt to influence a 
policy decision.  Conversely, if there is no limitation on interest group contributions, the 
amount of interest group contributions would not be limited and interest groups are more 
likely to attempt to influence a policy decision.  Therefore, the different findings on the 
effects of interest group contributions may come from different levels of regulatory 
settings where studies are undertaken.  
 
 
                                                 
7 . As of year 2000, the number of subsequent election cycles is three for gubernatorial elections, whereas 
the number is ten for state house elections. 
 158
Appendix A: Measurement of Variables 
 
I. Political Contributions (Source: the National Institute on Money in State Politics) 
Standardized number of contributors: the raw number of contributors is divided by the 
number of eligible voters and is multiplied by 100.  (Unit: the percentage of 
contributors). 
Standardized amount of contributions: the raw amount of contributions is divided by a 
deflator and the number of eligible voters.  A deflator is calculated by consumer 
price index based on 1995.  (Unit: constant dollar per eligible voter). 
Standardized number of contributors to the major party candidates: the raw number of 
contributors to the major party candidates is divided by the number of eligible 
voters and is multiplied by 100.   (Unit: the percentage of contributors). 
Standardized amount of contributions to the major party candidates: the raw amount of 
contributors to the major party candidates is divided by a deflator and the number 
of eligible voters.  A deflator is calculated by consumer price index based on 1995.   
(Unit: constant dollar per eligible voter). 
Amount per contribution at the state level: it is the standardized amount of contributions 
to the major party candidates divided by the standardized number of contributors 
to the major party candidates.  (Unit: the amount per contribution).   
Amount per contribution at the candidate level: it is the standardized amount of 
contributions to a major party candidate divided by the standardized number of 
contributors to a major party candidate.  (Unit: the amount per contribution).   
Disparity of the number and the amount: disparity is the ratio between incumbents and 
challengers.  Disparity of the number is the number of contributors to an 
incumbent divided by the number of contributors to a challenger.  Disparity of the 
amount is the amount of contributions to an incumbent divided by that to a 
challenger.   
Disparity of the amount per contribution: disparity of the amount per contribution is the 
amount per contribution for an incumbent divided by the amount per contribution 
for a challenger.  
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II. Campaign Finance Regulations (Source: The Campaign Finance Law) 
Total limitation: the sum of particularistic and universalistic contribution limits.  The 
range is from 0 (no limitation) to 4 (restrictive limitation).   
Particularistic contribution limit: it is coded as 0 if no limitation is on PAC contributions 
regardless of corporation and labor union contribution limits, 1 if some limits are 
on corporations, labor unions and PACs, and 2 if corporations or labor unions are 
prohibited from contributing with some limits on PACs.    
Universalistic contribution limit: it is coded as 0 if individuals and party contributions are 
not constrained, 1 if some limits are on either of them, and 2 if some limits are on 
both of them.   
Corporate contribution limitation: it is coded as 0 if PAC contributions are not limited, 1 
if some limitations are imposed on corporations and PACs, and 2 if corporate 
contributions are prohibited and some limitation is on PACs.   
Labor union contribution limitation: it is coded as 0 if there is no restriction on PACs, 1 if 
some limitations are imposed on labor unions and PACs, and 2 if labor union 
contributions are prohibited and some limitation is on PACs.   
Individual contribution limitation: individual contribution limits are divided by 1,000,000. 
Party contribution limitation: political party contribution limits are divided by 1,000,000. 
Ideological PAC contribution limitation: limits on political action committee (PAC) 
contributions are divided by 1,000,000. 
Disclosure requirement: the required amount of disclosure on itemization of contributions. 
 
III. Political and Demographic Control Variables 
Candidate Status: Being Challenger (BC) is coded 1 if a candidate is a challenger in 
incumbent-running elections and 0 otherwise.  Being Incumbent (BI) is coded 1 if 
a candidate is an incumbent candidate and 0 otherwise.  Being Open seat 
candidate (BO) is coded 1 if a candidate runs in open seat elections and 0 
otherwise.  BO is used as a base category.   
Interparty competition at t (IPCt): the absolute difference in the vote shares between the 
major party candidates; |% of Democratic candidate’s vote share - % of 
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Republican candidate’s vote share|.  Source: (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 
2000). 
Interparty competition at t-1 (IPCt-1): an absolute difference in the averaged vote shares 
between the major party candidates in the last five gubernatorial elections; 
5
  candidates Rep. of shares vote
5
1i
∑
=  - 
5
  candidates Dem. of shares vote
5
1i
∑
= .  
Source: (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 2000). 
Income: personal income in billions of current dollars in a state.  Source: Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 
Education: the percentage of college graduate or more in a state.  Source: Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 
Partisan strength at the state level: an absolute difference between the vote shares of 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the latest election in a state; 
|the vote share of a Democratic presidential candidate – the vote share of a 
Republican presidential candidate|.  Source: (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 
2000). 
Partisan strength at the candidate level: the percentage of a candidate’s party’s vote share 
in the latest presidential election in a state.  Source: (Scammon, McGillivray and 
Cook 2000). 
Government Status at the state level: government status at the state level is coded as 1 if 
either of the parties controls all branches of government and 0 otherwise.  Source: 
(Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 2000) and (U.S. Census-Bureau 1990-2001). 
Government Status at the candidate level: government status at the candidate level is 
coded as 1 if a candidate’s party controls every branch of governments, 0 if either 
of the parties does not control every branch of governments and -1 if his or her 
opponent’s party controls every branch of governments.  Source: (Scammon, 
McGillivray and Cook 2000) and (U.S. Census-Bureau 1990-2001). 
Spending difference: a standardized spending difference between the major party 
candidates in the last gubernatorial election; |spending by a Democratic candidate 
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– spending by a Republican candidate| / ∑ (spending by a Democratic candidate + 
spending by a Republican candidate).  Source: (Beyle and Jensen 2002). 
Party affiliation: it is coded as 0 if candidate is a Republican candidate and 1 if a 
candidate is a Democratic candidate.  Source: (Scammon, McGillivray and Cook 
2000). 
Probability of winning an election: the percentage of vote share.  Source: (Scammon, 
McGillivray and Cook 2000). 
Voting population: population of voting age. Unit: 1,000. Source: Statistical Abstract of 
the United States. 
Deflator: The deflator is acquired from World Development Indicator, 2002 (World Bank 
2002).  The deflator reflects yearly changes in the cost of living.  The base year is 
1995 which is coded as 1.  The amount of contributions is divided by the deflator 
in a year.   
State: the full name of state  
Year: a dummy variable for a year.   
ICPSR: identification number by Inter-Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
Candidate: candidate name.  Source: the National Institute on Money in State Politics. 
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Appendix B: Characteristics of Political Contributions and Disclosure Requirements 
I. Proportion under the Reporting Thresholds1  
1. Total Contributions 
Year Total Number  Total Amount  Number to major 
candidates 
Amount to major 
candidates 
1990 0.15 (0.26) 0.02 (0.04) 0.16 (0.26) 0.02 (0.04) 
1992 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1994 0.12 (0.11) 0.01 (0.01) 0.11 (0.10) 0.01 (0.01) 
1995 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
1996 0.02 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 
1997 0.05 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1998 0.12 (0.18) 0.02 (0.03) 0.12 (0.18) 0.01 (0.03) 
1999 0.07 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02) 0.08 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02) 
2000 0.12 (0.13) 0.01 (0.01) 0.12 (0.12) 0.00 (0.01) 
Average 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 
 
2. Particularistic Contributions 
Year Total Number Total Amount Number to major 
candidates 
Amount to major 
candidates 
1990 0.09 (0.15) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09 (0.15) 0.01 (0.02) 
1992 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1994 0.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 
1995 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1996 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 
1997 0.03 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1998 0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
1999 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
2000 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) 
Average 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 
3. Universalistic Contributions 
Year Total Number Total Amount Number to major 
candidates 
Amount to major 
candidates 
1990 0.22 (0.33) 0.06 (0.09) 0.23 (0.34) 0.05 (0.10) 
1992 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1994 0.21 (0.16) 0.04 (0.03) 0.21 (0.17) 0.04 (0.03) 
1995 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
1996 0.04 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.05 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
1997 0.17 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
1998 0.14 (0.19) 0.02 (0.05) 0.14 (0.19) 0.02 (0.04) 
1999 0.07 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02) 0.08 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02) 
2000 0.18 (0.19) 0.02 (0.02) 0.18 (0.19) 0.02 (0.02) 
Average 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Figures in cells are the proportion of contributions under the reporting threshold. 
Figures in parentheses are the standard deviation of proportion. 
                                                 
1 . The National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) reports “small contributions” under a sector 
variable.  Based on personal email with the NIMSP, small contributions are the aggregate of 
amounts under the reporting threshold.  The data, however, still reports small contribution records 
under the reporting threshold.  In addition, the number and amount of small contributions 
appeared on the World Wide Web are not reasonable.  For example, at Alaska of 1998, Tony 
Knowles (D, elected) received 4 counts of small contributions, yet the amount is $69,641.  A 
typical small contributor would donate $17410.25 to Tony Knowles, which is not small 
contribution.  Therefore, I exclude the number and amount of small contributions.  Including the 
number and amount of small contributions, however, does not substantially change the truncated 
proportion.   
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II. Required Amount of Disclosure on Itemization of Contributions 
Amount 1990/  
1991 
1992/ 
1993 
1994/ 
1995 
1996/ 
1997 
1998/ 
1999 
2000/ 
2001 
0 7 (14%) 6 (12%) 6 (12%) 6 (12%) 6 (12%)        6 (12%)        
20 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 3 (6%) 3 (6%) 
25 6 (12%) 7 (14%) 7 (14%) 6 (12%) 5 (10%) 5 (10%) 
30 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 
35   1 (2%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%)   1 (2%)  
50 5 (10%) 5 (10%) 6 (12%) 9 (18%) 11 (22%)   11 (22%)   
75 1 (2%)      
100 22 (44%) 21 (42%) 23 (46%) 22 (44%) 19 (38%)  18 (36%) 
150  1 (2%)  1 (2%) 2 (4%) 1 (2%) 
200 3 (6%) 3 (6%) 3 (6%) 2 (4%) 1 (2%)  2 (4%) 
250      1 (2%) 
300 1 (2%) 1 (2%)   1 (2%)  1 (2%) 
500 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 1 (2%)    
Total 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 50 (100%) 
Figures in cells are the number of states that require the amount of disclosure. 
Figures in parentheses are the percentage of states. 
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III. Unknown Proportions of Contributions 
  Number/Amount 
  1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Marginal 
Alaska 0.00/0.00  0.02/0.02    0.00/0.00   0.01/0.01 
Alabama       0.03/0.01   0.03/0.01 
Arizona       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
California       0.16/0.11   0.16/0.11 
Colorado       0.80/0.64   0.80/0.64 
Connecticut       0.01/0.00   0.01/0.00 
Florida       0.02/0.02   0.02/0.02 
Georgia       0.05/0.03   0.05/0.03 
Hawaii       0.07/0.07   0.07/0.07 
Iowa       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Idaho 0.23/0.12  0.02/0.02    0.01/0.01   0.09/0.05 
Illinois       0.07/0.03   0.07/0/03 
Indiana         0.04/0.03 0.04/0.03 
Kansas       0.01/0.02   0.01/0.02 
Kentucky    0.00/0.00    0.00/0.00  0.00/0.00 
Massachusetts       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Maryland       0.06/0.06   0.06/0.06 
Maine   0.04/0.07    0.01/0.01   0.02/0.04 
Michigan       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Minnesota       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Missouri         0.03/0.02 0.03/0.02 
Mississippi        0.11/0.05  0.11/0.05 
Montana  0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00    0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 
North Carolina         0.00/0.01 0.00/0.01 
North Dakota         0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 
New Hampshire       0.00/0.00  0.00/0.01 0.00/0.00 
New Jersey      0.04/0.04    0.04/0.04 
New Mexico       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Nevada 0.02/0.01      0.37/0.57   0.19/0.29 
New York       0.12/0.05   0.12/0.05 
Ohio       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Oregon 0.01/0.05  0.04/0.04    0.01/0.01   0.02/0.03 
Rhode Island   0.00/0.00    0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
South Carolina       0.04/0.04   0.04/0.04 
Tennessee       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Texas       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
Utah         0.06/0.04 0.06/0.04 
Vermont       0.02/0.02  0.03/0.01 0.03/0.01 
Washington  0.06/0.02   0.01/0.01    0.02/0.05 0.03/0.03 
Wisconsin       0.00/0.00   0.00/0.00 
West Virginia         0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 
Wyoming 0.01/0.02         0.01/0.02 
Marginal 0.05/0.04 0.03/0.01 0.02/0.03 0.00/0.00 0.01/0.01 0.04/0.04 0.06/0.06 0.06/0.03 0.02/0.02 0.05/0.04 
Figures in cells are ratios.   
Marginals are the average ratio of unknown proportions. 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
 
I. State Level 
  N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Limitation 58 2.19 1.54 0.00 4.00 
IPC 58 16.72 14.97 0.31 58.34 
Partisan Strength 58 13.06 9.39 0.90 40.50 
Government Status 58 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Open Seat 58 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Income 58 120.64 158.59 7.70 898.40 
College 58 24.08 4.09 15.30 34.00 
 
II. Candidate Level 
  N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Incumbents 116 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Challengers 116 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Open Seat Candidates 116 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Party 116 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Partisan Strength 116 44.36 8.82 26.30 66.80 
Government Status 116 0.00 0.62 -1.00 1.00 
Note that limitation, interparty competition, income and college are the same measure at the state and 
candidate levels.  Partisan strength and government status are measured differently at each level (see 
Appendix A for the measurement of variables).   
 
III. Correlations among the Independent Variables at the State Level 
 IPC Partisan Strength Income College 
IPC 1.0000    
Partisan Strength 0.0054    1.0000   
Income 0.0041   -0.0269    1.0000  
College -0.1530    0.2526    0.1505    1.0000 
N = 58 
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Appendix D: Distributions of Disparity Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.1. Total Contributions 
 
Lopsided Elections .33 72.39
Close Elections.33 72.39
Total Elections .33 72.39
Amounts
Lopsided Elections.79 73.85
Close Elections.79 73.85
Total Elections.79 73.85
Numbers 
Figure D.3. Universalistic Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections .35 72.39
Close Elections .35 72.39
Total Elections .35 72.39
Amounts
Lopsided Elections.61 73.85
Close Elections.61 73.85
Total Elections.61 73.85
Figure D.2. Particularistic Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections 0 107
Close Elections 0 107
Total Elections 0 107
Amounts
Lopsided Elections0 297.81
Close Elections0 297.81
Total Elections0 297.81
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Appendix E: Patterns of Political Contributions: Sub-Category 
 
I. The Proportion of Contributions1 
1. Proportion by Election Type 
Number (%) Amount N   
 Mean  Median Mean  Median  
Incumbent-Running Corporations 9.77 (12.59) 7.26 15.26 (14.96) 14.40 29 
  Labor Unions 0.73 (0.83) 0.47 2.71 (3.30) 1.65 29 
  Individuals 88.57 (14.18) 91.13 70.59 (24.53) 78.61 29 
  Parties 0.83 (1.21) 0.39 10.48 (18.15) 3.96 29 
  Ideological PACs 0.09 (0.16) 0.04 0.96 (3.65) 0.11 29 
Open Seat Corporations 12.86 (14.81) 8.53 19.14 (17.91) 16.37 29 
  Labor Unions 1.08 (0.91) 0.85 3.33 (3.81) 2.23 29 
  Individuals 85.13 (15.75) 89.49 68.03 (20.94) 65.15 29 
  Parties 0.78 (0.59) 0.59 9.12 (10.60) 3.86 29 
  Ideological PACs 0.16 (0.21) 0.07 0.39 (0.65) 0.18 29 
All Elections Corporations 11.32 (13.71) 8.47 17.20 (16.47) 15.15 58 
  Labor Unions 0.91 (0.88) 0.55 3.02 (3.54) 1.85 58 
  Individuals 86.85 (14.95) 90.16 69.31 (22.64) 71.51 58 
  Parties 0.81 (0.95) 0.52 9.80 (14.75) 3.91 58 
  Ideological PACs 0.12 (0.19) 0.06 0.68 (2.61) 0.15 58 
Figures are percentages. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
  
2. Proportion by Candidate Status 
Number Amount N 
 Mean  Median Mean  Median   
Incumbents Corporations 10.75 (13.41) 6.78 16.50 (15.97) 15.03 28 
  Labor Unions 0.82 (1.03) 0.39 3.35 (5.75) 1.11 28 
  Individuals 87.60 (14.61) 92.30 68.61 (26.36) 76.78 28 
  Parties 0.75 (0.94) 0.32 11.23 (20.71) 2.38 28 
  Ideological PACs 0.08 (0.16) 0.02 0.32 (0.78) 0.05 28 
Challengers Corporations 9.38 (13.14) 3.79 13.49 (16.62) 8.29 30 
  Labor Unions 0.97 (1.49) 0.03 3.06 (6.27) 0.06 30 
  Individuals 83.50 (16.82) 90.45 64.82 (23.63) 67.74 30 
  Parties 2.65 (2.99) 0.84 13.42 (16.27) 5.21 30 
  Ideological PACs 0.17 (0.32) 0.01 1.87 (4.34) 0.03 30 
Corporations 12.10 (13.53) 9.55 17.82 (17.01) 16.72 58 Open seat 
candidates Labor Unions 1.13 (1.65) 0.42 3.60 (6.43) 0.70 58 
  Individuals 85.51 (14.28) 88.45 67.40 (20.47) 64.36 58 
  Parties 1.09 (1.45) 0.72 10.78 (12.18) 5.11 58 
  Ideological PACs 0.16 (0.30) 0.08 0.40 (0.85) 0.09 58 
Figures are percentages. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
1 . Proportions in table are the average proportions of total contributions over election cycles. 
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II. The Descriptive Statistics of Political Contributions: Sub-Category 
1. State Level 
1.1 Corporate Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($) 
Mean 0.05 (0.07) 0.44 (0.51) 0.04 (0.05) 0.38 (0.43) 
Median 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.17 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
1.2. Labor Union Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($) 
Mean 0.004 (0.005) 0.075 (0.087) 0.003 (0.003) 0.068 (0.084) 
Median 0.002 0.040 0.002 0.036 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
1.3. Individual Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($) 
Mean 0.51 (0.47) 1.82 (1.39) 0.41 (0.38) 1.45 (1.15) 
Median 0.34 1.36 0.26 1.13 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
1.4. Political Party Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($) 
Mean 0.003 (0.004) 0.274 (0.468) 0.003 (0.003) 0.265 (0.458) 
Median 0.002 0.085 0.002 0.080 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
1.5. Ideological PAC Contributions: State Level 
  All Candidates Major Party Candidates 
  Number (%) Amount ($) Number (%) Amount ($) 
Mean 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0120 (0.0264) 0.0004 (0.0006) 0.0104 (0.0243) 
Median 0.0002 0.0025 0.0002 0.0023 
N 58 58 58 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 168
2. Candidate Level 
2.1. Corporate Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.23 (0.28) 28 
 Lopsided Elections 0.02 (0.02) 0.19 (0.20) 21 
 Close Elections 0.03 (0.04) 0.36 (0.43) 7 
Challengers Total Elections 0.01 (0.02) 0.11 (0.17) 30 
 Lopsided Elections 0.01 (0.01) 0.08 (0.12) 21 
 Close Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.18 (0.25) 9 
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.21 (0.28) 58 
 Lopsided Elections 0.02 (0.01) 0.23 (0.36) 16 
 Close Elections 0.02 (0.03) 0.20 (0.24) 42 
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.02 (0.02) 0.17 (0.24) 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
2.2. Labor Union Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.002 (0.002) 0.038 (0.059) 28 
 Lopsided Elections 0.002 (0.002) 0.044 (0.063) 21 
 Close Elections 0.001 (0.003) 0.022 (0.044) 7 
Challengers Total Elections 0.001 (0.002) 0.018 (0.051) 30 
 Lopsided Elections 0.002 (0.001) 0.008 (0.022) 21 
 Close Elections 0.002 (0.003) 0.043 (0.085) 9 
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.002 (0.003) 0.040 (0.075) 58 
 Lopsided Elections 0.001 (0.002) 0.055 (0.117) 16 
 Close Elections 0.002 (0.003) 0.035 (0.052) 42 
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.001 (0.002) 0.028 (0.055) 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
2.3. Individual Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.27 (0.24) 0.93 (0.75) 28 
 Lopsided Elections 0.25 (0.24) 0.84 (0.57) 21 
 Close Elections 0.30 (0.30) 1.23 (1.14) 7 
Challengers Total Elections 0.16 (0.21) 0.48 (0.55) 30 
 Lopsided Elections 0.14 (0.21) 0.34 (0.40) 21 
 Close Elections 0.22 (0.21) 0.80 (0.74) 9 
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.20 (0.20) 0.75 (0.65) 58 
 Lopsided Elections 0.13 (0.12) 0.48 (0.44) 16 
 Close Elections 0.22 (0.22) 0.85 (0.69) 42 
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.21 (0.23) 0.70 (0.69) 58 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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2.4. Political Party Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.0015 (0.0018) 0.1441 (0.2633) 28
 Lopsided Elections 0.0018 (0.0020) 0.1723 (0.2959) 21
 Close Elections 0.0005 (0.0005) 0.0597 (0.0959) 7
Challengers Total Elections 0.0013 (0.0014) 0.0951 (0.2151) 30
 Lopsided Elections 0.0015 (0.0016) 0.1188 (0.2514) 21
 Close Elections 0.0009 (0.0006) 0.0398 (0.0687) 9
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.0018 (0.0021) 0.1463 (0.2565) 58
 Lopsided Elections 0.0013 (0.0013) 0.1935 (0.3958) 16
 Close Elections 0.0020 (0.0023) 0.1283 (0.1815) 48
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.0014 (0.0016) 0.1188 (0.2387) 58
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
2.5. Ideological PAC Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number (%) Amount ($) N 
Incumbents Total Elections 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0032 (0.0078) 28
 Lopsided Elections 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0023 (0.0056) 21
 Close Elections 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0059 (0.0126) 7
Challengers Total Elections 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0092 (0.0308) 30
 Lopsided Elections 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0118 (0.0366) 21
 Close Elections 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0033 (0.0053) 9
Open Seat Candidates Total Elections 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0041 (0.0094) 58
 Lopsided Elections 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0028 (0.0042) 16
 Close Elections 0.0003 (0.0005) 0.0046 (0.0108) 42
Incumbents + 
Challengers 
Total Elections 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0063 (0.0228) 58
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 170
3. Disparity 
3.1. Disparity of Corporate Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 9.71 (21.96) 1.77 17.11  (57.67) 1.96 25
Lopsided Elections 12.44 (24.71) 3.17 22.09 (65.77) 3.27 19
Close Elections 1.10 (0.32) 1.16 1.36 (0.48) 1.17  6
Figures are ratios. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
3.2. Disparity in Labor Union Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 23.748 (84.037) 0.569 25.524 (70.040) 0.711 15
Lopsided Elections 37.068 (106.010) 0.917  37.177 (84.668) 2.113 10
Close Elections 1.549 (3.450) 0.034 2.219 (4.649) 0.073 5
Figures are ratios. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
3.3. Disparity of Individual Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 9.83 (18.53) 1.62 11.79 (21.38) 1.42 27
Lopsided Elections 12.87 (20.79) 2.68 15.53 (23.85) 2.85  20
Close Elections 1.14 (0.67) 0.79  1.12 (0.26)   1.09  7
Figures are ratios. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
3.4. Disparity of Political Party Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 1.677 (1.616) 1.162 59.23 (250.93) 1.036 23
Lopsided Elections 1.74 (1.69) 1.23  8.58 (29.75) 0.98 18
Close Elections 1.44 (1.48) 0.83  241.60 (538.00) 1.20  5
Figures are ratios. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
3.3. Disparity of Ideological PAC Contributions 
Number Amount N  
Mean Median Mean Median  
Total Elections 1.48 (1.99) 0.39 2.32 (4.57) 0.19 17
Lopsided Elections 1.45 (1.75) 0.50  2.81 (5.13) 0.25 13
Close Elections 1.58 (2.95) 0.16 0.71 (1.29) 0.10 4
Figures are ratios. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Appendix F: Distributions of Disparity Measures: Sub-Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure F.3 Individual Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections 0.35 80.26
Close Elections 0.35 80.26
Total Elections 0.35 80.26
Amounts
Lopsided Elections0.51 80.73
Close Elections
 
0.51 80.73
Total Elections0.51 80.73
Figure F.1. Corporate Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections 0 105
Close Elections0 105
Total Elections 0 105
Amounts
Lopsided Elections
 
0 290.81
Close Elections
 
0 290.81
Total Elections
 
0 290.81
Figure F.2. Labor Union Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections 0 338
Close Elections 0 338
Total Elections 0 338
Amounts
Lopsided Elections
 
0 268.93
Close Elections
 
0 268.93
Total Elections
 
0 268.93
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Figure F.4. Party Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections 0.2 6.43
Close Elections 0.2 6.43
Total Elections 0.2 6.43
Amounts
Lopsided Elections
 
0.20 1204
Close Elections2.0 1204
Total Elections
 
2.0 1204
Figure F.5. Ideological PAC Contributions
Numbers 
Lopsided Elections 0 6
Close Elections 0 6
Total Elections 0 6
Amounts
Lopsided Elections
 
0 17.39
Close Elections
 
0 17.39
Total Elections
 
0 17.39
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Appendix G: Statistical Results of Further Analyses 
 
I. Regression of Average Amount per Contribution to All Candidates 
1. Total, Particularistic and Universalistic Contributions 
   Total  Particularistic Universalistic 
Limitation -1.398* -3.397 -1.697* 
  (0.706) (2.106) (0.947) 
IPC 0.088 0.206 0.024 
  (0.089) (0.139) (0.066) 
Partisan Strength 0.129 -0.051 0.128 
  (0.118) (0.182) (0.087) 
Government Status 0.908 2.660 0.956 
  (2.366) (3.660) (1.742) 
Open Seat 4.370 3.657 2.603 
  (2.659) (4.130) (1.956) 
Income 0.008 0.045*** 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) 
College -0.251 -0.454 -0.235 
  (0.280) (0.437) (0.205) 
1992 0.328 5.371 1.659 
  (6.854) (10.663) (4.993) 
1994 -8.122 -7.559 -4.762 
  (4.986) (7.717) (3.659) 
1995 -7.830 -14.652 -5.584 
  (8.939) (14.214) (6.463) 
1996 -8.893 -18.684* -4.439 
  (6.929) (10.562) (5.128) 
1997 -0.637 -12.655 1.313 
  (9.613) (14.784) (7.085) 
1998 -5.334 -7.390 -2.364 
  (4.308) (6.710) (3.120) 
1999 -4.064 -18.993* 0.354 
  (6.709) (10.420) (4.912) 
2000 -3.508 -6.137 -0.809 
  (4.782) (7.503) (3.469) 
Constant 14.429* 24.692* 11.375* 
  (8.000) (12.499) (5.885) 
Observations 58 58 58 
R2 0.33 0.48 0.30 
F Test 1.40 2.57 1.22 
Probability > F 0.19 0.01 0.30 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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2. Political Contributions: Sub-category 
  Corporations Labor Unions Individuals Parties Ideological PACs 
Limitation -2.949 -11.120* -0.096 -8.757*** -12.374** 
  (1.869) (5.882) (0.155) (3.208) (5.982) 
IPC 0.184 0.097 0.030 -0.418 2.447 
  (0.124) (0.335) (0.059) (1.296) (2.250) 
Partisan Strength -0.099 -0.040 0.033 3.394* -4.153 
  (0.161) (0.441) (0.078) (1.708) (2.953) 
Government Status 2.413 5.553 0.696 28.294 -10.428 
  (3.247) (8.831) (1.557) (34.396) (59.416) 
Open Seat 2.157 -0.347 2.673 23.229 -17.827 
  (3.664) (9.945) (1.759) (38.861) (66.844) 
Income 0.034*** 0.109*** 0.003 0.200* -0.069 
  (0.010) (0.026) (0.005) (0.102) (0.176) 
College -0.400 -0.424 -0.230 -1.039 12.117* 
  (0.387) (1.079) (0.187) (4.047) (7.116) 
1992 3.232 -5.912 -0.260 42.265 94.538 
  (9.460) (25.212) (4.456) (97.932) (173.648) 
1994 -6.965 -13.194 -5.740* 24.435 61.043 
  (6.847) (18.680) (3.250) (72.362) (126.003) 
1995 -13.693 -36.596 -6.420 -44.976 127.058 
  (12.610) (33.159) (5.844) (127.217) (226.425) 
1996 -17.647* -33.485 -6.984 103.225 -0.694 
  (9.371) (25.087) (4.453) (101.499) (172.529) 
1997 -10.903 -43.731 0.730 -6.545 90.907 
  (13.116) (35.577) (6.225) (141.726) (241.994) 
1998 -7.190 -17.442 -3.497 47.456 87.145 
  (5.953) (16.057) (2.727) (62.294) (108.274) 
1999 -18.425* -25.371 -2.778 211.619** -1.077 
  (9.244) (24.828) (4.357) (97.546) (167.799) 
2000 -6.676 -21.600 -4.174 233.697*** 78.156 
  (6.657) (17.823) (3.068) (68.954) (119.930) 
Constant 24.557** 44.720 11.014* -91.097 -323.521 
  (11.089) (30.443) (5.461) (118.870) (218.374) 
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 
R2 0.44 0.42 0.26 0.54 0.19 
F Test 2.20 2.06 0.99 3.33 0.64 
Probability > F 0.02 0.03 0.48 0.00 0.82 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.2. Limitation and Disparity in Total Contributions  
  Number   Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Limitation 1.153 1.582 -0.420 -0.445 -0.155 -0.196 
  (1.664) (1.250) (2.168) (2.283) (0.187) (0.173) 
IPC   0.686***   0.521*  -0.009 
    (0.143)   (0.261)  (0.020) 
Partisan Strength   0.150   0.251  0.057** 
    (0.188)   (0.344)  (0.026) 
Government Status   -1.601   -5.959  0.489 
    (4.541)   (8.291)  (0.629) 
Income   -0.012   -0.015  -0.000 
    (0.013)   (0.023)  (0.002) 
College   -0.862*   -0.994  0.110 
    (0.461)   (0.842)  (0.064) 
1996 -1.275 -13.954 7.805 7.500 0.729 1.719 
  (15.314) (14.128) (19.947) (25.794) (1.724) (1.957) 
1997 -7.083 26.244* -2.300 33.547 0.576 -0.473 
  (14.762) (14.093) (19.227) (25.732) (1.662) (1.953) 
1998 2.208 15.687* 6.404 21.937 0.264 0.163 
  (9.055) (7.880) (11.793) (14.387) (1.019) (1.092) 
1999 63.420*** 56.715*** 70.939*** 70.432*** 0.358 2.105 
  (15.314) (12.062) (19.947) (22.022) (1.724) (1.671) 
2000 -5.905 14.516 -0.913 19.923 1.636 1.612 
  (9.841) (8.694) (12.818) (15.874) (1.108) (1.205) 
Constant 4.362 -4.460 4.585 1.861 1.281 -2.047 
  (8.219) (11.595) (10.705) (21.170) (0.925) (1.607) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.63 0.86 0.50 0.64 0.22 0.57 
F Test 5.70 8.68 3.34 2.41 0.96 0.75 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.48 0.71 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.3. Limitation and Total Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number    Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.204 0.155 -0.815* -0.355 -6.226** -6.518** 
  (0.514) (0.515) (0.457) (0.450) (2.875) (2.974) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.746 1.060** 0.255 0.667 -4.723 -5.142* 
  (0.514) (0.515) (0.457) (0.450) (2.874) (2.976) 
Limitation*BO 0.181 0.180* -0.076 -0.076 -2.152*** -2.150*** 
  (0.111) (0.108) (0.098) (0.094) (0.619) (0.623) 
Limitation*BC -0.001 -0.013 -0.183 -0.160 -1.104 -0.887 
  (0.157) (0.154) (0.140) (0.134) (0.879) (0.887) 
Limitation*BI 0.097 0.077 -0.030 -0.010 -1.002 -0.771 
  (0.159) (0.156) (0.141) (0.136) (0.889) (0.898) 
Party   -0.200  -0.161   0.253 
    (0.221)  (0.193)   (1.277) 
Partisan Strength   -0.013  -0.009   0.010 
    (0.014)  (0.012)   (0.082) 
IPC   -0.027***  -0.033***   0.039 
    (0.010)  (0.009)   (0.058) 
Government Status   0.171  0.169   0.355 
    (0.187)  (0.163)   (1.080) 
Income   -0.001  0.000   0.010** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.005) 
College   0.012  -0.010   -0.126 
    (0.030)  (0.026)   (0.171) 
1992 -0.338 -0.892 -0.093 -0.678 0.269 1.059 
  (0.757) (0.765) (0.672) (0.668) (4.231) (4.416) 
1994 0.648 0.200 0.308 -0.141 -7.247** -6.603* 
  (0.563) (0.582) (0.500) (0.508) (3.145) (3.359) 
1995 -0.329 -0.763 -0.629 -1.270 -6.229 -6.336 
  (0.972) (0.972) (0.863) (0.849) (5.432) (5.612) 
1996 0.104 0.437 -0.639 -0.325 -6.123 -7.382* 
  (0.760) (0.749) (0.674) (0.654) (4.246) (4.323) 
1997 -1.857* -2.491** -1.080 -2.170** 1.064 0.064 
  (0.978) (1.036) (0.868) (0.905) (5.467) (5.983) 
1998 -0.245 -0.323 -0.178 -0.473 -2.865 -4.042 
  (0.446) (0.464) (0.396) (0.405) (2.491) (2.679) 
1999 -1.172 -1.119 -0.954 -1.103* -2.390 -3.648 
  (0.745) (0.734) (0.661) (0.641) (4.161) (4.239) 
2000 0.448 0.042 0.565 -0.045 -1.986 -2.057 
  (0.489) (0.513) (0.434) (0.448) (2.731) (2.959) 
Constant -2.404*** -1.402 0.013 1.378 16.524*** 17.712*** 
  (0.429) (1.091) (0.381) (0.953) (2.400) (6.298) 
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Table 6.3. (continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.25 0.29 
F Test 2.47 2.50 3.74 3.71 2.56 2.09 
Probability > F  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
  0.905   1.069**   1.377 BI - BC 
    (0.562)  (0.513)   (3.242) 
  0.090  0.153   0.116 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC    (0.211)   (0.193)   (1.219) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.5. Limitation and Disparity in Particularistic Contributions  
  Number   Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Limitation -5.812 -8.772* -22.123 -30.111* -0.802 -0.921 
  (6.078) (4.738) (16.884) (14.310) (0.534) (0.647) 
IPC   0.588*   1.260  0.010 
    (0.288)   (0.870)  (0.039) 
Partisan Strength   1.416***   3.968***  0.030 
    (0.406)   (1.228)  (0.056) 
Government Status   9.927   20.894  -0.538 
    (8.887)   (26.840)  (1.214) 
Income   -0.031   -0.083  -0.001 
    (0.025)   (0.074)  (0.003) 
College   0.321   0.095  -0.068 
    (0.993)   (2.999)  (0.136) 
1996 13.421 24.971 48.479 97.585 1.708 2.956 
  (29.274) (28.070) (81.324) (84.770) (2.573) (3.834) 
1997 -0.469 25.710 17.668 90.545 1.195 3.211 
  (27.316) (28.589) (75.884) (86.340) (2.401) (3.905) 
1998 3.780 25.017 27.598 88.111 1.542 2.647 
  (17.404) (16.658) (48.348) (50.306) (1.529) (2.275) 
1999 4.707 38.987 38.910 138.264* 0.609 1.455 
  (29.274) (24.400) (81.324) (73.687) (2.573) (3.333) 
2000 20.374 44.876** 73.417 138.376** 1.018 2.063 
  (18.831) (17.544) (52.313) (52.983) (1.655) (2.396) 
Constant 6.917 -53.520** 5.336 -134.381* 0.994 1.381 
  (15.376) (23.088) (42.714) (69.725) (1.351) (3.154) 
Observations 26 26 26 26 26 26 
R2 0.17 0.67 0.20 0.62 0.15 0.18 
F Test 0.63 2.57 0.79 2.12 0.55 0.29 
Probability > F 0.71 0.05 0.59 0.09 0.76 0.98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.6. Limitation and Particularistic Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number    Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.906 -0.421 -1.609*** -1.045* -14.750** -12.953** 
  (0.615) (0.623) (0.611) (0.622) (5.990) (5.465) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.463 0.846 0.156 0.630 -10.065* -8.748 
  (0.619) (0.628) (0.616) (0.627) (6.035) (5.510) 
Limitation*BO -0.746*** -0.751*** -1.239*** -1.175*** -7.934*** -6.844*** 
  (0.283) (0.279) (0.282) (0.279) (2.763) (2.449) 
Limitation*BC -0.785** -0.717* -0.937** -0.785** -1.354 0.277 
  (0.374) (0.369) (0.372) (0.369) (3.644) (3.243) 
Limitation*BI -0.875** -0.773** -1.182*** -0.982*** -3.944 -1.882 
  (0.374) (0.370) (0.372) (0.369) (3.644) (3.244) 
Party   -0.062   0.050  4.281* 
    (0.289)   (0.289)  (2.539) 
Partisan Strength   0.003   0.008  0.057 
    (0.018)   (0.018)  (0.162) 
IPC   -0.040***   -0.040***  0.081 
    (0.013)   (0.013)  (0.117) 
Government Status   0.261   0.230  0.658 
    (0.245)   (0.244)  (2.149) 
Income   -0.001   0.001  0.050*** 
    (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.009) 
College   0.011   -0.038  -0.582* 
    (0.039)   (0.039)  (0.344) 
1992 -0.227 -0.831 0.471 -0.065 6.160 7.432 
  (0.987) (1.007) (0.981) (1.006) (9.622) (8.844) 
1994 0.798 0.386 0.589 0.257 -6.829 -4.889 
  (0.732) (0.764) (0.728) (0.763) (7.134) (6.703) 
1995 -4.613*** -5.211*** -4.379*** -5.276*** -8.320 -11.984 
  (1.302) (1.319) (1.294) (1.318) (12.692) (11.582) 
1996 -0.245 0.203 -0.983 -0.670 -6.963 -12.228 
  (0.978) (0.966) (0.972) (0.965) (9.530) (8.482) 
1997 -0.288 -1.444 -0.248 -1.613 0.140 -8.309 
  (1.255) (1.341) (1.248) (1.339) (12.234) (11.768) 
1998 -0.408 -0.632 -0.205 -0.656 5.571 -1.841 
  (0.577) (0.612) (0.574) (0.611) (5.626) (5.369) 
1999 -2.437** -2.491** -2.632*** -3.001*** -10.198 -16.273* 
  (0.971) (0.964) (0.965) (0.963) (9.460) (8.465) 
2000 -0.579 -1.271* -0.644 -1.453** -1.238 -4.132 
  (0.638) (0.680) (0.635) (0.679) (6.222) (5.971) 
Constant -3.696*** -3.250** -0.788 0.351 24.187*** 28.589** 
  (0.557) (1.439) (0.554) (1.437) (5.433) (12.633) 
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Table 6.6. (Continued)  
 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.39 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.18 0.41 
F Test 5.05 4.31 7.47 5.96 1.76 3.54 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
  1.268*   1.675**  4.204 BI - BC 
    (0.664)   (0.663)  (5.830) 
  -0.056   -0.198  -2.160 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC    (0.502)   (0.502)   (4.411) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.8. Limitation and Disparity in Universalistic Contributions  
  Number   Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Limitation 2.477 4.160 1.571 2.452 -0.180 -0.191 
  (3.305) (2.378) (3.978) (4.081) (0.364) (0.337) 
IPC   0.771***  0.558**   -0.010 
    (0.150)  (0.258)   (0.021) 
Partisan Strength   0.155  0.241   0.065** 
    (0.195)  (0.336)   (0.028) 
Government Status   -1.210  -5.510   0.546 
    (4.717)  (8.097)   (0.668) 
Income   -0.013  -0.009   0.000 
    (0.013)  (0.022)   (0.002) 
College   -0.852*  -1.107   0.096 
    (0.478)  (0.820)   (0.068) 
1996 0.298 -15.799 3.776 0.562 0.297 1.286 
  (16.075) (14.412) (19.350) (24.738) (1.769) (2.041) 
1997 -6.601 27.780* -5.876 28.649 0.298 -0.892 
  (16.075) (14.677) (19.350) (25.193) (1.769) (2.078) 
1998 4.458 18.499** 5.104 20.033 -0.056 -0.173 
  (9.547) (8.010) (11.492) (13.749) (1.050) (1.134) 
1999 65.005*** 56.376*** 66.869*** 63.615*** -0.082 1.662 
  (16.075) (12.184) (19.350) (20.914) (1.769) (1.725) 
2000 -4.438 17.379* -3.258 17.450 1.327 1.303 
  (10.430) (8.866) (12.555) (15.217) (1.147) (1.255) 
Constant 2.432 -10.206 3.834 1.946 1.463 -1.776 
  (8.982) (12.199) (10.812) (20.939) (0.988) (1.727) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.60 0.86 0.50 0.66 0.19 0.54 
F Test 4.95 8.59 3.39 2.61 0.80 1.11 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.58 0.38 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6.9. Limitation and Universalistic Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number    Amount    Amount/Number 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.419 -0.006 -0.842* -0.307 -4.087* -4.149 
  (0.534) (0.543) (0.465) (0.460) (2.371) (2.501) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.591 0.954* 0.137 0.619 -2.698 -2.895 
  (0.536) (0.544) (0.466) (0.461) (2.380) (2.507) 
Limitation*BO 0.293 0.302 -0.016 -0.035 -2.508*** -2.638*** 
  (0.214) (0.210) (0.186) (0.178) (0.949) (0.968) 
Limitation*BC 0.154 0.072 -0.171 -0.218 -1.741 -1.474 
  (0.303) (0.297) (0.264) (0.252) (1.345) (1.368) 
Limitation*BI 0.283 0.190 0.157 0.109 -1.467 -1.133 
  (0.316) (0.310) (0.275) (0.263) (1.403) (1.428) 
Party   -0.224  -0.234   -0.620 
    (0.234)  (0.198)   (1.078) 
Partisan Strength   -0.011  -0.008   0.038 
    (0.015)  (0.013)   (0.069) 
IPC   -0.026**  -0.034***   0.006 
    (0.011)  (0.009)   (0.049) 
Government Status   0.153  0.145   0.180 
    (0.198)  (0.168)   (0.912) 
Income   -0.001  -0.000   0.007* 
    (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.004) 
College   0.016  -0.007   -0.103 
    (0.031)  (0.026)   (0.143) 
1992 -0.009 -0.527 0.212 -0.344 1.341 2.108 
  (0.788) (0.799) (0.685) (0.677) (3.498) (3.682) 
1994 0.934 0.528 0.568 0.142 -5.324** -4.624 
  (0.590) (0.612) (0.513) (0.518) (2.618) (2.819) 
1995 0.349 -0.027 -0.065 -0.667 -5.735 -5.935 
  (1.003) (1.004) (0.872) (0.851) (4.450) (4.625) 
1996 0.422 0.787 -0.228 0.203 -4.059 -4.298 
  (0.800) (0.795) (0.696) (0.673) (3.549) (3.661) 
1997 -1.902* -2.400** -0.917 -1.878** 3.337 2.234 
  (1.043) (1.103) (0.907) (0.934) (4.629) (5.078) 
1998 0.119 0.082 0.200 -0.018 -1.729 -2.369 
  (0.465) (0.482) (0.404) (0.408) (2.064) (2.220) 
1999 -0.857 -0.735 -0.406 -0.459 0.875 0.057 
  (0.775) (0.765) (0.674) (0.648) (3.437) (3.525) 
2000 0.865* 0.500 1.095** 0.522 -0.011 -0.274 
  (0.508) (0.533) (0.442) (0.451) (2.256) (2.454) 
Constant -2.832*** -2.057* -0.763* 0.540 12.082*** 12.599** 
  (0.446) (1.149) (0.388) (0.973) (1.981) (5.292) 
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Table 6.9. (Continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.23 0.32 0.30 0.41 0.22 0.25 
F Test 2.40 2.36 3.35 3.49 2.16 1.67 
Probability > F 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 
  0.960  0.927*   1.254 BI – BC 
    (0.588)  (0.498)   (2.706) 
  0.118  0.326   0.341 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC    (0.416)   (0.352)   (1.915) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 7.2. Limitation and Corporate Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.463 -0.915 -9.470* 
  (0.685) (0.728) (5.333) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.913 0.720 -5.470 
  (0.690) (0.734) (5.377) 
Limitation*BO -0.884*** -1.301*** -4.756** 
  (0.307) (0.326) (2.390) 
Limitation*BC -0.829** -1.028** 2.265 
  (0.406) (0.432) (3.165) 
Limitation*BI -0.854** -1.059** -1.222 
  (0.406) (0.432) (3.166) 
Party -0.448 -0.477 1.648 
  (0.318) (0.338) (2.478) 
Partisan Strength -0.004 -0.002 0.035 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.158) 
IPC -0.041*** -0.040** 0.080 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.114) 
Government Status 0.344 0.338 0.199 
  (0.269) (0.286) (2.097) 
Income -0.001 0.001 0.038*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) 
College 0.009 -0.038 -0.645* 
  (0.043) (0.046) (0.335) 
1992 -0.928 -0.290 4.763 
  (1.108) (1.178) (8.630) 
1994 0.269 0.182 -4.351 
  (0.840) (0.893) (6.541) 
1995 -5.191*** -6.389*** -12.962 
  (1.451) (1.543) (11.303) 
1996 -0.012 -0.731 -12.654 
  (1.062) (1.130) (8.277) 
1997 -1.463 -1.533 -7.353 
  (1.474) (1.567) (11.484) 
1998 -0.788 -0.791 -2.699 
  (0.673) (0.715) (5.239) 
1999 -2.512** -3.539*** -16.513** 
  (1.060) (1.127) (8.261) 
2000 -1.359* -1.559* -5.213 
  (0.748) (0.795) (5.827) 
Constant -2.725* 0.922 29.668** 
  (1.582) (1.682) (12.328) 
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Table 7.2. (Continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.45 0.53 0.30 
F Test 4.17 5.66 2.20 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.01 
1.375* 1.635* 4.000 BI - BC 
  (0.730) (0.777) (5.690) 
-0.024 -0.031 -3.488 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC  (0.552) (0.587) (4.304) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7.4. Limitation and Labor Union Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.688 -1.067 -13.335 
  (0.639) (0.812) (13.408) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.987 1.596* 18.884 
  (0.643) (0.817) (13.490) 
Limitation*BO -0.118 -0.576 -14.275** 
  (0.327) (0.416) (6.872) 
Limitation*BC 0.280 0.189 -2.593 
  (0.440) (0.559) (9.233) 
Limitation*BI 0.113 -0.490 -22.047** 
  (0.441) (0.561) (9.264) 
Party 2.957*** 3.562*** 14.552** 
  (0.302) (0.383) (6.329) 
Partisan Strength -0.018 -0.015 0.421 
  (0.019) (0.025) (0.406) 
IPC -0.031** -0.042** -0.238 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.288) 
Government Status 0.086 0.174 -1.158 
  (0.255) (0.324) (5.349) 
Income 0.000 0.002 0.072*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.023) 
College 0.029 -0.014 -0.682 
  (0.042) (0.053) (0.882) 
1992 -1.370 -1.219 5.255 
  (1.026) (1.304) (21.526) 
1994 -0.522 -0.886 -0.421 
  (0.797) (1.014) (16.732) 
1995 -4.075*** -5.164*** -17.035 
  (1.315) (1.672) (27.600) 
1996 -0.037 -0.843 -5.528 
  (0.988) (1.256) (20.726) 
1997 -1.884 -2.414 -18.722 
  (1.394) (1.773) (29.260) 
1998 -1.227* -1.433* 3.623 
  (0.634) (0.807) (13.312) 
1999 -2.658*** -3.360*** -13.733 
  (0.982) (1.249) (20.605) 
2000 -1.599** -2.155** -9.156 
  (0.699) (0.888) (14.661) 
Constant -8.027*** -4.528** 14.701 
  (1.531) (1.946) (32.121) 
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Table 7.4. (Continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.58 0.56 0.29 
F Test 6.87 6.52 2.03 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.01 
1.675** 2.663*** 32.219** BI - BC 
  (0.685) (0.871) (14.377) 
-0.167 -0.679 -19.454 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC  (0.597) (0.760) (12.526) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7.6. Limitation and Individual Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.384 -0.637* -1.894 
  (0.415) (0.370) (1.444) 
Being Incumbent (BI) 0.777* 0.872** -0.679 
  (0.423) (0.377) (1.472) 
Limitation*BO 0.045 0.009 -0.265* 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.135) 
Limitation*BC 0.043 0.009 -0.110 
  (0.056) (0.050) (0.196) 
Limitation*BI 0.050 0.063 0.068 
  (0.057) (0.051) (0.199) 
Party -0.206 -0.187 0.117 
  (0.239) (0.213) (0.832) 
Partisan Strength -0.013 -0.010 -0.004 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.053) 
IPC -0.026** -0.035*** 0.005 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.038) 
Government Status 0.159 0.164 0.071 
  (0.202) (0.180) (0.703) 
Income -0.001 -0.000 0.005* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
College 0.011 -0.022 -0.167 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.113) 
1992 -0.455 -0.283 0.787 
  (0.821) (0.732) (2.858) 
1994 0.635 0.211 -5.357** 
  (0.623) (0.556) (2.168) 
1995 -0.104 -0.585 -5.141 
  (1.045) (0.932) (3.639) 
1996 1.008 0.130 -5.989** 
  (0.789) (0.704) (2.747) 
1997 -2.208** -1.704* 1.712 
  (1.102) (0.983) (3.835) 
1998 0.269 0.070 -3.254* 
  (0.481) (0.429) (1.673) 
1999 -0.625 -0.527 -2.269 
  (0.774) (0.691) (2.696) 
2000 0.682 0.273 -3.709* 
  (0.538) (0.480) (1.874) 
Constant -1.499 0.763 11.934*** 
  (1.218) (1.087) (4.241) 
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Table 7.6. (Continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.32 0.36 0.26 
F Test 2.41 2.87 1.78 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.04 
1.161*** 1.509*** 1.215 BI - BC 
  (0.390) (0.348) (1.359) 
0.007 0.054 0.179 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC  (0.078) (0.070) (0.273) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7.8. Limitation and Party Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.045 0.226 -22.478 
  (0.479) (0.827) (64.069) 
Being Incumbent (BI) -0.446 -0.498 66.739 
  (0.507) (0.874) (67.749) 
Limitation*BO -0.007 -0.190*** -10.221** 
  (0.037) (0.064) (4.947) 
Limitation*BC -0.017 -0.060 -1.924 
  (0.049) (0.085) (6.555) 
Limitation*BI -0.088* -0.237*** 0.159 
  (0.052) (0.089) (6.920) 
Party -0.160 -0.258 -38.191 
  (0.233) (0.402) (31.153) 
Partisan Strength -0.014 -0.011 3.027 
  (0.015) (0.026) (1.990) 
IPC -0.018* -0.044** -0.320 
  (0.011) (0.018) (1.416) 
Government Status 0.083 -0.131 -36.039 
  (0.197) (0.340) (26.374) 
Income -0.000 0.002 0.215* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.111) 
College -0.031 -0.047 2.815 
  (0.031) (0.054) (4.178) 
1992 -0.566 -0.991 40.057 
  (0.787) (1.357) (105.217) 
1994 -0.618 -1.167 22.121 
  (0.610) (1.052) (81.530) 
1995 -2.893*** -5.978*** -70.183 
  (1.000) (1.724) (133.668) 
1996 0.685 1.212 57.153 
  (0.793) (1.368) (106.006) 
1997 -2.023* -2.797 -54.653 
  (1.115) (1.924) (149.109) 
1998 -0.847* -0.976 22.435 
  (0.488) (0.841) (65.206) 
1999 -1.486* -1.284 150.840 
  (0.763) (1.316) (101.986) 
2000 -0.305 0.810 244.383*** 
  (0.535) (0.923) (71.541) 
Constant -4.750*** -1.867 -206.003 
  (1.182) (2.038) (157.972) 
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Table 7.8. (Continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.23 0.37 0.36 
F Test 1.51 2.97 2.81 
Probability > F 0.10 0.00 0.00 
-0.401 -0.724 89.217 BI - BC 
  (0.526) (0.907) (70.332) 
-0.072 -0.177 2.083 Limitation*BI – 
Limitation*BC (0.068) (0.117) (9.057) 
Note that BO indicates an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7.10. Limitation and Ideological PAC Contributions: Candidate Level 
  Number  Amount  Amount/Number 
Being Challenger (BC) -0.377 -0.101 -38.297 
  (0.506) (0.709) (59.716) 
Being Incumbent (BI) -0.079 0.456 -30.932 
  (0.521) (0.730) (61.445) 
Limitation*BO -0.029 -0.085 -3.222 
  (0.049) (0.069) (5.791) 
Limitation*BC -0.084 -0.182** -26.605*** 
  (0.065) (0.091) (7.663) 
Limitation*BI -0.007 -0.044 -3.749 
  (0.066) (0.093) (7.816) 
Party 0.078 -0.070 -29.961 
  (0.293) (0.411) (34.571) 
Partisan Strength 0.001 -0.008 -1.642 
  (0.019) (0.026) (2.206) 
IPC -0.017 -0.025 1.962 
  (0.013) (0.019) (1.571) 
Government Status -0.056 0.204 12.165 
  (0.248) (0.347) (29.241) 
Income -0.001 0.001 -0.083 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) 
College 0.039 0.030 7.909* 
  (0.040) (0.056) (4.710) 
1992 -0.309 0.447 74.800 
  (1.023) (1.433) (120.684) 
1994 -0.356 0.238 59.222 
  (0.775) (1.086) (91.421) 
1995 -3.233** -3.568* 112.583 
  (1.298) (1.820) (153.212) 
1996 -0.326 -1.092 30.303 
  (0.982) (1.376) (115.839) 
1997 -2.219 -2.578 102.146 
  (1.378) (1.931) (162.582) 
1998 -1.388** -1.365 85.670 
  (0.616) (0.863) (72.638) 
1999 -2.911*** -3.521** 75.899 
  (0.970) (1.360) (114.460) 
2000 -1.589** -1.751* 75.610 
  (0.679) (0.952) (80.169) 
Constant -9.120*** -6.691*** -178.870 
  (1.514) (2.123) (178.722) 
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Table 7.10. (Continued) 
 
Observations 116 116 116 
R2 0.27 0.24 0.16 
F Test 1.83 1.58 0.99 
Probability > F 0.03 0.08 0.48 
0.298 0.558 7.365 BI - BC 
  (0.501) (0.702) (59.123) 
0.077 0.137 22.856** Limitation*BI –  
Limitation*BC  (0.089) (0.125) (10.483) 
Note that BO is being an open seat candidate.   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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